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INTRODUCTION
For the last twenty years, public interest litigation has been the
preeminent tool of social reform in a wide variety of contexts.
Building on the test case approach to law reform developed in
Brown v. Board of Education,' lawyers have attempted to use
litigation to achieve far-reaching changes in the distribution of
2
public resources and the quality of life in public institutions.
Nowhere has this been more true than in the field of correctional
reform. Since the late sixties, hundreds of suits have been brought
and won by lawyers on behalf of inmates challenging the conditions
and practices in our nation's prisons, jails, and juvenile correctional
institutions. Many of these cases have resulted in court orders or
consent decrees requiring substantial remedial actions.
Courts continue to serve as reluctant but active participants in
the task of policing and reforming our nation's correctional
institutions. As of January 1993, forty states plus the District of
Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands were under court
order to reduce overcrowding and/or eliminate unconstitutional
conditions of confinement.' Twenty-five percent of all jails in the
1347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2 Observers of public interest lawyering frequently trace the origins of the law

reform strategy to Brown. See, e.g., Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court 1987 Term,
Foreword: The Forms ofJustice, 93 HARv. L. REv. 1, 2 (1979) ("[S]tructural reform has
its roots in the Warren Court era and the extraordinary effort to translate the rule

of Brown v. Board of Education into practice." (footnote omitted)); Jack Greenberg,
Litigationfor Social Change: Methods, Limits and Role in Democracy, 29 REC. ASS'N B.
CITY N.Y. 321, 331 (1974) ("Brown and the cases preceding it are sometimes looked
upon as a paradigm of law making in the courts and probably they have been the
principle inspiration to others who seek change through litigation."); Robert L. Rabin,
Lawyersfor Social Change: Perspectiveson PublicInterestLaw, 28 STAN. L. REv. 207, 253

(1976) ("Brown teaches us that, despite its vulnerability to various administrative
avoidance responses, the 'big case' may have major law reform implications because
of its educational value.").

3See EDNA MCCONNELL CLARK FOUND., AMERICANS BEHIND BARS 4 (1992)
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United States were under court order to reduce crowding in 1990,
and thirty percent were under court order to improve conditions of
confinement.4 In 1989, seven percent of the nation's 422 facilities
detaining ten percent of all incarcerated youngsters were operating
under consent decrees.5
Today, advocates, scholars, and financial supporters of public
interest litigation are struggling to define the proper role of
litigation in future efforts to achieve social reform.6 A major
impetus for this reassessment is the growing conservatism of the
federal courts, which have become increasingly reluctant to
intervene to protect civil rights from government incursion.7 The
shift in national politics to a Democratic administration has also
prompted renewed interest in legislative and administrative
8
advocacy.
This change in judicial and political climate provides a natural
point of reflection on the three decades of experience that now
inform the evaluation of judicial efficacy. Judges, advocates, and
scholars have learned much about the potential and limits of courtordered reform.9

Strategies and expectations have evolved, and

[hereinafter AMERICANS BEHIND BARS].
4
See id. at 3; see also BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
BULLETIN: JAIL INMATES 1991, at 4 (1992) [hereinafter JAIL INMATES 1991].
' See ANNIE E. CASEY FOUND., FRAMEWORK PAPER ON JUVENILE DETENTION 5
(1992) [hereinafter CASEY FRAMEWORK PAPER].
6 See, e.g., GERALD P. LOPEZ, REBELLIOUS LAwYERING: ONE CHICANO'S VISION OF
PROGRESSIVE LAW PRACTICE 261-73 (1992) (describing a fictional activist lawyer's

critique of § 1983 litigation); DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL
STUDY 293-391 (1988) (arguing for an ethical theory of political advocacy); Mayer N.
Zald, Foreword to JOEL F. HANDLER, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM: A
THEORY OF LAW REFORM AND SOCIAL CHANGE ix (1978) (confronting the question
"Can the legal system be used to change society"?); Patricia M. Wald, Ten Admonitions
for Legal Services Advocates Contemplating FederalLitigation, 27 CLEARINGHOUSE REV.
11, 13 (1993) (urging lawyers to "be realistic" and to "[I]earn to be a good negotiator
[and] a creative settler [because I]itigation should be only a part of a broader
strategy").
" See infra notes 273-94 and accompanying text (discussing how courts have
narrowed the scope of judicial intervention in First Amendment and due process
cases).
8 See Wald, supra note 6, at 14 (advising public interest lawyers to "forge
responsible relationships with new policymakers at every level" and arguing that the
new administration "deserves a real try").
' See Susan P. Sturm, A Normative Theoty of PublicLaw Remedies, 79 GEO. L.J. 1355,
1365-76 (1991) (describing efforts of courts and parties to improve the remedial
process); Wald, supra note 6, at 12-13 (summarizing the evolution of poverty law
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this evolution itself invites a critical perspective on the endeavor.
Experienced litigators demonstrate a keen awareness of the
10
difficulty and importance of the remedy in public law litigation.
Participants on both sides of the aisle express dissatisfaction with
the adversary process as a means of resolving public law disputes,
and have begun to experiment with alternative approaches that
reconceptualize legal advocacy to link formal adjudication, informal
negotiation, and public education."
In addition, some scholars and activists have questioned the
12
effectiveness of judicial intervention as a means of social change.
Some argue that the focus on litigation has discouraged the
development of other potentially more effective forms of public
1
interest advocacy such as lobbying and organizing. 3
Finally, public interest litigation continues to lack reliable
sources of funding and professional commitment, both of which are
crucial to its survival. Private foundations, whose support for
nonprofit public interest law firms has been crucial to the development of the public interest law, have substantially reduced their
support.' 4 Government funding for and involvement in public
advocacy and calling on poverty lawyers to "meditate on and perhaps recast" their
role).
o See, e.g., Interview with Stephen Bright, Executive Director, Southern Center for
Human Rights, in Atlanta, Ga. 2 (Aug. 11, 1991) [hereinafter Bright Interview]
(transcript on file with author) (noting that it is "worthless to get a decree if you don't
enforce it"); Interview with Alvin Bronstein, Executive Director, National Prison
Project of the ACLU, in Washington, D.C. 3 (Aug. 15, 1991) [hereinafter Bronstein
Interview] (transcript on file with author) (stating that remedy is the single most
important area needing National Prison Project attention).
1 See generally Sturm, supra note 9, at 1365-76 (discussing methods of remedies
formulation that deviate substantially from the formal adjudicatory model).
12
See, e.g., DONALD L. HoRowrrz, THE COURTS AND SOcIAL POLICY (1977);
Samuel J. Brakel, Prison Reform Litigation: Has the Revolution Gone Too Far?,
CORRECTIONS TODAY, Aug. 1987, at 160, 164.
1
3 See LOPEZ, supranote 6, at 2-3,261-73 (commenting on useful methods beyond
traditional legal avenues such as grassroots mobilization); GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE
HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 339 (1991) (noting that
limited resources may be "more effectively employed in other strategies"); GIRARDEAu
A. SPANN, RACE AGAINST THE COURT: THE SUPREME COURT AND MINORITIES IN
CONTEMPORARY AMERICA 85 (1993) ("[M]inorities could ... choose to forego a
reliance on judicial review ... and concentrate their efforts to advance minority
interests in overtly political branches of governments.").
4 The Edna McConnell Clark Foundation, which sponsored the study leading to
this Article, decided to discontinue general support for corrections litigation,
notwithstanding their recognition of its continued significance. Similarly, the Ford
Foundation dramatically scaled down its general support for public interest litigation.
See NAN ARON, LIBERTY AND JUSTICE FOR ALL: PUBLIC INTEREST LAW IN THE 1980s
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interest advocacy has been cut. 5 Legal services programs continue

to suffer from underfunding.' 6 Recent Supreme Court decisions
have cut back dramatically on the availability of attorney and expert
fees. 7 The future of public interest litigation must also be considered in light of these resource constraints.
This Article attempts to provide a framework for assessing the
legacy and future of public interest advocacy in one particular areacorrections. It documents a shift from a test case to an implementation model of advocacy, and urges the development of effective
remedial strategies as a method of linking litigation to a broader
strategy of correctional advocacy.
I have chosen to focus on this particular institutional context for
several reasons. On a pragmatic level, the Edna McConnell Clark

AND BEYOND 52-53 (1989) (stating that the average public interest group experienced
a 36% decline between 1979 and 1983, due in part to growth in the number of
organizations and to foundations' dislike of advocacy, particularly litigation).
15
See id. at 53 (documenting substantial decline in government funding for public
interest advocacy); Howard B. Eisenberg, RethinkingPrisonerCivilRights Cases andthe
Provisionof Counsel, 17 S. ILL. U. L.J. 417, 462 (1993) (documenting the elimination
of federal funding through the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration
("LEAA")); Interview with Mark Soler, Executive Director, Youth Law Center, in
Philadelphia, Pa. 3 (June 17, 1992) [hereinafter Soler Interview] (transcript on file
with author) (stating that the Reagan administration cut funding to the Office of
Juvenile Justice); Telephone Interview with Nancy Feldman, Director, Office of
Inmate Advocacy, New Jersey Office of the Public Advocate 1 (July 15, 1992)
(transcript on file with author) (reporting decision to phase out office of inmate
advocacy and that other sections of the office are already dosed). This may change
under the Clinton administration.
16 See ARON, supra note 14, at 65 ("The decline in funding for legal services in
recent years has been dramatic."); MARK KESSLER, LEGAL SERVICES FOR THE POOR:
A COMPARATIVE AND CONTEMPORARY ANALYSIS OF INTERORGANIZATIONAL POLITICS
50 (1987) (providing that as a result of high volume caseload and certain policies,
lawyers have little time to devote to any particular case); PENNSYLVANIA BAR ASS'N,
REPORT OF THE PENNSYLVANIA BAR ASSOCIATION TASK FORCE FOR LEGAL SERVICES
TO THE NEEDY 1 (1990) (stating that since 1979, state and federal funding for legal
services to the poor has been severely reduced). Recent declining interest rates have
reduced the availability of funding from IOLTA (Interest on Lawyers' Trust Accounts)
Programs. See Barbara C. Clark, InterestRate DeclineJeopardizesStable IOLTA Funding,
14 NAT'L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS'N CORNERSTONE, Fall 1992, at 2, 2 (stating that
as a result of declining interest rates, 60% of IOLTA programs participating in the
survey face income declines, resulting in cuts of up to 42% in funding for legal
services).
"7See, e.g., West Virginia Univ. Hosp. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 102 (1991) (limiting
recovery of expert fees to travel expenses and a witness fee of $30 per day for
depositions and court appearances); Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 897-99 (1984)
(holding that enhancements for quality work should rarely be made and only where
there is specific evidence of extraordinary quality); Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S.
424, 436-40 (1983) (limiting plaintiffs' recovery for unsuccessful claims, even if
plaintiff partially prevails).
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Foundation, which for the last twenty years has been the primary
source of funding for corrections litigation by private, nonprofit
organizations, asked me to study the future of corrections litigation
and the potential role of various organizations involved in corrections litigation to better inform the Foundation's decisions concerning its involvement in corrections litigation.
On a policy level, the area of corrections presents one of the
most important policy issues facing our state and local governments.
In many states it represents the single largest budget item, 18 and
the continued trend toward incarceration takes place at the expense
of education, social services, and rebuilding the infrastructure of
our cities. 9 The dramatic overrepresentation of people of color
in correctional institutions underscores the relationship of correctional policy to more basic social policies of the 1980s and the
importance of corrections in developing an effective strategy for
20
reversing the deterioration of urban communities.
On a more theoretical level, it is my view that the potential and
role of litigation varies in different organizational settings, and that
it is a mistake to ignore these organizational differences in assessing
and planning the future role of litigation. The legal standards
IsA recent report prepared by the Edna McConnell Clark Foundation documents
the soaring costs of corrections:
In 1992, the United States spent an estimated $25 billion on corrections,
including operations and construction. State and local governments have
picked up almost the entire cost, spending roughly 16 times as much on
prisons and jails as the federal government. Corrections spending is the
second fastest growing item in state budgets after Medicaid, and continues
to grow annually, although for the first time in many years, the rate of
growth is slowing somewhat.
AMERICANS BEHIND BARS, supra note 3, at 4.
19 See id. at 5 ("Building and operating prisons means diverting funds from health
care, job training, education, and from needed capital improvements on roads,
bridges, and water systems.").
2' As of January 1990, whites accounted for 48% of all prisoners under the
jurisdiction of state and federal correctional authorities. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, 1990 SOURCEBOOK OF CRBMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 609 (Kathleen
Maguire & TimothyJ. Flanagan eds., 1991). African-Americans accounted for 47%
of all state and federal inmates. See id. Hispanics accounted for 13% of the state
prison census in 1986. See id. at 614. A 1990 report by the Sentencing Project found
that on any given day in 1989 nearly one in four African-American men aged 20 to
29 was under the supervision of the criminal justice system-in prison or jail or on
probation or parole. In 1991, in Baltimore, Maryland, 56% of young black males
were under criminal justice system supervision. SeeJerome G. Miller, 56 Percent of
YoungBlack Males in Baltimore UnderJusticeSystem Control,OVERCROWDED TIMEs, Dec.
1992, at 1, 1 (1992).
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defining the scope ofjudicial reform activity are more favorable to
successful litigation in some contexts than others.2 1 The availability of plaintiffs willing to sue and lawyers willing to represent them
varies across subject areas.22 The demands of litigation and the
concomitant expertise and resources needed to handle advocacy
also differ among subject areas. 23 The organizational dynamics
contributing to the problems targeted by litigation and strategies for
altering them may differ. 24 Perhaps the most significant difference
involves the political context surrounding the institutions subject to
litigation and the potential for mobilizing other forms of effective
advocacy. Too often, scholars and advocates ignore th6se differences and offer overarching generalizations about litigation's impact
and potential. 25 It is my hope that this study's focus on public
21 See infra notes 275-302 and accompanying text (noting that courts have limited
First Amendment and programming issues more dramatically than Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement cases). The welfare context has suffered particularly
from unfavorable decisions upholding the constitutionality of inadequate benefit
levels and unfair practices. See e.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 326-27 (1980)
(upholding Hyde Amendment denying medicaid funding for medically necessary
abortions); Wyman v.James, 400 U.S. 309, 318 (1979) (upholding mandatory home
visits for welfare recipients); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 487 (1970)
(upholding constitutionality of regulation imposing ceiling on grant amount based on
family size as "rationally based and free from invidious discrimination").
' Even within the corrections area, there are wide differences in the availability
of plaintiffs. Male prisoners are extremely willing to use the courts to express their
dissatisfaction with prison conditions. See Ellen M. BarryJail Litigation Concerning
Women Prisoners,71 PRISONJ. 44,44 (1991). In contrast,juveniles and female inmates
have complained relatively infrequently. See id.; Interview with Ruth Ann DeWolf,
Legal Director, Correctional Law Project, Chicago Legal Assistance Foundation, in
Chicago, 111. 11 (Aug. 12, 1991) (transcript on file with author) (stating thatjuveniles
are less likely to write to courts with a complaint); Soler Interview, supra note 15, at
7 (noting that occasionally ajuvenile will call). Also, prison litigators reported that,
despite interest in pursuingjuvenile and women's cases, they pursued conditions cases
in male institutions that they viewed as more likely to generate attorneys' fees. See
Interview with Robert Cullen, Senior Corrections Attorney, Georgia Legal Services,
in Atlanta Ga. 6 (Aug. 10, 1991) [hereinafter Cullen Interview] (transcript on file with
author).
" See Susan P. Sturm, Lawyers at the Prison Gates: OrganizationalStructure and
Corrections Advocacy, 27 MICH. J.L. REFORM (forthcoming 1994) (describing how
expertise of legal services lawyers in providing individual service to clients in benefits
and housing cases does not equip them to handle complex corrections litigation).
24See Susan P. Sturm, Resolving the Remedial Dilemma: Strategies of Judicial
Intervention in Prisons, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 805, 861-910 (1990) (identifying and
analyzing four judicial approaches (the roles of deferrer, director, broker, and
catalyst) in relation to their capacity to establish an internal normative framework,
create incentives to undertake change, foster the development of an informationgathering system, and empower change agents within the prison).
2 See e.g., HoRowrrz, supra note 12, at 33-56 (1977) (developing general
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interest advocacy in the corrections context will help identify
themes and variations in public interest advocacy and contribute to
the development of strategies of public interest advocacy that can
build on common experience and yet respond to the particular
demands of each institutional context.
Section I begins with an assessment of the legacy of the last
twenty years of corrections litigation, with an eye toward understanding the future of litigation as a means of improving conditions
in correctional institutions. An assessment of litigation's impact and
potential as a change agent is a necessary starting point for
developing a model of correctional advocacy for the future. If
litigation has not been successful in the past, one must ask whether
there is reason to devote substantial resources to it in the future.
It is also important to understand why and under what circumstances litigation has prompted improvements in correctional institutions.
Section II presents the current status of conditions in correctional institutions, drawing on recent assessments by courts and
investigators.
If litigation has been successful in promoting
significant reform, this success poses the question whether there is
a continuing role for litigation in addressing the problems facing
corrections.
Section III considers the question of whether plaintiffs can
prevail in corrections litigation in the current judicial environment.
The federal judiciary, which has been the primary bulwark of
prisoners' rights, has become increasingly reluctant to intervene to
protect civil rights from government intrusion. 6 If recent case law
signals a return to a "hands off" approach to corrections cases,
litigation threatens to become a frustrating and futile gesture.
Section IV identifies emerging trends in corrections advocacy,
most notably the shift from a test case to an implementation model.
It draws on the assessment of litigation's impact and potential and
characteristics of adjudication that ignore remedial process and fail to account for
procedural adaptations in particular contexts); ROSENBERG, supra note 13, at 336
(generalizing across contexts to conclude that the courts' dependence on political
support and their lack of implementation powers prevent them from producing
significant social reform in all organizational settings).
26 "Since the election of Ronald Reagan in 1980, the two Republican administrations have appointed nearly 67% of America's 749 federal judges, ending nearly
a half-century of liberalism that began with President Franklin D. Roosevelt." Jeanne
Cummings, Path of Justice Hangs on Election: Clinton Could Halt Courts' Tilt to
Conservatism,ATLANTA J. & CONST., Oct. 4, 1992, at A2.
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interviews with lawyers involved in corrections litigation over the
past decade to suggest the future direction of effective corrections
27
advocacy in the next decade.
I.

THE PARTIAL HOPE:

LITIGATION AS LIMITED BUT

CRUCIAL TO CORRECTIONAL REFORM

Evaluating the impact of litigation on correctional institutions
in particular and the corrections field in general is a tricky business.
Because litigation is never the only factor influencing a corrections
system, its impact is difficult to isolate. Moreover, litigation is an
interactive, dynamic process involving judicial officers, litigators,
and other public officials, which further complicates the task of
2
determining its impact. 1
There is a developing literature on the impact of litigation on
prisons and jails. 29 Much of this literature consists of case studies
assessing the impact of judicial intervention on a particular
institution or system. One of the earliest and most comprehensive
studies, 0 sponsored by the American Bar Association and conducted by M. Kay Harris and Dudley Spiller, examined the impact of
four cases on conditions in prisons and jails in Arkansas, Baltimore,
Maryland, and two parish prisons in Louisiana." The Arkansas
57

As part of this study, over 100 interviews were conducted with lawyers
specializing in corrections litigation, legal services lawyers, private practitioners,
clinical faculty who have handled corrections litigation, and special masters with
extensive corrections experience concerning their involvement in corrections
advocacy.
9"See Peter H. Schuck, PublicLaw Litigation andSocial Reform, 102 YALE L.J. 1763,
1771-72 (1993) (noting "the repetitive, dialogic nature of the interactions between
courts, legislatures, agencies, and other social processes, as well as the political
synergy that some litigation engenders").
' The literature on the impact of litigation on juvenile institutions is sparse. A
recent publication entitled STEPPING STONES: SUCCESSFUL ADVOCACY FOR CHILDREN
(Sheryl Dicker ed., 1990) [hereinafter STEPPING STONES], begins to fill this gap.
" At the time this study was undertaken, only one specific assessment of the postdecree stage of a corrections case had been published. More recently, academic
interest in the impact ofjudicial intervention on prisons and jails has burgeoned.
3t See M. KAY HARRIS & DUDLEY P. SPILLER, JR., AFTER DECISION: IMPLEMENTATION OF JUDICIAL DECREES IN CORRECTIONAL SETTINGS (1976). The ABA project
studied the following cases: Collins v. Schoonfield, 344 F. Supp. 257 (D. Md. 1972)
(considering issues including disciplinary due process, medical care, conditions in
solitary confinement, communications with those outside the Baltimore city jail);
Hamilton v. Schiro, 338 F. Supp. 1016 (E.D. La. 1970), subsequent proceedings
reported as Hamilton v. Landrieu, 351 F. Supp. 549 (E.D. La. 1972) (considering
issues including discipline, medical care, general conditions, recreation, rehabilitative
services, and overcrowding of Orleans Parish (New Orleans) Prison); Holland v.

1993]

CORRECTIONS LITIGATION

case is particularly infamous because of its extreme cruelty and
horror, vividly depicted by the United States Supreme Court in
Hutto v. Finney. 2

Two book-length case studies examine the Texas case, Ruiz v.
Estelle,"3 which challenged conditions in the state's entire correctional system. 4 Larry Yackle published a comprehensive examination of the progress and impact of litigation challenging the
conditions of confinement in Alabama's main prison.3 5 Both
Donelon, Civ. No. 71-1442 (E.D. La. May 16, 1972) (unreported decision) (considering
issues including discipline, medical care, general conditions, overcrowding, and racial
segregation of Jefferson Parish Prison); and Holt v. Sarver, 300 F. Supp. 825 (E.D.
Ark. 1969) (considering issues including inmate safety at the hands of trusty guards,
medical care, sanitary and general conditions, and overcrowding).
32 437 U.S. 678, 681 (1978) ("The routine conditions that the ordinary Arkansas
convict had to endure were characterized by the District Court as 'a dark and evil
world completely alien to the free world.'"). Arkansas's prison system represented the
harsh realities of a plantation system of penal organization premised on inmate labor,
management by inmate trusties, and financial self-sufficiency of the prison system.
A more recent doctoral dissertation updated the analysis of the court's impact on
Arkansas's prisons. See Mary L. Parker, Judicial Intervention in Correctional
Institutions: The Arkansas Odyssey (1986) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Sam
Houston State University).
s- 503 F. Supp. 1265 (S.D. Tex. 1980), aFid in part, 679 F.2d 1115 (5th Cir.),
modified, 688 F.2d 266 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1042 (1983).
34 See BEN M. CROUCH &JAMES W. MARQUART, AN APPEAL TOJUsTICE: LITIGATED
REFORM OF THE TEXAS PRISONS 117-238 (1989); STEVEN J. MARTIN & SHELDON
EKLAND-OLSON, TEXAS PRISONS: THE WALLS CAME TUMBLING DowN (1989). The
court found constitutional violations in the areas of population, security and inmate
supervision, health care, discipline, access to legal services, and sanitation and safety
conditions. See Ruiz, 503 F. Supp. at 1391. The most controversial aspect of the case
involved the state's reliance on inmates as guards. See id. at 1303-04. Prior to the
litigation, Texas prided itself on its national reputation as a neat, orderly, and secure
system tightly run by George Beto, a charismatic, prebureaucratic director who "made
it clear that officials would control the prison and that inmates would be utterly
subordinate." CROUCH & MARQUART, supra,at 39-43. The litigation exposed a brutal,
dangerous, and arbitrary regime of building tenders that was dismantled pursuant to
court order. See Ruiz, 503 F. Supp. at 1303-07, 1387-91. During the period
immediately following the court-ordered elimination of the building tender system,
inmate-on-inmate violence increased dramatically. See CROUCH & MARQUART, supra,
at 188-89. After a transition period of administrative and bureaucratic reform, order
reemerged, and studies suggest that the prison became a safer and more stable
environment than it was under the "old order." See id. at 216-20.
' 5 See LARRY W. YAGKLE, REFORM AND REGRET: THE STORY OF FEDERALJUDICIAL
INVOLVEMENT IN THE ALABAMA PRISON SYSTEM (1989). The Alabama case was the

first case litigated and won on the theory that the totality of conditions in a prison
constituted cruel and unusual punishment. See id. at 101. Judge Frank Johnson
issued a comprehensive and detailed order requiring changes in virtually every aspect
of prison life. See id. at 101-04. He appointed a Prison Implementation Committee
to monitor compliance with the decree. See id. at 103. After the Court of Appeals
found that the Human Rights Committee "impermissibly intrude[d] ... upon
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studies focused on cases involving celebrated, activist judges and
6
Southern prison systems.
Bradley Chilton recently published a book focusing on litigation's impact on conditions in the Georgia State Prison, 7 and John
Dilulio recently edited a collection of case studies concerning the
impact of judicial intervention on corrections institutions in
Texas, 8 Georgia, 9 New York City,40 and West Virginia. 4 Adfunctions properly belonging to the daily operation of the Alabama prison system,"
Newman v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 283,289 (5th Cir. 1977),JudgeJohnson appointed the
Governor of Alabama as receiver of the prisons. See YACKLE, supra, at 183. After
more than 10 years, the court found substantial compliance with its order and
relinquished jurisdiction. See id. at 250-51.
For an insightful review of the Texas and Alabama case studies, see generally
Malcolm M. Feeley & Edward Rubin, Prison Litigation and BureaucraticDevelopment,
17 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 125 (1992).
'Judge FrankJohnson presidedover the Alabama prison case.
Judge WilliamW.
Justice handled the Texas prison case. For a thorough discussion of the Southern
plantation model of corrections administration and its demise, see Malcolm M. Feeley,
The Significance of Prison Conditions Cases: Budgets and Regions, 23 L. & SOC'Y REV.
273, 7278-81 (1989).
3 See BRADLEY S. CHILTON, PRISONS UNDER THE GAVEL: THE FEDERAL COURT
TAKEOVER OF GEORGIA PRISONS (1991).
3 See COURTS, CORRECTIONS, AND THE CONSTITUTION: THE IMPACT OF JUDICIAL
INTERVENTION ON PRISONS AND JAILS (John J. Dilulio, Jr., ed., 1990) [hereinafter
COURTS, CORRECTIONS, AND THE CONSTITUTION]. The three articles concerning the

Texas prison litigation are condensed versions of book-length case studies of Ruiz,
which is described above.
31 See Bradley S.
Chilton & Suzette M. Talarico, Politics and Constitutional
Interpretationin Prison Reform Litigation: The Case of Guthrie v. Evans, in COURTS,
CORRECTIONS, AND THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 38, at 115, 115-37. This essay is
a condensed version of a Ph.D. dissertation on the Guthrieprison litigation, the focus
of which was conditions in the Georgia state prison, and serves as a brief overview of
a book subsequently published entitled Prisons Under the Gavel: The Federal Court
Takeover of Georgia Prisons. See supra note 37.
In GuthrieJudgeAnthony A. Alaimo "condemned as cruel and unusual punishment the segregation, overcrowding, poor medical care, miserable conditions, and
unfair treatment of black and white inmates." Chilton & Talarico, supra,at 117. The
Guthrie case emerges as one of the success stories of corrections litigation. "The preGuthrieprison with its overcrowded dormitory wings, segregated facilities, discriminatory proceedings, limited medial treatment, and poor sanitation systems gave way to
a prison accredited by the American Correctional Association and held out as a model
for the rest of the state." Id. at 122.
4 See Ted S. Storey, When Intervention Works: Judge MorrisE. Lasker and the New
York City Jails, in COURTS, CORRECTIONS, AND THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 38, at

138, 138. This case study examines the conditions in pre-trial detention facilities in
New York City. It focuses on the shifting positions of political administrations
regarding prison reform andjudicial intervention,Judge Lasker's style of encouraging
compromise and persistent nudging toward compliance, and the creation of the
Office of Contract Compliance, an independent monitoring unit created by the
parties.
41
See Bert Useem, Crain: Nonreformist PrisonReform, in COURTS, CORRECTIONS,
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ditional empirical articles focus on particular aspects of judicial
intervention, such as the role of special masters,4 2 the impact of
prison disciplinary procedures, 43 and the attitudes of correctional

officials concerning litigation.'

Other empirical studies focusing

on the dynamics of prisons and change also address the issue of
judicial impact. 5 Finally, a growing number of masters theses and
doctoral dissertations present case studies of judicial intervention
46
in correctional institutions.
These case studies cover a wide range of institutions and
geographical areas, and provide a basis for a general assessment of
the impact of litigation on prisons and jails.47 Although case

AND THE CoNsTrrTrION, supra note 38, at 223, 223. This essay describes the politics

surrounding the implementation of litigation challenging conditions in the West
Virginia penitentiary.
ISee Brakel, supra note 12, at 160, 164; Susan P. Sturm, Note, 'Mastering"
Intervention in Prisons,88 YALE L.J. 1062, 1068-72 (1979).
"See WalterJ. Dickey, The Promiseand Problems of Rulemaking in Corrections: The
Wisconsin Experience, 1983 WIS. L. REV. 285,306-21; Harvard Ctr. for CriminalJustice,
JudicialIntervention in Prison Discipline,63 J. CP.M. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SC.
200, 203 (1972).
"See Donald P. Baker et al.,JudicialIntervention in Corrections: The California
Experience-An Empirical Study, 20 UCLA L. REV. 452, 491-524 (1973).
4See, e.g., LEO CARROLL, HACKS, BLACKS, AND CONS: RACE RELATIONS IN A
MAXIMUM SECURITY PRISON 10, 43-45, 54-61, 198-99 (1974) (studying race relations
in the Rhode Island prison system); MARK COLVIN, THE PENITENTIARY IN CRISIS:
FROM ACCOMMODATION TO RIOT IN NEW MEXICO 5, 117-18 (1992) (examining the
charges and conflicts preceding the 1980 riot at the penitentiary of New Mexico);
JOHNJ. DIIuLIO,JR., GOVERNING PRISONS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF CORRECTIONAL
MANAGEMENT 173-74,212-16,246-50 (1987) (studyingTexas, Michigan, and California
prison systems);JAMES B.JACOBS, STATEVILLE: THE PENITENTIARY IN MASS SOCIETY
9, 102, 105-19, 135-36 (1977) (studying Stateville penitentiary, the largest maximum
security prison in Illinois); CURTIS PROUT & ROBERT N. ROSS, CARE AND PUNISHMENT:
THE DILEMMAS OF PRISON MEDICINE 87-113 (1988); Sturm, supra note 24, at 861-909;
Susan P. Sturm, The Rhode Island Prison Decree, in DAVID W. LOUISELL ET AL., CASES
ON PLEADING AND PROCEDURE 1243, 1243-49 (6th ed. 1989) (discussing implementation of a judicial decree in the Adult Correction Institution in Rhode Island).
' See, e.g., Bradley S. Chilton, Guthriev. Evans: Civil Rights, Prison Reform, and
Institutional Reform Litigation (1988) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of
Georgia); Deborah Little & Malcolm M. Feeley, Courts,Jails and Organization Theory:
A Case Study ofBranson v. Winter (Nov. 1989) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
the Center for the Study of Law and Society, University of California at Berkeley);
Jutta Lungwitz, Stone v. City and County of San Francisco-Impactof a Consent Decree
on the Medical and Mental Health Services of a San Francisco CountyJail (Nov. 1989)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author); Parker, supra note 32; Wayne Welch,
A Comparative Analysis of Court Orders Against California CountyJails: Intervention and Impact (1990) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of California at Irvine).
""The studies, when considered as a body of work, avoid many of the pitfalls
associated with case study research. See ROSENBERG, supra note 13, at 28-36
(criticizing case studies as a basis for constructing hypotheses about courts'
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studies capture the richness of this dynamic, they cannot definitively

establish the causal linkages between litigation and change. As their
number increases, however, case studies provide a database from
which to identify patterns of change in the wake of litigation. Case
studies frequently trace the course of activities and conditions
within the institutions under scrutiny, and thus afford at least a
preliminary basis for assessing litigation's impact.
Most of the case studies of litigation's impact on correctional
institutions conclude that courts have had a significant and positive,
though limited, impact. However, several recent works, notably
Gerald Rosenberg's The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social
Change?,4" Donald Horowitz's The Courts and Social Policy,49 and
John Dilulio's Governing Prisons,5" are quite pessimistic about
courts' potential to achieve institutional reform. Because of the
attention these works have attracted and their profoundly negative
view of courts' capacity to achieve change in correctional institutions,5 1 these works warrant additional comment.

effectiveness in producing significant social reform). Although some of the studies
examine celebrated cases presided over by judges who are widely known asjudicial
activists, see, e.g., MARTIN & EKLAND-OLSON, supra note 34, at 83-111 (examining cases
presided over byJudge WilliamJustice); YACKLE, supranote 35, at 256-60 (examining
cases presided over by Judge Frank Johnson), others involve more traditional, less
celebrated cases, see e.g., CHILTON, supranote 37 (studying the Guthrie v. Evans, 828
F.2d 773 (11th Cir. 1987), lawsuit at the Georgia State Prison in Reidsville, Georgia);
HARRIS & SPILLER, supra note 31, at 31-63 (examining how Holt v. Sarver, 309 F.
Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970), affd and remanded,442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971), affected
the Arkansas prison system). Some of the studies have spanned considerable time
periods or revisited institutional settings after passages of time. See e.g., JACOBS,
supra note 45, at 10, 64-67, 107-08, 111-12, 166 (discussing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408
U.S. 471 (1972);Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969); Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546
(1964); Arsberry v. Sielaff, 586 F.2d 37 (7th Cir. 1978); and Adams v. Pate, 445 F.2d
105 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1024 (1971));John V. Baiamonte, Jr., Holland v.
Donelon Revisited: JailLitigation in Jefferson Parish,Louisiana, 1971-1991, 70 PRISON
J. 38 (1990) (studying Holland v. Donelon and its impact in Louisiana). Interestingly,
Rosenberg excludes the rich body of literature on correctional litigation from his
general assessment of the value of case studies in assessing judicial impact. See
ROSENBERG, supra note 13, at 305-14.
48

ROSENBERG, supra note 13.

19 HoRowrrz, supra note 12.
5JOHN J. DIIULIO, JR., GOVERNING PRISONS:
A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF
CORRECTIONAL MANAGEMENT (1987).
"' All three of these books received extensive critical attention. See, e.g., Stephen
L. Carter, The Courts and the Constitution: Do Courts Matter?, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1216
(1992) (reviewing THE HOLLOW HOPE); Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Fourth Chronicle:
Neutrality and Stasis in AntidiscriminationLaw, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1133 (1993) (same);
Neal Devins,JudicialMatters, 80 CAL. L. REV. 1027 (1992) (same); Feeley & Rubin,
supra note 35, at 133-35 (reviewing GOVERNING PRISONS); Schuck, supra note 28, at
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In The Hollow Hope, Gerald Rosenberg attempts to develop and

test a theory of judicial effectiveness that explains and predicts
courts' limited capacity to produce "significant social reform." He
argues that courts are limited by three separate constraints built
into the structure of the American political system: the limited
nature of constitutional rights, the lack of judicial independence,
and the judiciary's lack of power of implementation. 52 These
constraints can be overcome when: (1) there is "ample legal
precedent for change"; and (2) there is "support for change from
substantial numbers in Congress and from the executive"; and
(3) "there is either support from some citizens or at least low levels
of opposition from all citizens"-" plus at least one of the following
four conditions: (a) positive incentives to induce compliance,
(b) costs to induce compliance (c) a market mechanism for implementation, or (d) administrators and officials crucial for implementation who are willing to act and see court orders as a tool for
4
leveraging additional resources or for hiding behind.
To test his theory, Rosenberg sets out to compare "the contribution of courts vis-4-vis the Congress and the executive branch"5 5 in
a wide range of civil rights areas. 6 His most fully developed and
controversial findings concern the impact of courts in the area of
school desegregation.5 7 Rosenberg argues that from 1954 to 1964,
"the [Supreme] Court spoke forcefully while Congress and the
executive [branch] did little.""8 Then, in 1965, Congress and the
executive branch entered the field. Rosenberg claims that the
courts acting alone had virtually no impact on the rate of integration, press coverage, legislative impact, change in public attitudes,
59
and political activism.
Rosenberg thus purports to stand the conventional wisdom
about judicial impact on its head. He argues:
[B]efore Congress and the executive branch acted, courts had
virtually no direct effect on ending discrimination in the key fields

1763 (reviewingTHE HOLLOW HOPE); Sturm, supranote 9, at 1406-08 (critiquing THE
COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY).
52 See

ROSENBERG, .supranote 13, at 10-21.

Id. at 35-36.
'4
55 See id. at 33-36.
53

Id. at 49.

-

See id. at 39-71.

57See

id. at 42-57.

5Id. at 49.

59 See id. at 107-56.
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of education, voting, transportation, accommodations and public
places, and housing.... Only when Congress and the executive
branch acted in tandem with the courts did change occur in these
fields. In terms of judicial effects, then, Brown and its progeny
stand for the proposition that courts are impotent to produce
significant social reform.6"
In the corrections area, Rosenberg's assessment is more
perfunctory and less definitive. He does not attempt a rigorous
analysis of the body of case studies concerning corrections litigation,
but instead repeats the bottom line assessments of selected studies
concerning judicial impact. "Overall, the consensus view is that,
61
while some changes have been made, serious problems remain."
Rosenberg then attempts to explain the "uneven" results of
corrections litigation by pointing to the varied levels of political
support for court-ordered prison reform, the courts' lack of
implementation power, and the presence of administrators willing
62
to use court orders to achieve change.
Many scholars quoted by Rosenberg, including myself,6 draw
different conclusions from the same data concerning courts'
effectiveness. The varying perspectives on the effectiveness of
litigation result in part from differing expectations of the courts and
standards for success. For example, Rosenberg appears to declare
litigation a "hollow hope" despite his acknowledgement that "[m]any
of the worst conditions have been improved to at least minimal
standards."64 Because "problems still abound" and "change has
been uneven," Rosenberg suggests that corrections litigation is
ineffective. 5 Rosenberg's negative assessment, however, depends
on applying a somewhat utopian standard of success. Few, if any,
social reform efforts have universal, nationwide impact-the
standard Rosenberg uses to measure significant social reform.
Indeed, Rosenberg never offers any meaningful standard against
which to measure the effectiveness of litigation. Rosenberg's
critique also lacks a comparative perspective. Judicial intervention
should not be assessed in a vacuum, but rather in relation to other
efforts to bring about institutional reform. 6
I Id. at 70-7 1.
61Id. at 306.
62 Id. at 307-13.
"Rosenberg relies considerably on my student note entitled "Mastering"
Intermention in Prisons. See Sturm, supra note 42, at 1062.
" ROSENBERG, supra note 13, at 307.
65Id.

6See Sturm, supra note 9, at 1407-08. Studies of efforts to implement legislative
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Although Rosenberg draws sweeping negative judgments about
the courts' capacity, perhaps to support his sensational title and
maverick conclusions, his theory and data are less controversial and
original than his presentation suggests.6" Scholars and activists
have long recognized the interdependence of courts 8and other
6
branches of government to achieve meaningful reform.
Rosenberg's methodology and analysis reveal a more fundamental failure of vision. The author fails to understand the crucial role
of the remedial stage in public law litigation, and the central place
that district courts play in carrying out this implementation
function. Rosenberg proceeds to assess the effectiveness of a test
case strategy of reform-a strategy that, as I demonstrate below, fails
to depict accurately the tenor of recent civil rights advocacy,
particularly in the corrections area. 9 The test case strategy
focuses on developing new legal theories and doctrines to protect
and further the civil rights and interests of underrepresented
groups. It centers on obtaining Supreme Court decisions that
expand the scope of legal protections. Thus, Rosenberg's study
focuses on the impact of Supreme Court decisions and overgeneralizes by equating the Supreme Court's impact with that of the entire
federal judiciary. Rosenberg's data testing the impact of judicial
and administrative policy initiatives reveal that the other two branches of government
confront obstacles to reform similar to those documented in the judicial arena. See
generally JEFFREY L. PRESSMAN & AARON WILDAVSKY, IMPLEMENTATION (1973)
(analyzing the difficulties of carrying out a government policy through a study of the
Oakland Project of the University of California). At least one study attempting to
compare the relative effectiveness of courts and other branches of government
concludes that, at least in some respects, courts have a number of significant
advantages over legislative and executive agencies. See MICHAEL A. REBELL & ARTHUR
R. BLOCK, EDUCATIONAL POLICY MAKING AND THE COURTS: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF
JUDICIAL ACTIVISM 10, 13-14, 65-70, 118-20 (1982).
67 Other commentators have offered a similar critique. See Devins, supranote 51,
at 1030; Schuck, supranote 28, at 1764-66. Peter Schuck has convincingly challenged
the originality and value of Rosenberg's theoretical framework as a tool for explaining
or predicting the impact of judicial decisions. See id. at 1771-72 (asserting that
Rosenberg's theory is indeterminate; ignores certain dynamic effects unleashed by
many court decisions; gives excessive weight to whether litigation advances the
avowed agendas of public interest litigators; and fails to distinguish constitutional and
statutory interpretation decisions).
6s See, e.g., JOEL F. HANDLER, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM: A
THEORY OF LAW REFORM AND SOCIAL CHANGE 192 (1978) (discussing significance of

"bureaucratic contingency" in success ofjudicial intervention); Sturm, supranote 24,
at 885-95 (discussing the courts' dependence on responsible public officials for
meaningful reform and assessing effectiveness of various judicial strategies in
prompting cooperation by those officials).
69 See infra notes 320-63 and accompanying text.
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intervention are analyzed only in terms of the impact of particular
Supreme Court decisions.
This methodological approach is inappropriate in the institutional reform area. Rosenberg fails to grasp the evolution of the judicial
role toward what I call an implementation model of public interest
advocacy-a model that focuses on implementing legal norms in
particular institutional contexts.7 ° Most of the. significant activity
in the area of institutional reform litigation takes place at the lower
court level. Much of the media attention surrounding corrections
litigation follows local litigation. Thus, Rosenberg's failure to take
into account the impact of lower court decisions on official
behavior, media attention, and institutional change makes his
findings concerning judicial impact inconclusive at best.
Moreover, Rosenberg overstates the Supreme Court's involvement in civil rights enforcement. Contrary to Rosenberg's assertion,
the Supreme Court did not vigorously enforce school desegregation
and other civil rights laws after its decision in Brown v. Board of
Education.7 1 In the corrections field in particular, the Supreme
Court has been relatively quiet. Lower courts clearly dominate the
field of judicial intervention in the corrections area. 2 Rosenberg
by and large neglects this central locus of judicial activity.
Rosenberg also ignores the impact of litigation on organizational
structure and managerial capacity. His assessment of the indirect
effects of litigation looks only to litigation's impact on public
opinion and the views of political elites. At least in the corrections
field, this narrow focus filters out some of the most significant
consequences of litigation. 5
Finally, Rosenberg fails to grasp the dynamic and fluid character
of public law litigation and its relationship to other branches of
government. His analysis assumes three distinct branches of
government with little interplay among them.
He does not
acknowledge or attempt to study the impact litigation has on the
70 See infra notes 362-63 and accompanying text.
71 See

Devins, supra note 51, at 1040-41.
' Over the last 10 years, the Supreme Court has rarely addressed the issue of the
appropriate remedy to redress cruel and unusual prison conditions. In contrast,
lower courts have been extremely involved in developing and enforcing corrections
remedies. See Edward I. Koren, Status Report: State Prisonsand the Courtu-Januamy1,
1992, NAT'L PRISON PROJECT J., Winter 1992, at 13, 13-20 (summarizing ongoing
involvement by federal courts in corrections litigation in 40 states or territories).
" These consequences include contributing to the professionalization of
corrections, and increasing the visibility and accountability of the corrections field.
See infra notes 112-22, 132-34 and accompanying text.
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capacity and willingness of public officials to engage in reform. The
remedial process in corrections cases blurs the distinction between
formal adversary proceedings and what he presents as nonjudicial,
administrative, and political forms of intervention. His conclusion
that change does not occur in the absence of cooperation by
insiders is neither surprising nor particularly helpful in determining
when litigation will be successful, because litigation is itself often a
factor influencing the willingness of insiders to engage in reform
activities.

74

Rosenberg's analysis shares an additional limitation with
Horowitz's study concluding that courts lack the capacity to achieve
effective reform.75 Both authors assume that courts necessarily
adhere to the traditional model of adjudication, and fail "to take
into account the procedural innovations that enhance courts'
capacity to find social facts, consider competing solutions, and
facilitate negotiation. "76 Many of the studies relied upon by
Rosenberg to support his view that litigation is a "hollow hope"
were published ten or more years ago, and practice has evolved
considerably in the public remedial area since then. Indeed, one of
the significant findings of this Article concerns the changing
character of the process used to develop remedies and the increasing interaction of litigation and other forms of public interest
advocacy.

77

Governing Prisons, by John Dilulio, presents a particularly
negative picture of judicial intervention in prisons. 7' His book
does not focus on the question of the effectiveness of judicial
intervention, but rather on the management of prisons. His thesis
is that "[a] paramilitary prison bureaucracy, led by able institutional
managers and steered by a talented executive, may be the best
administrative response to the problem of establishing and
maintaining higher custody prisons in which inmates and staff lead
a calm, peaceful, and productive round of daily life."7 ' He compares three different prison systems, including the Texas system,
4 See infra notes 199-201 and accompanying text.

Horowitz characterizesjudicial processes as necessarily focused and piecemeal,

"ill-adapted to the ascertainment of social facts," HORowUZ, supra note 12, at 45,
lacking provision for policy review, and inhospitable to negotiation. See id. at 22-23,
34-36, 45-51, 51-56.
76 Sturm, supra note 9, at 1408.
See infra notes 418-31 and accompanying text.
7
sSee supra note 50.
7 DIIULio, supra note 50, at 256.
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and concludes that the Texas prison prior to litigation constitutes
the model of effective prison management.8 0
DiIulio seems captivated by the allure of the charismatic,
personality-driven model of administration employed by Director
George Beto. He bitterly criticizes the court, particularly Judge
Justice, for destroying Beto's system of management. 8 He goes so
far as to hold the court responsible for the breakdown in institutional order resulting in inmate deaths. 2 However, the empirical
support for this indictment lacks neutrality and methodological
rigor.
DiIulio's critique of Judge Justice's role in the Texas
litigation differs dramatically from that of two other extensive and
careful case studies that depict the Texas system prior to litigation
as defective, violent, arbitrary, and corrupt.8
These studies
concede that litigation's impact fell short of expectations, but
conclude that litigation was necessary to eliminate the abuses of the
Texas system. As Feeley and Rubin convincingly demonstrate,
DiIulio's treatment of the Texas prison system is idiosyncratic and
fundamentally flawed.'
He proceeds on the "pre-empirical
notion" that order and cleanliness are the primary virtues of a

'See

id. at 199-231 (comparing the Texas, Michigan, and California prison

systems).

8' For example:

If the judge were more judicious, his information better, his appreciation
for what TDC had achieved in the past less unkind, and his preoccupation
with its sores less total, or if he and his aides had troubled themselves to
consider the possible unintended consequences of their sweeping actions,
there can be little doubt that things would not have degenerated as they did.
Id. at 229.
' See id. ("The new legal framework imposed on TDC was ... a poorly tailored
and ill-fitting suit which the agency was rushed into wearing and which eventually, and
predictably, burst at the seams.").
83 See CROUCH & MARQUART, supra note 34, at 13-45, 117; MARTIN & EKLANDOLSON, supra note 34, at 5-25, 247. Dilulio's research focused exclusively on
interviews with administrators and guards. "[T]he bulk of [the interviews] were
conducted on the fly in the course of observations inside the several prisons .... "
Diluuo, supra note 50, at 5. The perspective of inmates or outsiders to the prison
system does not inform his analysis. His presentation tends toward the rhetorical and
conclusory, creating the impression that he developed his analysis and then used the
interviews to buttress it. In contrast, the other two authors relied on in-depth
research, including structured interviews with 70 prisoners and 40 officers, and
hundreds of informal interviews with administrators, staff, officers and inmates in
nearly all units of the system. The interviews were augmented with surveys of staff,
officers, and inmates. See CROUCH & MARQUART, supra note 34, at ix-x; MARTIN &
EKLAND-OLSON, supra note 34, at xvii-xxi (describing Martin's personal involvement
with the Texas prison system).

" See Feeley & Rubin, supra note 35.
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prison, and then conflates the concepts of bureaucracy and
order.8 5 The Texas model that DiIulio embraces is the opposite of
the paramilitaristic bureaucracy that he endorses in principle.
DiIulio has offered a more balanced perspective on litigation's
impact in his subsequent compilation of case studies of judicial
86
impact on corrections.
Despite these limitations, Horowitz, Rosenberg, and DiIulio do
identify important concerns about courts' unilateral capacities to
reform social institutions that must inform any serious assessment
ofjudicial impact. Some of these concerns, such as the potential for
unintended negative consequences from judicial intervention and
the limitations of the adversary process as a means of achieving
reform, emerge as recurring themes in the case studies of judicial
intervention in corrections institutions. Rather than offer a bottomline assessment of litigation as positive or negative, I have relied on
this body of case studies that examine the impact of courts on
correctional institutions to draw out the patterns in the direct and
indirect impact of litigation.
A. The Legal and CorrectionalLandscape in
the PrelitigationEra
Litigation challenging the conditions and practices in prisons,
jails, juvenile detention facilities, and state juvenile institutions is a
relatively recent phenomenon. Until the 1960s, courts adopted a
"hands-off" approach to prison cases. 7 Correctional institutions
were isolated from and invisible to society. They operated as closed
communities largely without public scrutiny.8 8 Inmate communica's Id. at 137-43. Feeley and Rubin thoughtfully assess and criticize the neutrality
and methodological reliability of the study. See id. at 125.
' See John J. Dilulio, Jr., Conclusion: What Judges Can Do to Improve Prisons and
Jails,in COURTS, CORRECTIONS, AND THE CONSTrrTON, supra note 38, at 287 ("[I]f

the question is one of net assessment, then the impact ofjudicial intervention into
prisons andjails over the last two decades has been positive-a qualified success, but

a success just the same.").
s7 See generally Comment, Beyond the Ken of the Courts: A CritiqueofJudicialRefusal

to Review the Complaints of Convicts, 72 YALE L.J. 506 (1963).
' To preserve their autonomy, prison officials developed patterns ofinstitutional
display designed to give visitors an "appropriate image" of the institution, insulating
the day-to-day conditions and forms of social control from outside scrutiny. See
ERVING GOFFMAN, ASYLUMs 102 (1961); JACOBS, supra note 45, at 36 ("Ragen's
Stateville was an autonomous institution accountable neither to other public agencies
nor to the public at large.").
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tion with the outside world was extremely limited. Inmates had no

avenues of redress for the life-threatening abuses they endured. 9
Conditions and practices in prisons, jails, and juvenile facilities
were frequently abysmal. "Violence, brutality, lack of medical care,
unsanitary conditions, inadequate plumbing, lack of ventilation, and
the absence of other necessities of life characterized the institudons."90

Many facilities were overcrowded

and poorly main-

tained. 9 Juvenile institutions were often oppressive and dangerous. 2 Moreover, juveniles were frequently incarcerated in adult
jails where they were routinely subjected to extreme abuse. 9s

" See James B. Jacobs, The Prisoners'Rights Movement and Its Impacts, in 2 CRIME
ANDJUSTICE: AN ANNUAL REVIEW OF RESEARCH 429 (Norval Morris & Michael Tonry

eds., 1980); DavidJ. Rothman, DecarceratingPrisonersand Patients, 1 Civ. LIB. REV. 8
(1973);JACOBS, supra note 45, at 36-37. Riots tend to attract immediate attention and
give inmates a platform for airing their grievances. However, violence often leads to
more repressive control measures, and tends to reinforce the image of inmates as
unworthy and uncontrollable. See Sturm, supra note 24, at 844.
90 HARRIS & SPILLER, supra note 31, at 4; see also YACKLE, supra note 35, at 11-12
("[The] penal system [was] permitted to degenerate into unrelieved squalor....
Alabama prisons were nothing more than human warehouses that contained but
hardly contended with an overwhelming population of idle criminal offenders.");
Chilton & Talarico, supra note 39, at 117 (describing "segregation, overcrowding,
poor medical care, miserable conditions, and unfair treatment of black and white
inmates at Reidsville").
91
See, e.g., HARRIS & SPILLER, supra note 31, at 6 (noting that overcrowding was
a serious problem in each of the institutions studied); YACKLE, supranote 35, at 11-12
(explaining that overcrowding was a recurring problem in the Alabama prison system
and that the drive to make prisoners pay for their own upkeep, combined with the
overcrowding, condemned the system to failure).
One authority describes the plight of juveniles in some jails in the following
terms:
Most of the children in thesejails have done nothing, yet they are subjected
to the cruelest of abuses. They are confined in overcrowded facilities,
forced to perform brutal exercise routines, punished by beatings by staff
and peers, put in isolation, and whipped. They have their heads held under
water in toilets. They are raped by both staff and peers, gassed in their
cells, and sometimes stomped or beaten to death by adult prisoners. A
number of youths not killed by others end up killing themselves.
Mark Soler et al., Stubborn and Rebellious Children: Liability of Public Officials for
Detentionof Children inJails, 1980 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 5-6 (quoting CLEMENS BARTOLLAS
& STUART J. MILLER, THE JUVENILE OFFENDER: CONTROL, CORRECTION AND
TREATMENT 212 (1978)); see also Gary H. v. Hegstrom, 831 F.2d 1430, 1431-36 (9th
Cir. 1987) (describing excessive use of isolation, inappropriate use of physical
restraints, dirty and unsanitary conditions, lack of programming, and inadequate
medical and mental health care in state juvenile detention facility); Martarella v.
Kelley, 349 F. Supp. 575, 579-85 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (detailing deplorable physical
conditions, sexual abuse, beatings, and absence of mental health and other programs
and services at juvenile institution for children designated as "persons in need of
supervision").
' See Soler et al., supra note 92, at 2 (stating that "on March 15, 1970, some 7,800
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Administrators frequently ran their institutions as fiefdoms, with
little awareness of developments in legal norms or corrections
administration. 4 In some systems, dominant inmates operating as
building tenders or trusties wielded supervisory, administrative, and
disciplinary authority over other inmates, and engaged in violent
and predatory behavior with official acquiescence.9 5 Guard
brutality was a routine part of prison life. 6 Institutions routinely
segregated inmates by race, and frequently provided grossly inferior
conditions, programs, and opportunities to nonwhite inmates.
Decisions concerning inmate discipline and control were made
arbitrarily,9" and inmates were prohibited from exercising basic
rights of free speech and religion."
children were confined in adult jails in the United States").
See Feeley & Rubin, supra note 35, at 126.
5
" See, e.g., Ben M. Crouch &James W. Marquart, Ruiz: Interventionand Emergent
Order in Texas Prisons,in COURTS, CORRECTIONS, AND THE CONSTrUTION, supra note
38, at 99-100 (describingbuilding tender system in Texas prisons); HARRIS & SPILLER,
supra note 31, at 49-51 (discussing that inmate trusties who "literally ran the prison
system... had the power of life and death over other inmates" and "engage[d] in an
incredibly wide variety of unlawful activities").
6 See, e.g., Sheldon Ekland-Olson & Steve J. Martin, Ruiz:
A Struggle over
Legitimacy, in COURTS, CORRECTIONS, AND THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 38, at 73,
77-78 (claiming that "[s]taff brutality... was routine in that it was deeply embedded
in the subculture of prison life as a legitimate alternative"). Perhaps the most
infamous form of brutality was the Tucker telephone, an instrument that
consisted of an electric generator taken from a ring-type telephone, placed
in sequence with two dry cell batteries and attached to an undressed inmate
strapped to the treatment table at the Tucker hospital by means of one
electrode to a big toe and a second electrode to the penis, at which time a
crank was turned sending an electric charge into the body of the inmate....
[S]everal charges were introduced into the inmate of a duration designed
to stop just short of the inmate passing out.
HARRIS & SPILLER, supra note 31, at 36-37.
17 Numerous judicial decisions documented and prohibited the use of formal or
informal violence as a form of discipline, the threat of uncertain punishment, and the
utilization of inmate trusties to maintain order. See, e.g., Ruiz v. Estelle, 679 F.2d
1115, 1140-42 (5th Cir.) (applying the Eighth Amendment to findings of overcrowding, inmate violence, staff brutality, and low guard-inmate ratios), modified, 688 F.2d
266 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1042 (1983); Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d
571, 579 (8th Cir. 1968) (prohibiting further use of whipping); Holt v. Sarver, 309 F.
Supp. 362, 365, 383-84 (E.D. Ark. 1970) (holding trustie system as administered
violated Eighth Amendment), affld, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971);see aisoJACOBS,supra
note 45, at 42-43 (describing role of uncertainty and selective distribution of
privileges in maintaining order).
'8 See, e.g., JACOBS, supra note 45, at 122 (describing as successful lawsuit
challenging restriction of exercise of First Amendment rights by inmates); Jacobs,
supranote 89, at 35 ("A prisoner who complained about arbitrary, corrupt, brutal, or
illegal treatment did so at his peril.").
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B. Litigation'sImpact on the Organizationand Management
of CorrectionalInstitutions

There is little doubt that litigation has profoundly changed the
conditions and practices in correctional institutions. The most farreaching and significant effects of litigation have been on the
structure, organization, and relationship of corrections to the larger
community. 9 These changes in turn affect the capacity of correctional leadership to manage and improve the quality of life in
correctional institutions. The following are examples of such
changes.
1. Litigation Has Contributed to a Greater Understanding
and Acceptance of Constitutional Standards
Governing Correctional Institutions
There is strong evidence that litigation has fostered the
development of norms and standards of minimally adequate
treatment of inmates within correctional systems. °
Virtually
every case study of judicial intervention in correctional institutions
recounts the internal development of correctional standards to
govern future practices and conduct within the institution, following
major litigation invalidating the conditions and practices in those
institutions. The court in Holt v. Hutto0 1 summarized the shift in
Arkansas from official resistance to official adoption of judicially
10 2
imposed norms and standards as the policy of the institution.

9 SeeJACOBS, supra note 45, at 107 (indicating that "the indirect ramifications of
judicial intervention into the prison have been far-reaching"). Rosenberg's assessment
ofjudicial impact in The Hollow Hope,supra note 13, ignores these indirect effects of
litigation, as well as the potential feedback effects of litigation on organizations'
capacity to govern themselves.
"o See, e.g., JACOBS, supra note 45, at 105 (providing that "the intrusion of the
federal courts required a rational decision-making process based upon uniform rules,
formal decision mechanisms, and ascertainable criteria"); Malcolm M. Feeley & Roger
A. Hanson, The Impact ofJudicial Intervention on Prisons andJails: A Frameworkfor
Analysis and a Review of the Literature, in COURTS, CORRECTIONS, AND THE CONSTITuTION, supra note 38, at 12, 25-28 (discussing the role of litigation as an impetus for
changes such as the adoption of prison regulations and the emphasis on constitutional standards in the training of local jail officials);Jacobs, supra note 89, at 462 ("The
prisoner's rights movement has contributed to a professional movement within
corrections to establish national standards."); Sturm, supranote 24, at 861-64 (arguing
thatjudicial intervention in the form of an announced normative framework results
in various reforms).
101363 F. Supp. 194 (E.D. Ark. 1973).

102The

court stated:
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The case studies also suggest that litigation has contributed to
the internalization of these standards by staff and administration.
For example, Crouch and Marquart report that after extensive
judicial intervention invalidating the use of inmate trusties to
maintain order, the Texas Department of Corrections officials began
to adopt new, constitutionally sanctioned methods to maintain
order. 3 The special master in the Texas litigation reported that
the prison officials who previously embraced as necessary and
inevitable the building tender system, which relied on inmate guards
to maintain order and administer the prison, "came to hold the
opposite view with equal commitment."0 4 Larry Yackle observed
among Alabama prison officials "a new sensitivity to the profound
fact of human incarceration." l"' The Arkansas case study traced
the development of constitutionally acceptable departmental policies
and procedures as a result of litigation.0 6 A number of states
now employ compliance officers whose jobs are to monitor and
evaluate conditions and practices in prisons and jails.0
Of course, litigation is not solely responsible for the growing
internalization of professional norms. Independent efforts within
the corrections field, such as the emergence of a network of
professional organizations that promulgate standards and the
incorporation of these standards in state statutes and administrative
regulations, have also contributed to this development. 0 8 HowevThis litigation today stands in a posture quite different from that in
which it stood in 1969 and 1970. In those years the Court was dealing with
officially prescribed or sanctioned conditions and practices which were
claimed to be unconstitutional, and the controlling facts were essentially
undisputed. Today, most of the practices and conditions alleged by
petitioners to exist and of which they complain are not officially approved
or sanctioned, and a number of them are specifically prohibited by the rules
and regulations of the Department ....
Id. at 198.
103 See CROUCH & MARQUART, supra note 34, at 230-31.
104 Sturm, supra note 24, at 863 n.253 (quoting Telephone Interview with Vincent
Nathan,
Partner, Nathan & Roberts (July 19, 1991) (transcript on file with author)).
5

10YACKLE, supra note 35, at 259.

" See Parker, supra note 32, at 374-75; see also Frank M. Dunbaugh, Prospectingfor
ProspectiveRelief. The Story of Seeking Compliancewith a FederalCourt DecreeMandating
Humane Conditionsof Confinement in the Baltimore CityJail,PRIsoNJ., Fall-Winter 1990,
at 57, 65 (reporting that "local, state and national standards have developed for such
matters as sanitation, plumbing, ventilation, fire safety, officer training and health
care"); Little & Feeley, supranote 46, at 40.41 (recounting development of procedures
governing services and programs in the wake of jail litigation).
107 See Feeley & Hanson, supra note 100, at 26-27.
o See id. at 27; Rod Miller, Standards and the Courts, CORRECTIONS TODAY, May
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er, litigation and professionalization have not occurred in isolation.
Litigators and courts rely on professional standards and experts to
evaluate the adequacy of conditions and practices and to apply
those standards in a particular institutional context.'0 9
The
corrections field has, in turn, developed standards, rules, and
regulations with an eye toward avoiding further judicial intervention.10 Litigation has thus played a major role in the development and further refinement of professional standards and

oversight."
1992, at 58.
109The Supreme Court has rejected the wholesale adoption of professional
standards as the basis for defining constitutional standards. See Rhodes v. Chapman,
452 U.S. 337, 348 n.13 (1981) (stating that expert opinions may be helpful and
relevant with respect to some questions, but do not establish constitutional minima).
Nonetheless, courts routinely refer to these standards to aid in assessing the
constitutionality of conditions in correctional institutions. See, e.g., Bell v. Wolfish,
441 U.S. 520, 544 n.27 (1979) (finding that while professional recommendations do
not establish the "constitutional minima" of cell space per inmate, they "may be
instructive in certain cases"); Ruiz v. Estelle, 503 F. Supp. 1265, 1285 (S.D. Tex. 1980)
(noting that although Wolfish precludes the use of recommended standards alone to
establish constitutional minima, Rhodes and other cases have used them as one factor
relevant to the adequacy of an institution's housing facilities), aff'd in part,679 F.2d
1115 (5th Cir.), modified, 688 F.2d 266 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1042
(1983); see also Tillery v. Owens, 719 F. Supp. 1256, 1270 (W.D. Pa. 1989) (citing
Wolfish, Rhodes, and Ruiz to justify reference to professional standards), afld, 907 F.2d
418 (3d Cir. 1990).
Professional correctional standards also come into play in developing appropriate
relief. See, e.g., Ruiz v. Estelle, 650 F.2d 555, 563-64 (5th Cir. 1981) (quoting district
court order incorporating professional standards of service delivery); Newman v.
Alabama, 503 F.2d 1320, 1332 (5th Cir. 1974) (upholding remedial order which had
prescribed certain standards of medical care); Palmigiano v. Garrahy, 443 F. Supp.
956, 986 n.37 (D.R.I. 1977) (requiring that officials comply with certain specific
standards published by "professional bodies").
11 See e.g., YACKLE, supra note 35, at 27 (describing various standards for the
operation of prisons and monitoring techniques which could be utilized without
"appearance ofjudicial meddling"); M. Wayne Higgins & CharlesJ. Kehoe, Accreditation Benefits Nation'sJails,Juvenile Detention Centers, CoRREcIoNs TODAY, May 1990,
at 40, 42 ("[M]ost correctional administrators involved in the accreditation process
see it as another form of insurance.... [S]tandards and accreditation are designed
to avoid judgments."); Miller, supra note 108, at 58 ("The findings [of an ACA
research team] indicate a solid relationship between standards and the courts. .. ").
...
SeeJacobs, supra note 89, at 462 (noting that the "prisoners' rights movement
has contributed to a professional movement within corrections to establish national
standards"); Feeley & Hanson, supra note 100, at 25-28 (discussing the role of
litigation as an impetus for changes such as the adoption of prison regulations and
the emphasis on constitutional standards in the training of local jail officials); Sturm,
supra note 24, at 861-64 (describing the role of litigation in introducing and
legitimizing norm of individual dignity and fostering development of professional
standards). Indeed, many prominent figures in prison medicine and psychiatry have
played crucial roles in litigation as experts, monitors, and consultants.
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2. Litigation Has Contributed to the Professionalization of
Corrections Leadership and Programmatic Staff
Corrections litigation has prompted the professionalization of
correctional leadership, both in many individual cases and in the
corrections field more generally.1 12 Twenty years ago, many
correctional administrators had little training or expertise in
management.'1 8 Often, the corrections commissioners or directors were purely political appointments. 4 As long as administrators maintained a low profile and avoided major scandals or
disturbances, their performance remained insulated from public
scrutiny. The corrections field lacked any effective political or
institutional incentives to develop performance standards
and
15
mechanisms for holding administrators accountable.
Judicial intervention opened prisons and corrections administrators to public scrutiny and evaluation in relation to standards of
performance. The high visibility of conditions litigation exposed
existing management's inability to respond' effectively to judicial
requirements that conditions be brought up to minimal standards
of decency. In many cases, this exposure triggered the replacement
of correctional leadership with qualified, trained leaders possessing
greater sensitivity to the demands of running constitutional
facilities.1 6 Litigation challenging the adequacy of medical care
112SeeJacobs,

supra note 89, at 463 (noting that the professional organization of

American prison officials has instituted an accrediting process "covering almost all
aspects of prison management").
I's See TODD R. CLEAR & GEORGE F. COLE, AMERICAN CORRECTIONS 145-46 (1987)
(criticizing correctional leadership for its "uncreative thinking, ungrounded and
idiosyncratic conceptualization, and unwarranted commitment to traditionalism");
Alvin W. Cohn, The Failureof CorrectionalManagement, 19 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 323,
323-31 (1973) (arguing that the lack of success of rehabilitation was due to
incompetent
correctional administration).
114
Se4 e.g., REMEDIAL LAW: WHEN COURTS BECOME ADMINISTRATORS 17 (Robert
C. Wood ed., 1990) (stating that the prison administration in command in Rhode
Island when litigation began was "strictly political" and had no experience with, or
expertise in, corrections).
's See Sturm, supra note 24, at 828 (noting that "[p]rison officials are essentially
left alone
as long as they maintain order").
1 6 See HARRIS & SPILLER, supra note 31, at 15 ("In Holt, Hamilton, and Collins, a
change in personnel involving the highest level correctional official was believed to
have aided the compliance process."); see also YACKLE, supra note 35, at 259
(describing new attitudes among even those administrators who had worked in the
system for years); Robert G. Schwartz, LitigationandMediationReduce Detention Center
Overcrowding, PRISON J., Spring-Summer 1991, at 68 (following the filing of the
Santiago complaint, thejudges appointed a new Board of Managers, who in turn hired
a new Executive Director); Marvin Zalman, Wayne County Jail Inmates v. Wayne
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in correctional institutions has frequently resulted in the involvement of private professional health providers, such as university
medical schools.1 7 A national commission on correctional health
care now publishes a quarterly journal, certifies correctional health
care professionals, and sponsors regular professional conferences. 118
Several case studies report that this trend toward
professionalization, however, has not permeated the lower levels of
corrections administration.' 9 Consequently, some studies link
litigation to a widening gap in perspective between administration
and line staff and suggest that this gap has limited the managerial
capacity of corrections administrators. 120 In some systems, lower
level staff members have shown considerable resistance to reformminded administrators and remarkable ingenuity in their capacity
to frustrate the efforts of progressive administrators.12 ' There are

County Sheriff: The Anatomy of a Lawsuit, PRISON J., Spring-Summer 1991, at 15
(describing how appointment of receiver led to retention of new jail administrator,
and new health and food directors); Chilton, supra note 46, at 145-47 (documenting
appointment of experienced administrators whose abilities were crucial to reforms in
prison); Little & Feeley, supra note 46, at 46 (noting that the county consciously
replaced the sheriff with a professional administrator who was "committed to
alternatives and diversion from incarceration").
n" See, e.g., YACKLE, supra note 35, at 258 (reporting vastly improved health care
system provided under contract with Correctional Management Systems); Baamonte,
supra note 47, at 39 (reporting that litigation led to contracts with licensed physicians,
a nurse-administrator, and medical assistants).
"'See CCHPProgramNears 500: Over 100 Certified with FallExam, CORRECT CARE,
Spring 1992, at 11 (noting the results of a recent certification exam); id. at 7
(advertising national conference).
19 See CROUCH & MARQUART, supra note 34, at 54-55 (describing officer
socialization subculture in the Texas Department of Corrections); LUCIEN X.
LOMBARDO, GUARDS IMPRISONED: CORRECTIONAL OFFICERS AT WORK 162-63 (1981)

(describing low status and stigma sometimes associated with position of correctional
officers, discouraging them from developing strong professional identity);James B.
Jacobs & Norma Crotty, The Guard's World, inJAMES B. JACOBS, NEW PERSPECTIVES
ON PRISONS AND IMPRISONMENT 133, 135 (1983).
"'See Feeley & Hanson, supra note 100, at 22 (pointing out one study that
concluded that "court orders widen the gap between correctional leadership and
prison staff by facilitating appointments of a new type of administrator whose values
are more closely attuned to those of the court than traditional line staff"); see also
LOMBARDO, supra note 119, at 129-32 (documenting guards' cynical attitudes toward
correctional administrators and effectiveness of their programs);Jacobs, supra note
89, at 458-59 (stating that prisoners' rights movement has caused replacement of old
wardens with a "new administrative elite, which is better educated and more
bureaucratically minded").
12 See Richard McCleery, CorrectionalAdministration
andPoliticalChange,in PRISON
WTHIN SOCIETY 113, 122-27 (Lawrence E. Hazelrigg ed., 1968) (documenting staff
resistance to administrative reform); Sturm, supra note 24, at 869-70 (describing
officials' success in ignoring or sabotaging court orders).
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some indications that this gap may be temporary and that the
process of professionalization has begun to affect corrections staff
22

as well.1

3. Litigation Has Contributed to the Bureaucratization
of Correctional Institutions
Court intervention has fostered the centralization of correctional
management and the formalization of decision-making within
correctional institutions. 23 Litigation requires corrections officials to account for a wide range of activities and conditions in their
institutions. This requirement has prompted the development of
improved information systems, extensive documentation, and
rational, visible decision-making. Partly in response to litigation,
officials have developed regularized procedures governed by written
rules and regulations such that "every prison and jail in the United
States ...

must work within the structure of modern bureaucratic

organization." 124 Litigation's transformative impact occurred most
dramatically in southern prisons, which moved from prebureaucratic
plantation-style systems to modern bureaucracies.1 25 The case
studies document that governance by personal dominance and
officially sanctioned brutality is a thing of the past. Many scholars
" See YACKLE, supra note 35, at 257 (reporting change from prelitigation guard
staff consisting primarily of poorly educated rural whites to a more diverse staff,
nearly half of whom were college educated and all of whom received instruction in
prison work); Dunbaugh, supra note 106, at 65 (stating thatjail staff has become more
professional); G. Larry Mays & William A. Taggart, The Impact of Litigation on
Changing New Mexico Prison Conditions, PRISON J., Spring-Summer 1985, at 38, 51
(describing greater stability in upper and lower personnel levels, creation of a
legitimate training program for correctional officers, increases in salaries for
correctional officers, and recruitment of experienced corrections professionals).
" See, e.g., Chilton & Talarico, supra note 39, at 122 ("Under the scrutiny of the
Guthrie litigation, the historical deference accorded to the warden gave way to a
bureaucratic restructuring that put the prison squarely under the state's correctional
authority."); Feeley & Rubin, supra note 35, at 126 (noting that prison management
must now examine a "myriad of federal standards" daily to respond to court orders
or avoid additional court action); Jacobs, supra note 89, at 458 (arguing that prison
litigation had led to the "bureaucratization" of the prison); Wayne N. Welsh,Jail
Litigation in California: An EmpiricalAssessment, PRISONJ., Spring-Summer 1991, at
30, 39 (stating that litigation led to the creation of the new County Department of
Correction); Zalman, supra note 116, at 15 (stating that litigation led to the
assumption of responsibility for jail by the county).
4 Feeley & Rubin, supra note 35, at 126.
12 See Feeley & Hanson, supra note 100, at 26 (noting that "[i]n effect the courts
rejected the southern model").
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argue that the move toward bureaucracy has led to safer, less
12 6
arbitrary, and more humane institutions.
4. Litigation Is Associated with Short-Term Demoralization
of Staff and Disruption of Institutional Order
A number of commentators have observed that litigation
contributes, at least in the short run, to inmate violence and staff
demoralization by raising inmates' expectations, undermining prison
officials' authority, widening the gap between administration and
staff, and by limiting the discretion of prison officials vis-4-vis inmates. 127 The most frequently cited studies, however, fail to
establish a causal chain between violence and litigation.1 28 Others
have attributed violence following litigation to abdication by prison
administrators and staff of responsibility for developing legitimate
forms of inmate control to replace the traditional, repressive control
mechanisms invalidated by the courts.129
Similar short-term
26

1

See CROUCH & MARQUART, supra note 34, at 232-33 (noting that a survey of

prisoners in the Texas Department of Corrections system conducted several years
after litigated reform indicated that the prisoners perceive that the TDC is a "safer
place"); JACOBS, supra note 45, at 209 (noting that under a "corporate" model of
management, prisoners at Stateville receive treatment and opportunities commensurate with the law and fairness); Feeley & Rubin, supra note 35, at 145 (stating that
"the protection of individual rights is only meaningful in the context of a strong
bureaucracy, for bureaucratic organization... substitutes the rule of law for the will
of the person").
127 See, e.g., DIIULIO, supra note 50, at 219, 226 (noting an increase in "rapes,
assaults, murders, and other forms of prison disorder" following prison litigation
involving the Texas Department of Corrections, as well as "demoralized and
beleaguered staff"); Kathleen Engel & Stanley Rothman, Prison Violence and the
Paradox of Reform, PUB. INTEREST, Fall 1983, at 91, 94, 100-01 (describing the
paradoxical rise in prison violence paralleling the expansion of the prison reform
movement); Chilton, supra note 46, at 150, 169 (stating that the changes brought by
institutional reform litigation involving the Georgia state prison disrupted prison
social
organization and may have led to an increase in violence).
12
1 See Feeley & Hanson, supranote 100, at 19-21 (noting that generalizations that
indicate an increase in violence have been drawn from a "skewed sample that
overemphasizes resistance to change," and are based on small time frames that do not
adequately reflect the real adjustment over a period of a number of years).
2 See, e.g., VincentNathan, Reflections on Two Decades of Court-Ordered Prison
Reform, Lecture at the CriminalJustice Workshop, New York University School of
Law. Nathan notes that:
[V]iolence of the level suffered by [Texas Department of Corrections]
prisoners and staff during 1984 and 1985 was not an inevitable ofjudicial
intervention ....
Quite apart from the lack of bureaucratic skills needed to deal with the
complex task of restructuring an unconstitutional system, the attitude of
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reactions have been observed in connection with purely administrative attempts to reform prison programs and organization, suggesting that any attempt at prison reform will initially trigger destabilizaCase studies analyzing the impact of
tion and resistance.'
virtual
unanimity that even when violence and
litigation suggest with
turmoil occur, they may well be short-lived and may give way to
effective and legal methods of control over inmate behavior.' 3 '
5. Litigation Has Increased the Visibility and
Accountability of Corrections
Litigation has opened corrections institutions to scrutiny by
lawyers, judges, state and local agencies, and the media. Institutions
previously insulated from rigorous scrutiny by their remote
locations, the lack of public concern over their inadequacies, and
their careful control over public access face regular evaluation by
lawyers, state agencies, and the courts. The sustained presence of
outsiders, particularly inmates' lawyers, has reduced some of the
more egregious practices and has led to greater adherence to rules
and regulations. 3 2 In some cases, litigation has led to the institution of regular inspections by state agencies charged with overseeing
TDC leadership... played a major role in the precipitous deterioration of
security that occurred.
Id. at 42-45.
150 SeeJACOBS, supra note 45, at 79 (describing the "deeply imbedded resistance
to change" at Stateville, where staff found ways to circumvent new rules); McCleery,
supranote 121, at 113,127-29 (describing how administrative reform efforts of a new
warden in Hawaii prison system led to destabilization as the "old guard" battled to
recapture authority).
131 See CROUCH & MARQUART, supra note 34, at 233 ("[W]hile intervention may
initially promote disorganization and violence, negative consequences do not
necessarilybecome a permanent feature of the prisoners' world. That is, the paradox
of reform is only paradoxical for a relatively short period."); Feeley & Hanson, supra
note 100, at 24-25 (summarizing several long-term or ongoing studies that found
generally that court-ordered reform has not exacerbated continuing problems of
inmate violence and may have resulted in less crowded and safer jails and a "new
and stability").
order
1
12 SeeJACOBS, supra note 45, at 123. Jacobs notes that:
Itis the [Prison Legal Services] staff members' daily presence at the prison,
their persistent questioning of the rules, their relentless demands to see files
and records, and the fear they invoke in the hearts of many of the prison
staff that has the most profound effect on the day-to-day administration of
the prison.... Some of the more egregious practices were halted; short
phone calls and meetings with the warden increased; adherence to the rules
and regulations necessarily became more observable and explicit.
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compliance with state health and safety regulations. Litigation has
also generated considerable media coverage of prison conditions.
Virtually every case study reports extensive media coverage of the
litigation and the conditions and practices in the targeted institutions.'
This media coverage exposed serious abuses and inhumane conditions in correctional institutions, and is widely credited
with increasing public awareness of the inadequacies in correctional
34
institutions and acceptance of the need for reform.1
In sum, litigation has had a considerable effect on the organization, leadership, and structure of corrections institutions. It has
fostered the acceptance of norms and standards governing correctional institutions, contributed to the professionalization of
corrections leadership, prompted the rationalization and formalization of correctional institutions, and increased their visibility and
accountability. Litigation has also been associated with short-term
demoralization of staff and disruption of institutional order.
C. Litigation'sImpact on Conditions and Practices
The case studies also show that court intervention generally has
improved the living conditions and practices in the facilities at issue.
In some cases, the improvements linked to court-ordered change
have been quite dramatic 135 and have concerned virtually every
...
This finding again conflicts with Rosenberg's assessment of the impact of court
intervention, and illustrates the distorting effect of his exclusive focus on the response
to Supreme Court decisions. See ROSENBERG, supra note 13, at 111-16 (minimizing
courts' impact on media coverage of issues such as school desegregation and womens'
rights).
1
34 See, e.g., HARRIS & SPILLER, supra note 31, at 24 ("Repeated publicity about
harsh conditions and brutal or uncaring treatment increased public receptivity toward
correctional reform."); YACKLE, supra note 35, at 45, 66, 95 (describing extensive
media coverage of Alabama litigation); Parker, supra note 32, at 144, 151-52, 159
(documenting media coverage of Arkansas litigation and prison conditions exposed
through it). Public opinion surveys show that, when educated about the issues, the
public "[is] not nearly as punitive as some of their leaders think .... Studies show that
the public views rehabilitation as a primary purpose of criminal sanctions, and they
consistently support treatment for drug-addicted offenders." AMERICANS BEHIND
BARS, supra note 3, at 24.
...
See, e.g., Chilton & Talarico, supranote 39, at 122 ("The pre-Guthrieprison with
its overcrowded dormitory wings, segregated facilities, discriminatory proceedings,
limited medical treatment, and poor sanitation systems gave way to a prison
accredited by the American Correctional Association and held out as a model for the
rest of the state."). As noted by Harris and Spiller:
A great many improvements in the prison system related to the environment
of the prisons and the quality of life enjoyed by the inmates. Those
improvements largely responded directly to requirements established by the
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aspect of inmate life.13 Yet, in many systems improvements have
been limited to raising living conditions to minimal standards, and
have failed to provide a systemic response to the overcrowding
problem plaguing most correctional institutions.
The most blatant abuses, such as Arkansas's Tucker telephone,
Alabama's "doghouses,"137 and widespread use of officially sanctioned violence, have been virtually eliminated, often in direct
response to litigation. 38 The case studies also show that in many
instances, previous legislative and administrative efforts to eliminate
these abuses had been unsuccessful, and that litigation was a crucial
39
factor in exposing and correcting these abuses.
The case studies suggest that litigation may be particularly
successful in improving the quality of medical care and physical
conditions in targeted institutions. Even in cases where compliance
has otherwise been uneven, litigation has led to the development
1 40
and maintenance of a vastly improved system of medical care.
court order.... They were dearly attributable to the litigation ....
The
changes in the prison system were more than cosmetic; theywere broad and
profound. The system bore little resemblance in 1976 to the system that
existed before 1969. Every aspect of prison life was improved by the
litigation.
HARRIS & SPILLER, supranote 31, at 113; see also Storey, supra note 40, at 166 (noting
dramatic improvements in quality of life in the Manhattan House of Detention, also
known as "the Tombs").
16
" See Chilton & Talarico, supra note 39, at 151 ("[T]he overcrowded, run-down,
violent, and poorly managed maximum security prison was rebuilt and restructured
into the
modern, single cell, relatively safe, ACA-accredited institution it is today.")
7
11 The doghouse was the punishment cell in Alabama:
[It] measured only thirty-two square feet in area-the size of an ordinary
door. The doghouse was accessible to visitors only with great difficulty. As
much as a half hour might pass before a guard could locate the keys and
open the main door, described by one witness as a "tombstone." ...
Inmates in the doghouse had no beds, no lights, no toilets, no running
water, no reading matter. They were fed once a day and allowed to shower
once in eleven days. They were never released for exercise. They were
crushed together, as many as six men to a cell, for weeks at a time.
YACKLE, supra note 35, at 12-13.
Iss SeegenerallyMARTIN & EKLAND-OLSON, supra note 34, at 171 (documenting the
role that the court played in forcing Texas officials to acknowledge and eliminate the
building tender system-a system that gave inmates formal authority and weapons to
manage and discipline other inmates).
'39See, e.g., CROUCH & MARQUART, supra note 34, at 91 (noting that litigation
administrators had earlier tolerated the building tender system despite their
recognition of its dangerous and violent character).
140 See, e.g., YACKLE, supranote 35, at 258 (stating that medical and mental health
care, now under contract, are vastly improved); Baiamonte, supra note 47, at 39
("[H]ealth care plans for inmates were 'far superior to the prior arrangements and
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This relative success may be attributable to the independence and
professionalism of medical care providers brought in to provide
services in response to litigation. In addition, the case studies
directly link litigation to the appropriation of funds for capital
41
expenditures to renovate and expand correctional facilities.'
The quality of the food and lighting in prisons has improved
markedly as the result of litigation. Several case studies suggest that
corrections officials are less resistant to court-ordered changes in
physical facilities, and that these types of reforms are easier to
achieve. 142

Litigation has virtually eliminated the use of inmates as trusties
or building tenders. This system of governance, which relied on
inmates to manage other inmates and maintain order, prevailed in
many Southern institutions and contributed strongly to the arbitrary
and violent environment that characterized prison life. Its elimination dramatically transformed the structure of governance in
Southern prisons and eliminated some of the worst abuses in those
systems. 14 1 In many jurisdictions, staffing ratios improved dramat-

went far beyond what was required by the court orders.'... Undoubtedly, Holland
v. Donelon was the impetus to the development of a correctional center medical unit
that is today the only accredited facility in Louisiana...." (quoting a 1975 field study
ofJefferson Parish jail conducted by students and doctors from Tulane University's
Graduate School of Public Health)); MarkJ. Lopez & Dudley P. Spiller,Jr., The New
OrleansJailLitigation (1969-1991), PRISONJ., Fall-Winter 1990, at 50, 52 ("The most
significant gains were made in the areas of medical care and prison security.");
Parker, supra note 32, at 233 (noting that investigators found medical care "to be
adequate or above average with the exception of mental health care").
141 See, e.g., HARIS & SPILLER, supra note 31, at 24 ("The amount of funds
available to the correctional administrators increased significantly in each case.");
MARTIN &EKLAND-OLSON, supra note 34, at 238-39 (stating that in order to meet the
court-imposed standards the state increased its corrections budget significantly). It
is less certain whether litigation has led to overall increases in the noncapital budget
of corrections institutions. Taggart argues that the impact of litigation on operating
costs is negligible in many states. See William A. Taggart, Redefining the Power of the
FederalJudiciary: The Impact of Court-OrderedPrison Reform on State Expendituresfor
Corrections,23 L. & Soc'Y REV. 241,248-68 (1989) (examining the growing willingness
of courts to mandate financial commitments in achieving financial reform and the
link between court-ordered prison reform and state correction expenditures).
142 See Crouch & Marquart,supra note 95, at 101 ("On such issues as poor medical
care, crowding, and sanitation problems.., there was relatively little resistance to
change.... The resistance came instead on those points in the decree that directly
questioned the dominance of officers and their discretion to maintain control in ways
they deemed effective."); Parker, supra note 32, at 362 ("'Structural changes are not
only the easier of the two to accomplish-they are also the most politically feasible
changes to attempt.'" (quoting R. Sarver, Commissioner of Corrections, Little Rock,
Arkansas)).
14'See Feeley & Hanson, supra note 100, at 26 ("Although the [Southern
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ically in response to court orders. 44 In Alabama, once courtordered reforms took hold, the rate of violence plummeted, and
inmates reported that they felt safe in dormitories that were
145
described as a "jungle atmosphere" prior to the litigation.
Crouch and Marquart report that the Texas Department of
Corrections is a safer place as a result of the bureaucratic order
146
instituted in response to court intervention.
In some cases, however, the implementation process has been
unable to overcome internal and external resistance to change,
particularly in areas requiring the cooperation of internal staff or
public officials outside the prison. For example, Larry Yackle
describes the failure of the court's effort to reform Alabama's
system for classifying inmates for purposes of determining custody
grades and program assignments. 47 The court ordered defendants to contract with an outside organization to implement a new
classification plan. The Prison Classification Project ("PCP")
developed new procedures and criteria for classification and

plantation] model ...

had long been under attack, intervention by the courts

removed whatever vestiges of legal legitimacy [have] survived.. .

.");

Feeley & Rubin,

supra note 35, at 143-44 (noting that before the era of prison litigation the Southern
prison systems were based on a premise entirely different from the more familiar
premise on which other American prison systems were based and that litigation
rejected "not only conditions [in Southern prisons] but also the underlying vision of
the prison").
'" See e.g., CROUCH & MARQUART, supra note 34, at 230 (noting that an important
element in the new control structure was a much larger guard force); Parker, supra
note 32, at 374 (describing employment of additional security personnel).
14 YACKLE, supra note 35, at 257; see also HARRIS & SPILLER, supra note 31, at 23
(noting the contribution of Hamilton v. Schiro to the reduction of violent incidents
and the reported improvements in personal safety from each of the cases studied).
146
See CROUCH & MARQUART, supra note 34, at 232 ("Not only do institutional
data reveal less violence, but also inmates in 1987 perceived [the Texas Department
of Corrections] to be a much less dangerous place compared to the late 1970s and
early1471980s.").
See YACKLE, supra note 35, at 138. Yackle notes:
By all accounts, the classification of prisoners was central to the task of
reforming the Alabama prison system. At the basic level of the theory in
Pugh, it was essential to identify violent inmates in order to remove them
from the dormitories .... [I]t was necessary to discover prisoners' needs
and desires so that candidates for educational and vocational programs
could be assigned accordingly.
Id. At the time of the trial in Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318 (M.D. Ala. 1976), aff'd
sub nom. Newman v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1977), rev'd in part per curiam
sub nom. Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, cert. denied, 438 U.S. 915 (1978), "there was
no 'working' classification system in the Alabama prison system.... In general,
inmates were assigned to any institution, any living quarters, and any program where
space was available." YACKLE, supra note 35 at 139 (footnote omitted).
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reclassified all inmates in the Alabama prisons. A year after PCP's
departure, an expert found "little trace of the work that [PCP] had
done.'1

48

Even injurisdictions where litigation is credited with dramatically transforming conditions in correctional institutions, litigation's
impact has often been limited to raising conditions and practices to
minimal standards.'4 9 Harris and Spiller's study of judicial intervention in four correctional settings reports that conditions were
improved, but there was considerable dissatisfaction with the quality
of life.'
In Alabama, Yackle reports that conditions were not
"affirmatively

good ...

merely better. "15 1

Harris

and

Spiller

report that "relief was intended to eliminate illegality and achieve
minimal constitutional acceptability. It was not directed toward the
152
creation of ideal or even progressive programs."
In most of the cases studied involving adult institutions,
litigation has not resulted in the development of progressive, stateof-the-art facilities or deinstitutionalization of offenders.
For
example, there is wide consensus within the corrections field that
corrections should move in the direction of small, decentralized
living units governed by unit management, rather than large,
centrally managed institutions.'
Indeed, experience suggests
I4" Id. at 165. For other examples of prison officials' capacity to ignore, resist, or
sabotage court orders, see Sturm, supra note 24, at 869-71.
14 This is not a surprising finding in light of the courts' limited mandate. Courts
that attempt to require defendants to exceed minimal standards will be reversed on
appeal. See, e.g., Ruiz v. Estelle, 679 F.2d 1115 (5th Cir.) (reversing aspects ofJudge
Justice's order, inter alia, requiring state to use parole and furloughs to reduce
overcrowding and to house only one inmate in cells of 60 feet or less), modified, 688
F.2d 266 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1042 (1983). However, there are many
instances where court intervention has prompted or enabled defendants to go beyond
minimal standards in their programmatic responses. See infra text accompanying
notes 180-182, 210-212.
150See HARRIS & SPILLER, supra note 31, at 22-23 (stating that most of the
institutions were raised only to minimum standards and remained overcrowded,
physical limitations imposed by antiquated structures were not overcome, and
counselling, education, and other programs were not meaningfully available).
151 YACKLE, supra note 35, at 259.
152 HARRIS & SPILLER, supra note 31, at 28.
...
See, e.g., Jim Bencivenga, What Can Be Done Now?, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR,
July 28, 1988, at 14, 15 (repeating call byJohn DiIulio for unit management to help
create better prisons); Penny Wise on Rikers Island, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 1988, at A22
("The city's corrections community offers nearly unanimous support for a shift to unit
management. Correction Commissioner Richard Koehler is an articulate advocate.
The Mayor's CriminalJustice Coordinator, the Board of Correction and the Legal Aid
Society all urge its adoption, as does the National Institute of Correction."); Special
Focus-Unit Management, CORRECIONS TODAY, Apr. 1991, at 24-48 (describing the
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that a move to unit management eliminates many of the problems
prompting judicial intervention." 4 Yet, litigation does not mandate or necessarily increase the use of unit management.

55

Courts have not interpreted the Eighth Amendment to invalidate
outdated institutions that warehouse inmates, even if levels of
violence are predictably higher in those institutions, as long as
inmates receive the basic necessities of life.'56 Methods of incarceration that are generally acknowledged to be ineffectual or
undesirable, such as housing inmates in large, rural institutions with
dormitory-style housing and little opportunity for work or education, persist in systems that achieved compliance with court orders
57
concerning prison conditions.
The case studies also document the tendency of corrections
administrators to respond initially to litigation by focusing tremendous attention and resources on institutions under court order at
the expense of other facilities.'5 8 One case study observes:

value, success, and future of unit management).
" See John J. DiIulio, Jr., Conflicts of CriminalInterest: A Programfor Streets and
Jails, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 1, 1989, § 5, at 3 ("Where it has been tried on Riker's, unit
management has reduced rates of violent incidents and improved inmate-staff

relations.").
15 In an earlier article, I noted that
[t]he constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment is

essentially a negative doctrine, prohibiting certain practices and conditions,
but containing no affirmative normative vision of prison practices.
Constitutional doctrine therefore does not directly mandate the development of norms that promote and protect individual integrity, only the
elimination of visible abuses.
Sturm, supra note 24, at 872-73.
"sIndeed, when Judge Justice required Texas officials to build or restructure
institutions that are amenable to unit management, he was reversed on appeal for
exceeding the scope of the constitutional violation and impermissibly intruding into
administrative discretion. See Ruiz v. Estelle, 679 F.2d 1115, 1145-63 (5th Cir.),
modified, 688 F.2d 266 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1042 (1983).
"n'
See id. at 1148 ("However inefficient the management of large prisons may be
when compared with the administration of smaller ones, and however desirable it may
be to locate prisons near large communities, the failure to do either does not cause
confinement to be cruel and unusual."). Larry Yackle reports thatJudge Johnson
focused exclusively on the conditions in the institutions, and was unwilling to consider
the systemic inadequacies that caused prison overcrowding, or to involve the actors
whose policies and practices thwarted efforts to eliminate unconstitutional
overcrowding. See YACKLE, supra note 35, at 89.
"s One study concludes that "the judiciary's ability to alter pre-established
spending patterns at the state level is partially a function of its willingness to broaden
the scope of reform to focus on the entire prison system rather than on a single
institution." Taggart, supra note 141, at 265.

676

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

LAW REVIEW [Vol. 142: 639

The only facility affected by Stone is County Jail #1. CJ #1 has
received more attention and resources in the past 10 years than
the two other facilities. To a certain extent, these facilities have
suffered from the priority given to CJ #1. They have frequently
been used as an overflow reservoir to prevent overcrowding in CJ
#1. CJ #2 and CJ #3 have far lower staffing levels and are not as
well maintained as CJ #1.
Many officials and employees on
defendants' side would actually prefer if the entire system were
159
under court order.
The case studies reveal considerable variation in litigation's longterm impact on conditions in correctional institutions. In some
cases, particularly where systemic reforms have been achieved and
effective local monitoring mechanisms have been institutionalized,
changes appear to have endured over time.160 In other cases, the
studies reveal substantial backsliding in institutions that have
previously made considerable progress toward achieving constitu16 1
tional conditions.
The impact of judicial intervention on incarceration rates and
construction of new facilities is mixed. In many overcrowding cases,
courts have used caps to limit the population in facilities. 162 The

159 Lungwitz, supra note 46, at 42 (describing the effect of litigation on the San
Francisco county jail system).
16
See e.g., Chilton & Talarico, supra note 39, at 122 (claiming that in the Georgia
maximum security prison at Reidsville changes were the result, in large part if not
solely, of the Guthrielitigation); Mark Soler & Loren Warboys, Servicesfor Violent and
Severely Disturbed Children: The Willie M. Litigation, in STEPPING STONES, supra note
29, at 61, 107-10 (discussing changes in North Carolina's treatment of emotionally
disturbed children that resulted from the WillieM. litigation); Baiamonte, supranote
47, at 39-48 (noting changes in prison conditions in Jefferson Parish, Louisiana that
occurred as a result of the Holland v. Donelon litigation). Vincent Nathan, the
monitor in Guthrie v. Evans, reports that the institutions targeted by the Georgia
litigation remain "clean as a whistle constitutionally." Interview with Vincent Nathan,
Partner, Nathan & Roberts and Special Master, in Washington, D.C. 9 (July 19, 1991)
[hereinafter Nathan Interview] (transcript on file with author).
161See, e.g., YACKLE, supra note 35, at 259 ("Even the new prisons in the north
showed signs of wear; in the south, the threat of slipping back to ruin was palpable.");
Lopez & Spiller, supranote 140, at 53 ("The list of deplorable conditions that resulted
from the crowding generally tracks the findings made byJudge Chistenberry 20 years
ago."); Parker, supra note 32, at 376 (reporting backsliding in overcrowding, verbal
abuse, discipline, and staffing).
162 See, e.g., Celestineo v. Singletary, 147 F.R.D. 258, 261 (M.D. Fla. 1993)
(adopting the Special Master's Report and Recommendation that "for the past several
years the Defendant [prison] has been in no less than substantial compliance with the
Overcrowding Settlement Agreement filed in 1949"); Loya v. Board of County
Commrs., 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11242, at *6 (D. Idaho May 4, 1992) ("The Court
finds that a maximum of forty (40) prisoners at any one time will be allowed in the
current jail facility."); Vazquez v. Carver, 729 F. Supp. 1063, 1069 (E.D. Pa. 1989)

1993]

CORRECTIONS LITIGATION

direct impact of caps on institutions is obvious; if the court
enforces
63
its order the population of the targeted facilities falls.
The more difficult issue concerns the impact of court intervention on the system's overall approach to the overcrowding problem.
The case studies do not answer this question definitively. Several
patterns of response emerge from the case studies. In some cases,
court intervention simply failed to have any significant effect on the
overcrowding problem. 1'
In a significant number of cases,
administrators responded in the short run to population caps by
transferring inmates to other facilities.'6 5 Population limits in
state correctional institutions have in some cases caused delays in
the transfer of sentenced prisoners to state custody, thereby
66
dramatically increasing overcrowding in local jails.
(finding that "[w]ithout a population cap, the inmates ... would be subjected to
continued genuine 'privations and hardship'"); Essex CountyJail Inmates v. Amato,
726 F. Supp. 539,541 (D.N.J. 1989) (finding that a "maximum inmate capacity of 594
effectiveJuly 1, 1983" had not been met as of November 1989); Benjamin v. Malcolm,
659 F. Supp. 1006, 1007 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) ("There is no argument but that the
population caps must be reimposed and that the overcrowding at the North Facility
must end.").
16 See, e.g., HARRIS & SPILLER, supra note 31, at 12-13 (reporting compliance with

a population limit on Orleans and Jefferson Parish Prisons); William G. Babcock,
LitigatingPrisonConditionsin Philadelphia:Part I, PRISONJ., Fall-Winter 1990, at 74,
79 ("While the admissions moratorium certainly was not a long range solution to the
problem of prison overcrowding, it did serve as an effective measure to keep the
population at or near the [maximum allowable population] while the City searched
for and implemented long-range means to alleviate the problem."); Allen F. Breed,
PrisonReform Leads toJailCrisis,PRISONJ., Spring-Summer 1991, at 24,25 (discussing
decision byJudge Higgins to enjoin the state from admitting any new prisoners to the
system until the institutions were brought within their capacity levels, thereby rapidly
eliminating overcrowding in state prisons); Lopez & Spiller, supranote 140, at 52 ("To
this day, Judge Polozola sets the population levels at all of Louisiana's prisons and
jails.").
"' See, e.g., Welsh, supra note 123, at 39 (arguing that new lawsuit filed challenging
overcrowding after first suit failed to produce any significant progress toward dealing
with overcrowding); Parker, supra note 32, at 362 (stating that Arkansas never
reduced overcrowded conditions, particularly in 100-man barracks (citing Finney v.
Mabry, 546 F. Supp. 628, 648 (E.D. Ark. 1982)).
6
1 5 See HARRIS & SPILLER, supra note 31, at 159-60 (noting that in Holland v.
Donelon, transfers were the primary device used to keep population within the court
limit, resulting in the detention ofJefferson Parish prisoners at other facilities where
they experienced overcrowding and other unsatisfactory treatment); YACKLE, supra
note 35, at 171 (reporting that the Commissioner of Corrections in Alabama
responded to each new population cap order by moving prisoners from the jail
concerned to some other jail that was not yet subject to a court order).
166 See, e.g., YACKLE, supra note 35, at 97 (stating that population cap in state case
led to backing up of inmates in local jails); Breed, supra note 163, at 25 (noting that
as a result of population limits in state system, population in local jals in Tennessee
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A second type of response to overcrowding by state and local
officials or the courts involves the use of emergency or stopgap
measures, such as emergency releases of inmates. 167 In many
instances, this approach has not been sufficient to alleviate
overcrowding even in the short run."6 This type of response has
sometimes triggered a strong political backlash that has limited its
69
future availability as a population control mechanism.
A third type of response observed in most of the case studies is
the expansion of the capacity of the targeted system through prison
construction and increased use of temporary housing. In some of
these cases, plans were already in the works for construction of new
facilities, but litigation was credited by some for pushing through
17 0
previously unsuccessful bond issues or expediting construction.
In almost every case studied involving adult institutions, responsible
officials responded to overcrowding orders at least initially by
seeking to build new facilities. 171 In some cases, "the promise of
began to increase rapidly).
67
1 See Lungwitz, supra note 46, at 36 (discussing how the extensive use of prerelease powers given to sheriff by the court were inadequate in combatting
overcrowding).
16 See Babcock, supra note 163, at 79 (discussing diminishing effectiveness of
population cap in part because of amendments expanding exceptions to admissions
moratorium); Lungwitz, supra note 46, at 36 (stating that jail was in violation of
overcrowding provisions prior to opening of new jail even though sheriff made
extensive use of prerelease powers).
169 See YACKLE, supra note 35, at 202-03. In Alabama, the Attorney General
blamed the federal court and governor for the release of inmates, and attempted to
"capitalize on public anxiety over the release of convicts and thus increase his political
popularity-both affirmatively, by resisting the release order in court, and negatively,
by suggesting that [the governor] favored the release of felons and contrasting the
governor's stance with his own." Id. The Fifth Circuit has limited the availability of
prisoner releases as a mechanism for enforcing population caps, directing district
courts first to apply contempt sanctions for noncompliance. See Newman v. Alabama,
683 F.2d 1312, 1321 (11th Cir. 1982) (holding that the district court abused its
discretion by ordering the release of prisoners to alleviate prison overcrowding), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 1050 (1993). Similarly, the Ninth Circuit reversed a district court
order that gave the sheriff the power to supersede sentencing orders and release
inmates when they complete 50% of their sentence. However, it left undisturbed a
ruling allowing the sheriff to release inmates when they complete 70% of their
sentence because this ruling did not require the sheriff to override state law. See
Stone v. San Francisco, 968 F.2d 850 (9th Cir. 1992); see also Richard Barbieri, 9th
Circuit OKsJail Crowding Fines, RECORDER, June 26, 1992, at 1, 1.
170See, e.g., HARRIs & SPILLER, supranote 31, at 25-26 (reporting that in two cases
studied, voters approved bond issues for construction of new facilities in aftermath
of litigation).
171See, e.g., CROUCH & MARQTUART, supra note 34, at 238 (reporting decision by

Texas, California, and other large states to build more prisons); YACKLE, supra note
35, at 255 (noting that a commissioner recognized the futility of construction as a
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a new jail slowed down effective action" toward dealing with the
overcrowding problem.' 72 Invariably, the hope that construction
of new facilities alone would solve the overcrowding problem
proved illusory; within a short time, the new facilities were full and
population pressures continued.' 7
Finally, in some cases the initial reliance on construction
eventually gave way to a more systemic and potentially successful
approach to overcrowding. For example, inJefferson Parish, which
continued to face overcrowding and renewed litigation after
constructing two new jails, local authorities "ordered its Criminal
Justice Coordinating Council ("CJCC") staff to begin a systemic and
coordinated approach so that all parts of the criminal justice system
would contribute to the alleviation of jail overcrowding."" 4 Local
officials report that the costs of building and maintaining new
facilities have led them to turn to nonconstruction methods to
75
alleviate the problem.1

In Tennessee, the Sixth Circuit faced a situation in which
separate population caps had been imposed on the state system and
county jails, making it impossible for the commissioner to comply
means of solving overcrowding yet proposed massive construction program to keep
pace with burgeoning inmate population); Baiamonte, supranote 47, at 41 (discussing
construction of new 302-bed facility in response to overcrowding); Dunbaugh, supra
note 106, at 65 ("[T]he need for more beds diverted much of this budget and most
of next year's capital improvements budget to the construction of two new 50-bed
dormitories ...
172 Zalman,

."); Parker, supra note 32, at 374-75 (describing new facilities).

supra note 116, at 12.

'7' See e.g., YACKLE, supra note 35, at 122 (reporting that a new, larger prison was
built but that it did not offer relief); Zalman, supra note 116, at 12 (noting that new
jail opened in 1985 with authorized room for 750 inmates but was soon occupied by
1300 inmates); see also Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk Co. Jail, 112 S. Ct. 748 (1992)
(documenting the failure of construction of new facility to solve county jail's
overcrowding problem).
174Baiamonte, supra note 47, at 41.42. This approach included the use of
dtations-in-lieu-of-arrest by police, tracking cases, alternative release programs,
releases, "good behavior" reductions in sentences, post-arrest screening by the district
attorney, case scheduling practices, increased use of nonincarcerative sentencing
options, and more lenient bail practices. See id. at 42-45.
175 See id. at 46; see also Thomas Ostrowski,JudicialInterventionandJailReform, in
CRIMINAL CORRECTIONS: IDEALS AND REAISTIES 167,175 (Jameson W. Doig ed., 1983)
(discussing adoption by judge of systemic approach to defining problems and
solutions of overcrowding, with subsequent gradual and steady decline of jail
population and dramatic improvement in living conditions in the jail); Wayne N.
Welsh & Henry N. Pontell, Counties in Court: InterorganizationalAdaptations to Jail
Litigation in California,25 L. & SOC'Y REV. 73, 94-95 (1991) (noting that litigation
contributed to the eventual development of interagency coordination and "more
proactive responses").
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with both. The circuit court responded by initiating a mediation
process facilitated by its senior conference attorney to seek a
The
comprehensive solution to the overcrowding problem.
mediation produced an agreement that led to the appointment of
a Consultant for Local Corrections ("CLC") and the creation of an
Implementation Coordinating Committee ("ICC") composed of
attorneys and county executive officers, sheriffs, the chair of the
parole board, the commissioner of corrections, and legislators. The
CLC performed a population capacity analysis which revealed that
in every county the capacity levels were smaller than existing
populations. The CLC then developed an array of suggestions as to
how to reduce the jail population, which was turned over to the ICC
for review and comment. A final report, appealed by only one
county, was submitted to the court, which ordered the implementation of the CLC's recommendations. This federal court order
initiated a process that led each county to develop a range of
1 76
population reduction mechanisms.
Reports and case studies concerning litigation involving
overcrowding injuvenile institutions suggest that systemic responses
to overcrowding may be easier to achieve in the juvenile justice
system. 177 A case study of the Willie M. 17 1 litigation involving
North Carolina's treatment of aggressive, emotionally disturbed
children reports that the case led to the complete restructuring of
the system for delivering services to these children. 179 The state
reduced the number of children confined in juvenile detention
centers, training schools, and other secure facilities and the number
of days children spent in those institutions."' Since the Willie M.
settlement, there has been an increase in the number of days
children are receiving appropriate treatment, an increased use of
176 See Breed, supra note 163, at 26-28 (discussing different population control
mechanisms, including new construction, early release, and other "creative" options).
" This view was strongly articulated by Barry Krisberg, president of the National
Council on Crime and Delinquency, an organization conducting major research and
consulting in bothjuvenile and adult corrections. See Interview with Barry Krisberg,
President, National Center for Crime and Delinquency, in San Francisco, Cal. 3 (July
17, 1993) [hereinafter Krisberg Interview] (transcript on file with author) (noting that
in the juvenile area there are some clear successes in moving toward community-based
programming, and more openness to these innovations).
178
Willie M. v. Hunt, 657 F.2d 55 (4th Cir. 1981).
79
1 See Soler & Warboys, supra note 160, at 107.
ISO
See id.
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less restrictive settings, and an increase in the use of ancillary nonresidential services.181
In Pennsylvania, litigation also prompted the development of a
system-wide approach to overcrowding in thejuvenilejustice system.
At the initiation of the Juvenile Law Center, participants in the
juvenile justice system negotiated a resolution of litigation concerning conditions and overcrowding in Pennsylvania juvenile justice
institutions."8 2 The parties used interest-based mediation, facilitated by a neutral mediator, to develop a short-term agreement to end
overcrowding in the juvenile detention center and a long-term plan
of regular meetings among responsible officials to develop a unified
approach to juvenile justice in Philadelphia. The implementation
of these agreements has led to a reduction in population and the
development of effective population control mechanisms.
D. Accountingfor Litigation'sMixed Success
A careful analysis of case studies of court intervention in
correctional institutions suggests that the impact of litigation on
conditions and practices varies considerably. In some cases
litigation has prompted dramatic, systemic change that has endured
for years after a court ceased active involvement. In other cases
court intervention has had a more superficial impact, and positive
reforms appear to be short-lived. Before attempting to explain
these varying results, it is important to understand how litigation
ever has a significant impact on conditions, practices, and organizational capacity in correctional institutions.
Given the view articulated by some commentators that courts
lack the capacity to implement their orders, one might ask why
183
litigation has been at all successful in promoting reform.
Analysis of the case studies suggests several factors that prompt
government officials to change in response to court intervention.
First, discovery mechanisms and monitoring devices serve to
uncover the existence of gross inadequacies in prison conditions
181 See id. at 107-08.
2
1' See Schwartz, supra note

116, at 72-75; Robert F. Schwartz, PhiladelphiaSolves
Juvenile Overcrowding by Mediation, OVERCROWDED TIMES, March 1991, at 1, 16
(reporting that three days of. mediation resulted in agreements, a process for
continued management ofjuvenilejustice system, and population levels below courtordered population cap for the first time in over a year).
" For a more thorough discussion of the attributes enabling courts to prompt
correctional reform, see Sturm, supra note 24, at 846-48.
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that are otherwise insulated from sustained public scrutiny.
Extensive and sustained media attention paid to corrections
litigation creates pressure to address these inadequacies. Second,
the case studies suggest that corrections officials are motivated to
achieve compliance with court orders by an overwhelming desire to
get rid ofjudicial involvement and oversight. "The decision makers
don't like to be sued, hate going to court, and fear personal
liability."'
Corrections officials are accustomed to considerable
autonomy, resent the outside intrusion into their domain, and are
extremely anxious to eliminate it.' 85 This response appears to be
particularly pronounced wherejudicial oversight has been active and
where courts have usedjudicial sanctions to respond to noncompliance. 86 Third, major corrections litigation is frequently accompanied by an influx of expertise and resources that expands the
capacity of government officials to manage the process of reform
18 7
and to maintain constitutional facilities.
Finally, prisoners' rights litigators have developed a considerable
presence in the corrections world and have been able to pursue
litigation on a wide scale.18 In systems that have a centralized
administration, administrators are likely to be aware of litigation
against a major institution, even if the entire system is not under
scrutiny. 189 Unlike many areas of public interest advocacy, there

supra note 45, at 118 (citation omitted).
supra note 31, at 17, 401-03 (discussing defendants'
active pursuit of compliance to persuade court to relinquish jurisdiction); YACKLE,
supra note 35, at 259 (stating that primary goal of administration is freedom from
court supervision).
8
1 6 See HARRIS & SPILLER, supra note 31, at 19 (describing cases in which active
judicial supervision fostered compliance); see also Sturm, supra note 24, at 893-94
(describing the importance of using sanctions to create incentives for public officals
to develop
an effective remedy).
87
1 See HARRIS & SPiLLER, supra note 31, at 24-25, 28 (outlining changes in
correctional systems as a result of correctional litigation); Sturm, supra note 24, at
881-84 (describing access to resources and expertise afforded byjudidal intervention);
supra note 141 and accompanying text.
18 For example, the National Prison Project is involved in 29 of the 40 states or
territories that are under court order to improve prison conditions. See Edward I.
Koren, Status Report: State Prisons and the Courts-Januay 1, 1993, NAT'L PRISON
PROJECT J., Winter 1993, at 3, 3-11. The future of funding for organizations
specializing in corrections litigation is uncertain. The Edna McConnell Clark
Foundation recently decided to discontinue general support for corrections litigation.
For a discussion of the current future state of legal representation of inmates in cases
challenging conditions of confinement in correctional institutions, see generally
Sturm, supra note 23.
189 See HARIS & SPILLER, supra note 31, at 26-27, 383-84, 409-10 (discussing
official awareness of litigation against a single institution within a system).
'4 JACOBS,

"sSee

HARRIS & SPILLER,
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is no shortage of individuals willing to file corrections litigation
challenging conditions of confinement in prisons. 190 Prisoners
have both the time and inclination to file litigation. Although most
of these cases never make it past a motion to dismiss,191 some do
lead to the appointment of extremely competent counsel. 92 Thus,
many correctional administrators view litigation as a fact of life that
must be addressed.
However, litigation has not been uniformly effective in either
promoting constitutional compliance or prompting systemic reform.
The case studies provide a basis for offering several tentative
explanations for this variation in response, although they are
necessarily preliminary and exploratory.
First, litigation has been identified as having the most dramatic
and far-reaching structural effects in the South, where prisons
previously were modeled on the plantation system, and were selfsufficient and dependent on agriculture.'
In the South, the
courts "repudiated a longstanding and deeply ingrained approach
to prisons and replaced it with an alternative model, one that was
in line with the dominant view of corrections officials and organizations across the nation."'94 This observation may reflect a more
fundamental pattern: litigation may be most effective in transforming institutions that deviate from a widely shared professional and
social norm.
Second, case studies and assessments of litigation in corrections
and other areas highlight the importance of enlisting the support of
10 See Eisenberg, supra note 15, at 419 ("In fiscal year 1991, more than 26,000
prisoner civil rights cases were filed in the United States district courts. This
represented 12% of all district court civil filings, and substantially exceeded the total
of all other civil rights cases combined." (citations omitted)). This feature of
corrections litigation, along with the centralization ofstate corrections administration,
was not taken into account in Rosenberg's sweeping pronouncements concerning the
failure of the judiciary as a tool for social reform.
19
' See William B. Turner, When PrisonersSue: A Study of PrisonerSection 1983 Suits
in the FederalCourts, 92 HARv. L. REv. 610, 660-61 (1979) (detailing statistics in five
judicial districts concerning survival of motions to dismiss in prisoners' rights cases).
12
See YACKLE, supranote 35, at 50-51 (outlining appointment of counsel in prison
rights cases); Sturm, supranote 28 (describing involvement of private practitioners in
prisoners' rights cases through court appointments). For a discussion of the
inadequacy of current approaches to court appointments of private counsel in
prisoner civil rights cases, see Eisenberg, supra note 15, at 455-56 (a review of all
prisoner civil rights files in three federal districts revealed that no case was filed by
an attorney).
. See Feeley, supra note 36, at 278 (describing old plantation-style systems).
1
14 Id. at 279.
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crucial insiders within the targeted system to achieve lasting reform.
Both supporters and critics of judicial intervention have noted the
significance of this factor in achieving system reform. For example,
Sheryl Dicker, the editor of a volume containing five case studies of
child advocacy efforts, concludes that "advocates must find a
'partner' inside government to achieve successful implementation
of reforms."' 9 5 Gerald Rosenberg, who is generally skeptical of
the capacity of courts to achieve significant reform, concludes that
courts can be effective producers of significant social reform when
"[a] dministrators and officials crucial for implementation are willing
to act and see court orders as a tool for leveraging additional
resources or for hiding behind."'9 6 Joel Handler also observes
that the "bureaucratic contingency" that thwarts much judicially
mandated change can be overcome by forming alliances with crucial
government agencies. 9 Harris and Spiller identified "unwillingness or inability to comply on the part of one or more necessary
actors" as one of two variables explaining noncompliance with court
98
orders.
Although cooperation of crucial insiders is an important
ingredient of successful implementation, it is not a variable that
remains constant or unaffected by the courts. Judicial intervention
frequently affects the stance of key decision-makers toward reform.
Leaders who were sympathetic to litigation at the outset sometimes
become more hostile as the litigation proceeds and the adversary
process takes over.'9 9

Some officials who were initially skeptical

or hostile to judicial intervention become more supportive as a
result of constructive interactions with judicial officers or recognition of potential benefits flowing from the litigation. 200 In addition, new leaders and staff often accompany litigation. 20 1 The
dynamic character of the litigation process makes reliable predictions about the level of cooperation with and the likely success of
court intervention difficult.

The strategy of judicial intervention is a third factor accounting
for the differential success of litigation. I have argued elsewhere
195 Sheryl

Dicker, Introduction to STEPPING STONES, supra note 29, at 7.
ROSENBERG, supra note 13, at 36.
1 See HANDLER, supra note 6, at 196-97.
198HARRIS & SPILLER, supra note 31, at 5.
1
See id. at 87 (detailing shift of prison administrators' attitudes during litigation).
21 See id. at 10-13,26 (describing more receptive climate to judicial intervention).
21 See id. at 15, 24-25 (outlining cases in which prison staffs have grown or been
replaced); supra note 116 and accompanying text.
19
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that a court's capacity to intervene effectively in correctional
institutions depends, at least in part, on the approach adopted by
the court to manage the compliance process." 2 I identify the
catalyst approach combining a deliberative remedial formulation
process with the use of traditional sanctions to induce compliance
as the approach most likely to lead to successful intervention,
drawing on case studies to support this conclusion.1 3 Recent case
studies confirm the significance ofjudicial approach in defining the
court's potential. Case studies also suggest that approaches
encouraging mediated remedies, such as the use of court-appointed
officials to assist in developing and monitoring a decree, contribute
20 4
to the success of judicial intervention.
Finally, the case studies suggest that progress has been made
over the last twenty years in the development of creative and
constructive approaches to judicial intervention, and that the use of
these approaches enhances the likelihood of achieving institutional
reform.0 5 Judges and litigators have developed more cooperative
forms of factfinding, remedial formulation, and monitoring that
minimize the adverse effects of the adversary process and enhance
the possibility of cooperative approaches to solving the problems
identified through litigation or the threat of litigation. 0 6 These
approaches include: (1) the use of expert panels selected by the
parties to perform factfinding, assist in developing remedies and
monitor compliance; 207 (2) the use of court-supervised mediation
to achieve a consensual remedy that addresses the problems
underlying constitutional violations;208 (3) the use of existing
oversight mechanisms in the enforcement stage, such as state
regulatory agencies and the accreditation process; (4) the use of
monitoring mechanisms that employ defendants' employees as
22
203
204

See Sturm, supra note 24, at 848.
See id. at 856-60 (outlining "catalyst" approach and its effectiveness).
See, e.g., Chilton, supra note 46, at 106-07 (describing successful use of

mediation and/or negotiation to achieve ultimate settlement and compliance in South
Carolina and Georgia prison cases).
205 See, e.g., STEPPING STONES,

supra note 29, at 56-59 (discussing the successful use

of a variety of advocacy strategies in selected case studies); Schwartz, supra note 182,
at 16-17 (describing successful mediation of issues raised by three cases challenging
conditions and overcrowding in Philadelphia's juvenile institutions); infra text

accompanying notes 418-31.
2'6 See Sturm, supra note 9, at 1373-76 (describing cases employing collaborative
remedial
approaches).
207
20

See id. at 1366-67, 1371-73.

s See id. at 1373-75.

686

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

LAW REVIEW [Vol. 142: 639

compliance officers; and (5) consolidation of cases involving related
institutions to avoid the tendency to displace problems to institu29
tions not under the purview of a particular court. 1
A related development involves the emerging recognition by
advocates, defendants, and judges of the importance of systemic
approaches to court intervention.
The most successful court
interventions identified in the literature are those that take into
account the systemic nature of the problems in defining the
litigation and developing remedial solutions. 211 Other studies
suggest that litigation is most likely to increase the resources
211
devoted to criminal justice if it targets the entire system.
Particularly in the juvenile area, where litigation is more likely to
target agencies with overlapping or complementary responsibilities,
case studies suggest the potential for significant systemic reform.

21 2

II. THE CONTINUED NEED FOR CORRECTIONS LITIGATION

The corrections field has progressed considerably over the past
twenty years, in part as a result of litigation. 213 This progress,
214
along with the limited role of litigation in corrections reform,
poses the issue of the continued significance of corrections
litigation in the next decade. Has litigation run its course?
There is strong evidence that litigation continues to play a
crucial role in achieving and maintaining minimally adequate
correctional institutions, and that this need will continue through
the next decade. 215 This Section summarizes the circumstances
justifying the continued need for litigation concerning conditions
and practices in correctional institutions.
209 See supra notes 174-76 and accompanying text; see also Sturm, supra note 9, at
1373-76; Interview with Nancy Ortega, Staff Attorney, Southern Center for Human
Rights, in Atlanta, Ga. 4 (Aug. 11, 1991) [hereinafter Ortega Interview] (transcript on
file with author) (describing coordinated litigation in Virginia, Texas, and Alabama).
210 See supra text accompanying note 160 (stating that systemic reforms have
endured).
211 See Taggart, supra note 141, at 263-65.
212 See supra notes 177-82 and accompanying text.
213 See supra text accompanying notes 100-18 (discussing effects of corrections
litigation).
214 The issue of the continued viability of litigation with the federal courts'
increasing conservatism is addressed in the next Section. See infra notes 273-319 and
accompanying
text.
21
5 See generally Sturm, supra note 24, at 815-46 (describing the dynamics of
"organizational stasis" in prisons).
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A. Conditions in CorrectionsInstitutions Continue to Deprive
Inmates of Minimally Adequate Living Conditions
Conditions threatening the health and safety of inmates
continue to plague many correctional institutions, even in institutions that have been subject to suit.21 6 Compliance with minimal
standards of constitutional decency has yet to be achieved in many
of the state institutions and systems currently under court order.217 In numerous cases lacking vigorous judicial enforcement,
little progress toward achieving and developing systems for
21

6 See e.g., DeGidio v. Pung, 920 F.2d 525, 527-31 (8th Cir. 1990) (documenting

serious and longstanding failure of prison officials to respond to tuberculosis
outbreak); Tillery v. Owens, 719 F. Supp. 1256, 1259 (W.D. Pa. 1989) (condemning
the State Correctional Institution at Pittsburgh as an "overcrowded, unsanitary, and
understaffed firetrap"), aff'd, 907 F.2d 418 (3d Cir. 1990); Inmates of Occoquan v.
Barry, 717 F. Supp. 854, 855, 858-64 (D.D.C. 1989) (finding that sanitation in the
dorms was "deplorable," the bathrooms were in terrible condition, a serious fire
safety hazard problem existed, food services posed a health risk, medical services
experienced major failures, and mental health services were grossly inadequate),
appeal dismissed in part, aff'd in part, 874 F.2d 147 (3d Cir.), vacated, 493 U.S. 948
(1989); Inmates at the Allegheny CountyJail v. Wecht, 699 F. Supp. 1137, 1139, 1147
(W.D. Pa. 1988) (noting that although conditions were a vast improvement over what
they were when the case began in 1976, "[s]evere overcrowding, inadequate cell size,
inadequate staffing and the insufficient medical and psychiatric services [did] not
provide even minimally adequate care"); Fisher v. Koehler, 692 F. Supp. 1519, 1562
(S.D.N.Y. 1988) (finding "systemic deficiencies" in failure to control violence), affid,
902 F.2d 2 (2d Cir. 1990); Erin Hallissy, PrisonRights Groups Call for FBI Probe at
Vacaville, S.F. CHRON.,July 11, 1991, at A20 (reporting that after heat-related deaths
of three inmates, prison rights groups called for investigation of "the inhumane
treatment of prisoners, lack of medical attention in all areas, unhealthy living
conditions, food and dietary needs"); Dan Weikel, Report Assails Conditions at State
PrisonforWomen, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 11, 1990, at A3 (stating that a legislative committee
report on prison conditions documented poor medical care, drug trafficking, charges
of sexual assaults, filthy conditions, dangerous conditions, and spoiled food); Thomas
D. Williams & Colin Poitras, Reports Show Poor Conditions at Prison, HARTFORD
CoURANT, July 4, 1992, at Cl (reporting that monthly reports filed by warden
revealed overcrowding, fire-code violations, inmate violence, and poor inmate health
care).
217
Se e.g., TwelveJohn Does v. District of Columbia, 855 F.2d 874, 874-75 (D.C.
Cir. 1988) (upholding contempt citation for District's failure to take steps adequate
to eradicate overcrowding problem); Palmigiano v. DiPrete, 737 F. Supp. 1257, 1259
(D.R.I. 1990) ("Because of the increase [in population] and the resultant overcrowding,. . . conditions in the ISC now were 'much, much worse, much, much worse' than
they were in 1985."); Fambro v. Fulton County, 713 F. Supp. 1426, 1428-31 (N.D. Ga.
1989) (finding health-threatening defects in medical care system, unsanitary
conditions). For a general discussion of current conditions in prison, jails, and
juvenile institutions, see generally HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, PRISON CONDITIONS IN THE
UNITED STATES (1991) (suggesting that the use of excessive force, inadequate physical
conditions, sexual abuse, grossly inadequate medical care, and absence of programming are characteristic in many correctional institutions).
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maintaining constitutional conditions has occurred.2 18 Overcrowding has undermined the progress toward compliance made in many
jurisdictions, and conditions in many jails appear to be particularly
219

poor.
The pressures of increasing populations and limited budgets
account for a significant portion of the recent deterioration of
conditions in correctional institutions. Between 1980 and 1990, the
22
number of people incarcerated in the United States doubled. 1
At the beginning of 1991, "state and federal prisons were operating
218 See Morales Feliciano v. Romero Barcelo, 672 F. Supp. 591, 621-23 (D.P.R.

1986), enforced sub. nom. Morales Feliciano v. Hernandez-Colon, 697 F. Supp. 26
(D.P.R. 1987) (citing prison for contempt of earlier court order); OFFICE OF THE
COURT MONITOR, CASE SUMMARY: MORALES FELICIANO V. HERNANDEZ COLON (1992)
(documenting extreme overcrowding, violence, excessive use of force, and deplorable
sanitary conditions that persisted for years following the issuance of a court order,
and the stipulation recently entered as a result of active judicial oversight); Lopez &
Spiller, supra note 140, at 53-55 (documenting neglect of court orders requiring
elimination of severe overcrowding, dangerous physical conditions, and other serious
deprivations in the absence of monitoring activity by plaintiffs' lawyers or the court).
"' See e.g., Carver v. Knox County, Tenn., 753 F. Supp, 1370, 1376-79 (E.D. Tenn.
1989) (finding that overcrowding routinely forced inmates to sleep on mattresses on
the floor, two of the three toilets were nonfunctioning and served as locations on
which inmates sleep, inmates were forced to share mattresses, inmates were deprived
of blankets and towels during periods of gross overcrowding, and the level of violence
increased dramatically), affd in par4 rev'd in part, 887 F.2d 1287 (6th Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 495 U.S. 919 (1990); Gilland v. Owens, 718 F. Supp. 665, 686 (W.D. Tenn.
1989) ("The proof at trial plainly established a high level of violence at the Shelby
County Jail and a pervasive and constant threat of personal harm to inmates from
attacks by other inmates."); Fambro v. Fulton County, Ga., 713 F. Supp. 1426, 1428
(N.D. Ga. 1989) (stating that sheriff concluded that "Fulton CountyJail rests in an
unsafe and insecure condition, making it difficult if not impossible to provide an
adequate level of basic human services to the inmate population"); Brock v. Warren
County, Tenn., 713 F. Supp. 238, 243-44 (E.D. Tenn. 1989) (awarding damages to
children of inmate who died as a result of being housed in cell with no ventilation,
extremely high heat and humidity, characterized by sheriff as "not fit to house
prisoners during the summer");Jackson v. Gardner, 639 F. Supp. 1005, 1008, 1011
(E.D. Tenn. 1986) (finding that jail conditions in which inmates were confined 24
hours daily in physically dilapidated, insect infested, dimly lit, poorly ventilated area,
averaging under 20 square feet per inmate with inadequate sanitary facilities,
recreation, and fire escape plans constituted cruel and unusual punishment); Albro
v. County of Onondaga, 627 F. Supp. 1280, 1287 (N.D.N.Y. 1986) ("[C]ontinuous
overcrowding resulting in inmates being housed in corridors-particularly those not
provided cots; inmates not being segregated-particularly persons not mentally
unstable being housed with the mentally unstable inmates ... and the lack of
activities outside of the cell blocks [does not] comport with contemporary standards
of decency."); Inmates and GuardsJoinin Suit on Conditions,N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 1989,
at A21 (reporting that inmates and guards joined forces in lawsuit challenging
overcrowding and understaffing in tense county jail in Seattle).
220 See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BULLETIN:
PRISONERS IN 1990, at 1 (1991).
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at 25.1 percent over capacity.... The National Council on Crime
and Delinquency projects that by 1994, the state and federal prison
population will reach one million, an increase of more than 200
percent since 1980. " 221 Jails and juvenile facilities are experienc222
ing similar increases in population.
Overcrowding threatens to overwhelm the capacity of correction223
al systems to maintain minimally adequate living conditions.
Case after case recounts the dramatic and devastating effects of
overcrowding on the conditions in corrections institutions. The
observations of the court in the Rhode Island prison litigation are
typical: "Overcrowding at the ISC, in Mr. Gordon's opinion, has
overwhelmed the institution's maintenance and support services
and, therefore, it represents 'an immediate and overt threat to the
inmate population. ' " 224 The implications of overcrowding were
highlighted by expert testimony in Palmigiano v. Garrahy,225 an
earlier, related, Rhode Island case:
[Overcrowding] leads to tension and frustration; the potential is
created for magnification of problems; small misunderstandings
become large ones; retaliation becomes inevitable. Over the past
three and one-half years, the rate of assaults at the ISC has
increased; the level of inmate assaults on staff approximate one
every two weeks. In addition, ... the double-celling had a
negative impact on classification because it prevented the proper
separation of certain kinds of prisoners.
.. Predictably, the overcrowding has also created numerous
environmental health problems.... The ventilation, plumbing,
noise levels, and food services are all being over-taxed with
commensurate maintenance problems impacting on the general
226
living conditions.

supra note 3, at 1.
In 1989, the average occupancy ofjails was 108%. The largest facilities-those
with more than 1000 inmates averaged 126% of capacity. See HuMAN RIGHTS WATCH,
supra note 217, at 18-19. "In 1988, a one-day census of publicly operated juvenile
detention centers found that more than half of all youth were detained in overcrowded facilities and that 27.5 percent of the total of 422 facilities were over capacity."
2' AMERICANS BEHIND BARS,

CASEY FRAMEWORK PAPER, supra note 5, at 4.

. See, e.g., Palmigiano v. DiPrete, 700 F. Supp. 1180 (D.R.I. 1988); Palmigiano v.
Garrahy, 443 F. Supp. 956, 985-86 (D.R.I. 1977) (holding state officials would be in
contempt if they failed to comply with court-mandated prison reforms), affid, 616 F.2d
598 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 839 (1980).
.4DiPrete,737 F. Supp. at 1260.
639 F. Supp. 244, 249 (D.R.I. 1986).
2 'Id.; see also Inmates of Occoquan v. Barry, 717 F. Supp. 854, 858-64 (D.D.C.
1989) (documenting effects of chronic overcrowding); Fambro v. Fulton County, Ga.,
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In many systems that have previously achieved compliance with
court orders to improve conditions and programs, overcrowding has
led to a recurrence of such basic problems as violence, inadequate
service delivery, unsafe living conditions, and renewed activity by
the courts in response to these conditions. 227 Many defendants
have responded to population increases by seeking to modify caps
to allow facilities to house additional inmates even though those
facilities have already been found to be constitutionally deficient at
228
existing population levels.

713 F. Supp. 1426, 1428 (N.D. Ga. 1989) ("[D]ue to this excessive population... in
my professional opinion the Fulton County Jail rests in an unsafe and insecure
condition."); Jackson v. Gardner, 639 F. Supp. 1005, 1009 (E.D. Tenn. 1986) ("The
primary cause of Sullivan County's constitutional violation is the overcrowding.");
Albro v. County of Onondaga, 627 F. Supp. 1280, 1285-86 (N.D.N.Y. 1986)
("Overcrowding has adversely affected many aspects of living conditions at the PSB
.... There is increased tension and propensity for physical threats and violence
because of the housing situation, the failure to segregate inmates by statutory
classification, and the apparent inability of the deputies to adequately perform their
supervisory duties.").
'7 In Palmigiano, for example, the defendants sought to be released from
injunctive obligations based on a Special Master's report showing substantial improvement in their compliance with a 1977 injunction. The court denied the motion, citing
the lack of complete compliance and the dangers posed by overcrowding. See 639 F.
Supp. at 257-58. In 1990, the court held defendants in contempt and in "continuing
contempt" based on a "record of sordid and explosively dangerous conditions"
brought about largely by worsening overcrowding. See DiPrete,737 F. Supp. at 126162. Similar deterioration of compliance efforts were reported in other prison
systems. See Babcock, supra note 163, at 75 (Philadelphia); Baiamonte, supra note 47,
at 40 (Baltimore); Lungwitz, supra note 46, at 29 (San Francisco); Parker, supra note
32, at 213 (Arkansas); see also Storey, supra note 40, at 163 (New York City). The
American Public Health Association has reported:
Other states in which significant noncompliance has been alleged or proved
after a lapse of years without controversy include Kansas (1980 decree
reopened in 1988, injunctive relief granted, new decree in 1989), Louisiana
(case reopened in 1989, investigations pending), Michigan (contempt found
in 1989), New Hampshire (contempt motion pending), and Utah (new
litigation filed, restraining order issued, contempt proceedings filed in
1989).
Brief of the American Public Health Association as Amicus Curiae at 36 n.32, Wilson
v. Seiter, 111 S. Ct. 2321 (1991) (No. 89-7376). "Unchecked overcrowding has
devastating effects on the entire institutional program." Interview withJohn Boston,
Legal Director, Prisoners Rights Project, Legal Aid Society of New York, in New York,
N.Y. 10 (July 23, 1991 and Aug. 7, 1991) [hereinafter Boston Interview] (transcript
on file with author).
228 See OFInCE OF THE COURT MoNrrOR, supra note 218, at 5, 12 (noting that

despite conditions in which inmates were "stacked like cordwood in institutions
throughout the island," defendants filed second motion to modify crowding
stipulation).
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The fiscal crisis currently facing state and local governments is
an additional factor undermining the progress made toward
achieving minimally adequate conditions in correctional institutions.22 9 Many states and localities have attempted to cut staff and
slash operating and capital budgets for corrections, even in the face
of court orders and increasing populations. 230 In many cases,
drastic judicial action has been needed to prevent states from
cramming inmates into already overcrowded facilities with reduced
staff and services.

231

Overcrowding is not the type of problem that corrections
administrators ordinarily can remedy without outside support. In
many instances, without pressure from the courts, they receive
neither the legislative and executive support necessary to redirect
correctional policy, nor the resources necessary to maintain
232
adequate levels of service delivery.
B. No Effective Check on the Conditions in Correctional
Institutions Other than Litigation or the Threat
of Litigation Has Emerged
Litigation has served to open correctional institutions to public
scrutiny, to hold officials accountable for the institutions they run,

I

See Carleton R. Bryant, Senators Told of Cities' Plight Amid Cutbacks, WASH.

TIMES, Jan. 9, 1992, at A3 (describing necessity of cutting services due to "triple
whammy" of "federal funding reductions, state cutbacks, and the continuing
recession"); Leila Corcoran, City Finances Crumble Across the Nation, League Says,
REuTERS Bus. REP.,July 8, 1991, at I (stating 61% of the nation's municipalities face
a budget deficit in 1991); Osborn Elliot, End the FederalAbandonment of U.S. Cities,
USA TODAY, May 4, 1992, at 13A ("[D]uring the past 10 years, ... federal aid to
states and cities was cut by $78 billion.").
20
I See, e.g., Dunbaugh, supra note 106, at 65 (stating that city's fiscal difficulties
have led to budget restrictions that limit needed staff increases, and delay sorely
needed capital improvements and maintenance); Lungwitz, supra note 46, at 37 ("In
addition to increasing populations, the Department of Public Health had to
accommodate a 10% budget cut in 1988 and face the AIDS epidemic.").
2s See e.g., Duran v. Anaya, 642 F. Supp. 510, 511, 525 (D.N.M. 1986) (holding
that lack of funds was no defense to failure to meet minimum constitutional
standards, and enjoining proposed budget and staff cuts directed at medical care,
mental health care, and security staffing in statewide class action previously resolved
by consentjudgment); Zalman, supra note 116, at 12 (noting that "budgetary disputes
...ultimately required the Court to enter an order... delineating the staff positions
at the Jail deemed necessary for compliance" with previous court orders (quoting
from Receivership Order designating a county executive as receiver of the prison)).
"2 See Sturm, supra note 24, at 840-42 (explaining that administrators have only
a limited ability to control overcrowding due to resistance from legislators and
executives, and the nature ofjudicial sentencing processes).
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and to create pressure to achieve and maintain constitutional
prisons and jails. The pressures toward isolation and insulation,
however, lurk on the horizon. External scrutiny and accountability
are crucial to prevent prisons and jails from routinely subjecting
inmates to the brutal conditions that characterized the isolated
institutions of yesteryear.23 3
In most jurisdictions, effective
methods of holding corrections accountable have not yet developed.
There is persuasive evidence that without litigation many
correctional systems will insulate themselves from outside scrutiny
and thus prevent the disclosure of inadequate conditions that is so
crucial to correctional reform. Human Rights Watch, an organization that investigates the human rights aspects of imprisonment in
the United States and abroad, reports:
We were discouraged by the difficulty and slowness of the process
of obtaining permission to visit American prisons (which com-

pared unfavorably with our experience in several less democratic
countries).

Human Rights Watch's experience in gaining access to U.S.
prisons and in seeing what we needed to see there provides a
telling illustration of how difficult it is for the American23public
to
4
obtain a reliable picture of the situation within prisons.

Human Rights Watch investigators report that in some institutions,
their visits were carefully managed, and they were unable to visit the
areas and facilities that they had specifically requested. 235 Indeed,
the report relies heavily on reported cases for its description of
conditions in correctional institutions. Similarly, much of the media
coverage of prison and jail conditions in recent years concerns
information and assessments obtained through litigation. Without
litigation, the salutary role played by the media in exposing
inadequacies in prison conditions will be diminished." 6
2- See generally id. (arguing that because of entrenched normative frameworks,

incentive structures, information processing systems, and power dynamics,
correctional institutions are incapable of internal reform without judicial intervention).
234 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 217, at 9.
"sSee id. at 1-2. In an informal discussion with the author at the 1992 National
Legal Aid and Defender Association Conference, the individual responsible for
conducting many of the needs assessment studies for legal services reported similar
difficulty in obtaining access to correctional facilities.
2' Recent case law limiting prisoners' access to the media and the right of
reporters to obtain access to prisons adds to this concern. See, e.g., Smith v. Delo, 995
F.2d 827, 830 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding that regulation requiring that inmates' mail be
sent to the prison mailroom unsealed for inspection is rationally related to prison
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In addition, without the realistic threat of litigation, corrections
advocates lack any effective means of influencing public officials to
take seriously inmates' concerns. Inmates lack political power to
advocate effectively on their own behalf; in most states they are not7
23
allowed to vote, even after they have completed their sentences.
The plight of criminal offenders rarely inspires effective political
mobilization.3
At least for adult offenders, coalitions with the
political clout to influence governors and legislators do not
exist. 239 Without external pressure to correct serious deficiencies,
the dynamics of organizational stasis predispose responsible officials
to avoid rocking the boat. 40
Nor is there persuasive evidence that the American Correctional
Association ("ACA") or any other professional organization within
the corrections field currently performs an effective oversight role
in the absence of litigation. The American Correctional Association
officials' legitimate interests); Mann v. Adams, 846 F.2d 589, 590-91 (9th Cir. 1988)
(finding no special deference for mail from the media to prisoners required in the
light of security considerations), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 898 (1988); Gaines v. Lane, 790
F.2d 1299, 1305-07 (7th Cir. 1986) (denying privileged status to mail from the media
and rejecting prisoners' First Amendment claim that mail inspection process denied
access to the media as an alternate means for petitioning the government);Jersawitz
v. Hanberry, 783 F.2d 1532, 1534 (11th Cir.) (upholding regulation that limits
interview access for inmate interviews to representatives of the news media employed
by radio or television stations holding FCC licenses), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 883 (1986).
"7 See Judy Goldberg & Nadine Marsh, Ex-Offenders Find Doors Closed on Voting

Rights, NAT'L PRISON PROJECTJ., Spring 1985, at 3, 3-4 (stating that ex-offenders may
find it difficult, if not impossible, to regain voting rights after being released in most
states).
' Although there is greater sympathy and potential for political advocacy for
children, there is little public sympathy for children who have committed serious
offenses. See Soler Interview, supra note 15, at 4 (noting thatjuvenile offenders can
elicit antipathy as well as sympathy); Interview with Allen Breed, Director, National
Institute of Corrections, in San Francisco, Cal. 3 (July 19, 1991) [hereinafter Breed
Interview] (transcript on file with author). Breed, who is a former commissioner of
the California Youth Authority, and who currently serves as a master in various
corrections cases, notes a rising public perception that juvenile offenders are
dangerous and should be treated like adults. See id. at 3.
29
" See Breed Interview, supra note 238, at 3; see also BARBARA L. MCELENEY,
CORRECrIONAL REFORM IN NEW YORK: THE ROCKEFELLER YEARS AND BEYOND 30
(1985) ("Because Corrections had traditionally been accorded a low priority and there
were ... no public riots nor demonstrations within the prisons that demanded
Gubernatorial reaction, the Division of the Budget was granted virtual autonomy in
the trimming or amendment of the original Correction Department budget.").
40 See Sturm, supra note 24, at 832 ("The governor is often concerned with
keepinginmates in, costs down, and visible disturbances out of the news .... Because
change is perceived as posing a substantial risk of disruption, the governor's office
frequently enhances the pressure toward custody, order, and the status quo.").
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has created a set of standards for all correctional functions, and is
currently in the process of auditing state and local agencies to assess
their compliance with these standards and accrediting those that
do.24 ' Although more than 100 facilities and programs sought
accreditation in 1991, accreditation does not adequately assure that
the institutions are constitutional.2 42 Moreover, the accreditation
process lacks any sanctions for lack of accreditation. 4 ' Indeed,
corrections professionals themselves report that a major incentive
for participation in the accreditation process is the avoidance of
litigation. 2" Litigation has been a necessary catalyst for involvement in the accreditation process in many instances of successful
change through accreditation.245 Moreover, the accreditation
241 See CLEAR & COLE,

supra note 113, at 143.

21 See LaMarca v. Turner, 662 F. Supp. 647, 655 (S.D. Fla. 1987) (finding that

accreditation had "virtually no significance because accredited institutions have been
found unconstitutional by the courts"); see also Lynn S. Branham, Accreditation:
Making a Good ProcessBetter, 57 FED. PROBATION 11, 11 (1993). Branham, a member
of the Commission on Accreditation for Corrections, reported that she is "not
confident that accreditation adequately ensures that the conditions of confinement
in certain institutions are constitutional." Id. She found that auditors rarely take
steps to investigate the status of litigation pending against a facility that has applied
for accreditation. See id. at 13. Branham was concerned that auditors "gloss over"
problems they have observed in a facility, and characterizes some auditors' reports as
"incomplete and misleading." Id. at 14. Finally, she noted instances in which auditors
failed to mention or explore substantial questions concerning compliance with
accreditation standards. See id. at 14-15.
24 Although more than 1000 facilities are participating in the accreditation
process, see George M. Phyfer, Accreditation: Corrections' Foundation, CORRECTIONS
TODAY, May 1992, at 8, the process is purely voluntary. Because states and federal
officials have no opportunity to close down or withdraw funds if institutions fail to
comply, and inmates cannot choose to go elsewhere if an institution is substandard,
correction accreditation lacks the sanction necessary to give it teeth. See John P.
Conrad, ChartingaCourseforImprisonmentPolicy, 478 ANNALS AM. AcAD. POL. & SOC.
Sci. 123,124 (1985) (notingan absence of "disadvantages accruing to an unaccredited
prison such as those that can ruin an unaccredited university or hospital"). Although
the ACA believes that "the prospect of accreditation will be the carrot to lead funding
sources to open their purses .... [i]n practice, correctional operations of such
dubious quality have been funded that the entire accreditation process has lost
credibility." CLEAR & COLE, supra note 113, at 143.
2
See M. Wayne Huggins & Charles J. Kehoe, Accreditation Benefits Nation'sJails,
Juvenile Detention Centers, CORRECTIONS TODAY, May 1992, at 40, 42 ("[M]ost
correctional administrators involved in the accreditation process see it as another
form of insurance.... designed to avoid judgments."); Rod Miller, Standardsand the
Courts: An Evolving Relationship, CORRECTIONS TODAY, May 1992, at 58, 60
("Accreditation officials are now experimenting with [a checklist] that attempts to
apply judges' priorities in assessing a facility's overall acceptability.").
45
See Paul E. Humphries, Mandatory Accreditation: Ensuring Quality Care in
Tennessee'sJuvenile Facilities,CORRECTIONS TODAY, Oct. 1986, at 82 (describing how
Tennessee passed mandatory accreditation legislation in response to a court order
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process has not been able to hold the line against the pressures of
limited budgets and increasing populations. 246 In response to
pressures on corrections administrators to manage their facilities
with fewer resources for greater numbers of inmates, the ACA
diluted the standards governing adequate living space. 247 The
National Prison Project and the American Bar Association provided
the only organizational opposition to this move. "The power within
the field of corrections augmented by the pressures of political
arena will dilute the standards and the very meaning of accredita-

tion."

248

Meaningful grievance mechanisms can permit correctional
institutions to respond promptly to trouble spots and personnel
problems, and can provide prompt resolution of disputes without
the necessity of litigation. 24" To be effective, these mechanisms
must include some form of independent review, participation by
inmates and staff in their design and operation, short enforceable
time limits, written responses with reasons for adverse decisions,
and effective administrative oversight of the system. 25 0 Some
requiring improvements in state correctional facilities); W. Hardy Rauch, Keeping Our
Own House in Order-ConsentDecreeLifted in Kentucky, CORRECTIONS TODAY, Dec. 1987,
at 117 (stating that Kentucky agreed to use accreditation standards to comply with a
consent decree requiring improvements in two state prisons); Raymond N. Roberts,
How Accreditation Helped Revitalize a Penitentiay Under Court Order, CORRECTIONS
TODAY, May 1992, at 52 (describing how judge ordered compliance with ACA
accreditation
standards as a means of correcting deficient conditions).
2
1 See Conrad, supra note 243, at 123-24 (noting that states continue to operate
their2 penal systems as usual despite being unaccredited by the ACA).
11 See William C. Harrell, ASCA Proposes WateringDownofSingle-CellingStandards,
NAT'L PRISON PROJECTJ., Summer 1991, at 14, 14 (describing a proposed change in
the ACA standards that would water down single cell standards and permit housing
of medium security prisoners in a multiple occupancy or dormitory facility with up
to 50 other inmates); ACA Committee Relaxes Double-Celling Standard, NAT'L PRISON
PROJECTJ., Winter 1992, at 5 (noting that the Standards Committee of ACA voted to
adopt new standards); Breed Interview, supra note 238, at 5-6 (noting that modifications reducing cell size requirements have been proposed atACA meetings with little
opposition).
24 Breed Interview, supra note 238, at 6.
249 See Turner, supra note 191, at 641 (explaining the benefits of prisoner
grievance mechanisms). See generallyJ.MICHAEL KEATING, JR. ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, GRIEVANCE MECHANISMS IN CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS (1975) (outlining
the need for grievance mechanisms to avoid litigation and inmate violence).
2 See Turner, supra note 191, at 642 (listing principles that the Center for
Correctional Justice believes all effective grievance systems must have). These
requirements are essentially incorporated into the Civil Rights of Institutionalized
Persons Act ("CRIPA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1997, 1997aj (1988). Section 1997e permits
federal district courts to compel inmates to exhaust state grievance procedures if
those grievance procedures have been certified by the Attorney General or a federal
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states have adopted grievance mechanisms that have been certified
by the Department of Justice or the courts to comply with these
general requirements.5 1
However, grievance procedures do not provide an effective
substitute for litigation concerning conditions of confinement in
correctional institutions. Many grievance systems do not meet the
standards required for accreditation under the Institutionalized
Persons Act,25 2 and there is some question as to whether systems
that have recently been certified in fact comply with the requirements of effective dispute resolution. 253
Even those that do
systemic problems. 254
address
to
designed
generally
not
are
qualify
They do not accept class-wide complaints, and do not empower
corrections officials to involve other state actors whose participation
is frequently necessary to address systemic problems such as overcrowding and poor living conditions. Similarly, other dispute
resolutions internally administered by the corrections department,
such as ombudsmen, deal primarily with individual problems, such
as failure to deliver mail. 25 Moreover, most grievance officers
district court to comply with statutory standards.
" As of April 1991, five states obtained statewide certification of their grievance
procedures by the Justice Department. The Justice Department has certified the
grievance plans of particular institutions within three states, and five states have
received court certification of grievance systems in one or more judicial districts
within the state. See Note, Resolving Prisoners' Grievances Out of Court: 42 U.S.C.

§

1997e, 104 HARv. L. REV.

1309,

1316 (1991). In addition, 11 states and the District

of Columbia are in the process of obtaining certification from theJustice Department
and25five
states are pursuing judicial approval of their plans. See id. at 1317.
2
See Turner, supra note 191, at 639 n.18 (reporting the findings of a General
Accounting Office survey that no state or large city systems meet the generally
accepted principles for an effective grievance mechanism).
See Telephone Interview with Randall Berg, Executive Director, FloridaJustice
Institute 2 (Feb. 4, 1992) [hereinafter Berg Interview] (transcript on file with author)
(stating that the "inmate grievance procedure [in Florida] is ajoke but [is] close to
being certified by the [Department ofJustice]").
9 See Turner, supra note 191, at 645 (noting that "several large categories of
prisoner suits cannot be reached by an administrative mechanism"). For example, an
American Arbitration Association Report noted that no brutality case had been
resolved through grievance procedures. See id. at 644 n.16 5 (citing COMMUNITY
DISPUTE SERV., AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASS'N, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS
REGARDING THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN INMATE DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCEDURE IN
RHODE ISLAND

31-32 (1977)).

" See id.; Telephone Interview with Linda Singer, Director, Center for
CommunityJustice and Partner, Lichter, Tristman, Singer & Ross 1 (Feb. 13, 1992)
[hereinafter Singer Interview] (transcript on file with author) (stating that the Center
is the organization that pioneered the development and implementation of standards
for prison administrative remedies and noting that ombudsmen generally deal with
problems such as lost mail); see also KEATING ET AL., supra note 249, app. A.
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and ombudsmen depend on the administration for their position.
This seriously limits their capacity to hold their departments to
constitutional standards, particularly when additional resources are
required to do so. 256 Indeed, experts on dispute resolution state
that alternative forms of dispute resolution, such as negotiation and
mediation, have worked as agents of systemic reform in corrections
257
only when linked in some significant way with litigation.
C. LitigationHas Only Begun to Address the Problems Facing

Jails andJuvenile and Women's Institutions
The reform of jails has not progressed to the same extent as
state correctional facilities over the past two decades. The combination of the decentralized and rural character of many jails insulates
them from scrutiny. 25 Inmates in jails remain incarcerated for
relatively short time periods, and often leave the institution before
their case can be heard or certified.5 9 Many jails, particularly in
rural areas, remain untouched by litigation. 260 Jails are more
likely than prisons to subject inmates to the brutal, primitive
conditions that characterized prisons twenty years ago. 26 1 In many
jurisdictions,jails are run by sheriffs whose background and primary
concern is law enforcement26 2 and who typically lack the expertise
2 See KEATING ET AL., supra note 249, at 15-21 (noting that many state programs
have limitations because "ombudsmen are departmental employees hired by and
responsible to the directors of the agency they are supposed to monitor").
1 See Singer Interview, supra note 255, at 1.
' As ofJune 30, 1988, approximately two-thirds of the nation's jails were small
facilities with capacity for 50 inmates or fewer. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BULLETIN: CENSUS OF LOCAL JAILS 1988, at 6 (1990)
[hereinafter CENSUS OF LOCAL JAnS 1988].
" See Turner, supra note 191, at 644 & n.166 ("The average time served [injails
is]... not long enough to process fully any formal claim for relief, either administrative or judicial."); Ortega Interview, supra note 209, at 3 (describing difficulties of
maintaining a law suit on behalf ofjail inmates due to high turnover rate).
26 According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics, 30% of the nation's jails were
under court order to improve conditions of confinement, and 27%were under court
order to reduce crowding. See JAIL INMATES 1991, supra note 4, at 1 (1992); see also
Interview with Ed Koren, Staff Attorney, National Prison Project, and former
Director, National Jail Project, in Washington, D.C. 7 (July 31, 1991) [hereinafter
Koren Interview] (transcript on file with author) (noting that litigators have gotten
on top of problems in cities, but that "[r]ural areas are totally untouched").
261 See supra notes 89-98 and accompanying text.
262
See M. Kay Harris,Judicial Intervention in Local Jails: An EditorialOverview,
PRISONJ., Fall-Winter 1990, at 1, 1; Feeley & Hanson, supra note 100, at 27-28 (noting
that jails run by sheriffs have difficulties institutionalizing responses to litigation);
Russ Immarigeon, The Context ofjail Litigation in the United States, PRISON J., Fall-
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26
and resources necessary to manage decent facilities.
Serious problems also persist in juvenile facilities. According to
the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, by
October 1989, only 34 of 56 participating states and territories had
demonstrated compliance with the requirement of separation of
juvenile and adult offenders. 2
Similarly, although the largest
state juvenile systems, such as Florida, California, and Texas, have
been the subject of litigation, many institutions with extremely poor
conditions have yet to be tackled. 26"
Despite the fact that a
disproportionate number of children in juvenile justice institutions
have a history of multiple problems, "the services they receive are
266
likely to be insufficient and/or unresponsive to their needs."
Moreover, juvenile justice advocates report that children are far less
likely to complain about brutal conditions than adults. 6 7
Historically, litigation has rarely focused on the problems of
incarcerated women. Until recently, women have been less likely to
litigate, although there are indications that this reluctance is
diminishing. 26 In cases challenging conditions in both men's and

Winter 1990, at 12, 16 (noting that criminologist Hans W. Mattick and the
Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration ofJustice both view local
administration ofjails by law enforcement officials as central to the jail problem).
26 See Feeley & Hanson, supranote 100, at 27-28 ("[Localjails] lack administrative
depth and expertise, and counties lack the capacity to provide correctional law
specialists other than in response to litigation.").
264 See HOUSE SELECT COMM. ON CHILDREN, YOUTH, AND FAMILIES, No PLACE TO
CALL HOME: DISCARDED CHILDREN IN AMERICA, H.R. REP. NO. 395, 101st Cong., 2d
Sess.26543 (1990) [hereinafter No PLACE TO CALL HOME].

According to a recent report, "seven percent of the nation's 422 facilities
detaining 10 percent of all youngsters in 1989 were operating under consent decrees."

CASEY FRAMEWORK PAPER, supra note 5, at 5. Forty-one cases in 22 states have been
brought on behalf of children in the juvenile justice system who have been placed in
adultjails,juvenile detention centers, training schools, and secure residential facilities.
See No PLACE TO CALL HOME, supranote 264, at 193-204. The conditions in juvenile
facilities are often terrible. As one worker at an institution in Maryland testified,
"When I arrived at Montrose, evidence of neglect [was] everywhere. Overcrowded,
understaffed, badly in need of repair; it seemed to me that virtually everyone had
given up. Best description I can give is it was a human warehouse." Id. at 71
(quoting Children in State Care: Ensuring Their Protectionand Support, HearingsBefore
the Select Comm. on Children, Youth, and Families of the House of Representatives, 99th
Cong., 2d Sess. 106 (1986) (statement ofPatricia Hanges, Franciscan Lay Volunteer)).
266 No PLACE TO CALL HOME, supra note 264, at 50.
261 See Interview with Robert Schwartz, DirectorJuvenile Law Center, in Philadelphia, Pa. 1 (July 8, 1991 and July 10, 1992) [hereinafter Schwartz Interview]
(transcript on file with author) (observing that "children were without mouthpieces
in key areas"); Soler Interview, supra note 15, at 4 (noting that when a facility is
overcrowded, staff tend to use severe methods to control situations to "[k]eep kids
quiet"); supra note 22.
21 See Ellen M. BarryJailLitigationConcerningWomen Prisoners,PRISONJ., Spring-
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women's institutions, the problems of women tend to be neglected,2" 9 and court-ordered improvements are often not extended as
fully to women's institutions. 270 Furthermore, the population in
women's facilities is growing at a much faster rate than men's
institutions, and overcrowding problems in women's institutions are
severe.27 Nonetheless, corrections advocates have also noted an
increased public interest in addressing the problems facing
incarcerated women.272
III. CORRECTIONS LITIGATION AND THE REAGAN/BUSH JUDICIARY:
THERE IS A FUTURE

Analysis of Supreme Court and lower court decisions and

discussions with judges and advocates suggest that, despite the
increasing conservatism of the courts and narrowing of the scope of
legal protection, litigation challenging the adequacy of "the minimal
civilized measure of life's necessities "273 in corrections institutions
will continue to be successfully prosecuted. Although the changing
character of the federal courts may affect the nature and scope of
such litigation, the days of judicial intervention in corrections are
274
not over.
The Supreme Court has dramatically narrowed the scope of
judicial intervention in First Amendment and due process cases.
Summer 1991, at 44, 44 (1991); supra note 22 and accompanying text.
269 See Bronstein Interview, supra note 10, at 7 (discussing neglect of women's

facilities in state litigation, causing severe overcrowding, including up to 300%
capacity at one facility).
27' See Feeley & Hanson, supra note 100, at 35.
271 See CENSUS OF LOCALJAILs 1988, supra note 258, at 3 (reporting that women's
imprisonmenthas expanded disproportionately to population increases experienced
by men between 1983 and 1988). See generally Russ Immarigeon & Meda ChesneyLind, Women's Prisons: Overcrowded and Overused 5,9 (Mar. 1991) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author) (documenting that "female populations injails and
prisons have increased disproportionately to the increase in women's involvement in
serious crime," and that "states that failed to develop sufficient community resources
experienced severe overcrowding" in women's prisons).
" See Telephone Interview with Rebecca Isaacs, Acting Director, Legal Services
for Prisoners with Children 1 (July 17, 1992) (transcript on file with author)
(describing 1992 as the year of the woman in prison, and noting that women's
correctional issues have captured the attention of the National Association of Women
Judges, the ABA, and a state commission in California).
'" Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981).
274 One appeals courtjudge has stated: "I certainly don't think the game is over
by a long shot. There are areas that are going to survive even the most conservative
of rulings." Telephone Interview with Judge Jon Newman, United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit I (Feb. 13, 1992) (transcript on file with author).
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Until recently, many lower courts subjected any policy or practice
that infringed upon freedom of speech or religion to strict scrutiny,
invalidating those that prison officials could not demonstrate to be
necessary.
In Turner v. Safley2 75 and O'Lone v. Estate of
2 7 61
Shabazz,
the Supreme the Supreme Court held that a lesser
standard of scrutiny is appropriate in determining the constitutionality of prison rules.
Turner involved a challenge to regulations relating to inmate-toinmate correspondence and inmate marriages. The court of appeals
applied a strict scrutiny analysis and concluded that both regulations
violated inmates' constitutional rights.2 " The Supreme Court
held that "when a prison regulation impinges on inmate's constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to
This deferential standard
legitimate penological interests."2 78
places the burden on plaintiffs to demonstrate that the connection
between a particular policy or practice and legitimate penological
concerns is so remote as to be arbitrary or irrational. Applying this
lesser standard of scrutiny, the Supreme Court agreed that the
constitutional right of inmates to marry was impermissibly burdened
by the challenged regulation.2 79 However, the Court found the
inmate correspondence regulation to be valid because it was
"logically connected to .. . legitimate security concerns."280
In O'Lone, Islamic inmates challenged prison policies that
prevented them from attending Jumu'ah, a Muslim congregational
service held on Friday afternoons. 281 The court of appeals held
that the challenged regulations could be sustained only if the prison
officials demonstrated that they "were intended to serve, and d[id]
serve, the important penological goal of security, and that no
reasonable method exists by which [prisoners'] religious rights can
be accommodated without creating bona fide security problems." 28 2 The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Court of
Appeals erred in placing the burden on prison officials to disprove
275482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987).
276482 U.S. 342, 349 (1987).
2
71 See Safley v. Turner, 777 F.2d

1307, 1316 (8th Cir. 1985), affd inpar, rev'd in
par4 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
278Turner, 482 U.S. at 89.
See id. at 97.
2"
2
so Id. at 91.
21 See O'Lone, 482 U.S. at 345.
" Shabazz v. O'Lone, 782 F.2d 416, 420 (3d Cir. 1986), rev'd, 482 U.S. 342
(1987).
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the. availability of alternative methods of accommodating prisoners'
religious rights. 283 The Court found that this approach failed to
reflect the appropriate respect and deference for the judgment of
prison administrators under the Constitution. The Court agreed
with the district court's conclusion that the challenged policies were
reasonably related to legitimate penological
interests, and therefore
28 4
did not offend the Free Exercise Clause.
The Supreme Court has not overruled its prior holding in Wolff
v. McDonnell,28 5 which requires that inmates receive notice and a
hearing prior to the imposition of disciplinary sanctions. 28 6 In
Wolff, the Court held that the procedure for imposing sanctions had
to observe minimal due process requirements. 2 7 Although prison
disciplinary proceedings do not implicate the full panoply of rights
due a defendant in a criminal prosecution, the Court held that such
proceedings must be governed by a mutual accommodation between
institutional needs and generally applicable constitutional requirements.28 8
A series of subsequent Supreme Court cases, however, limited
prisoner due process rights and virtually eliminated privacy rights
for prisoners. 289 Unless a statute or regulation creates a liberty

interest, government may impose any treatment that is "within the
normal limits or range of custody which the conviction has
authorized the State to impose." 9 0 Deference to prison administrators has become the guiding principle in prisoners' rights cases.
This deferential standard does not mean that First Amendment
U.S. at 351-52.
214 See id. at 350-51.
28 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
2
86 See id. at 564.
28
See id. at 555.
23
' The Court held that due process requires that an inmate receive written notice
of charges at least 24 hours before the disciplinary hearing; that there be a written
statement by the factfinders as to the evidence relied on and the reasons for the
disciplinary action; and that an inmate be allowed to call witnesses and present
documentary evidence in his or her defense where doing so does not jeopardize
institutional safety or correctional goals. See id. at 563-67. Inmates are not entitled
under the Due Process Clause to cross-examine witnesses or be represented by
counsel. See id. at 567-70.
289 See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984) (holding that prisoners do not have
a reasonable expectation of privacy in their prison cells); Block v. Rutherford, 468
U.S. 576 (1984) (allowing blanket prohibition on contact visits); Meachum v. Fano,
427 U.S. 215 (1976) (holding that prisoners not have any "right" to stay in a certain
type of prison); Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236 (1976) (holding that a hearing is
not required when transferring a prisoner).
2
Meachum, 427 U.S. at 225.
28 See O'Lone, 482
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and due process cases are unwinnable. Applying the rational basis
standard articulated above, the Supreme Court invalidated regulations prohibiting marriages between inmates.2 9 1

Lower courts

have relied on this decision as support for invalidating restrictive
speech policies that are based on speculative concerns. 92 Moreover, a review of recent case law reveals that actions to enforce wellestablished First Amendment and due process rights, such as the
right to a prior disciplinary hearing and the right to meals that
conform to religious dietary rules, continue to be brought and
won. 2 3 However, cases seeking to expand First Amendment or
due process protections beyond existing boundaries have, for the
294
most part, been unsuccessful.
The Supreme Court's recent "conditions of confinement" cases
also impose new hurdles for plaintiffs to overcome, but continue to

...
See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 97-99 (1987).
'2 See e.g., Mujahid v. Sumner, 807 F. Supp. 1505, 1508-11 (D. Haw. 1992)
(holding that rules restricting correspondence and visitation among inmates and
members of the media and barring outgoing correspondence with specific members
of the news media were facially unconstitutional), aff'd, 996 F.2d 1226(9th Cir. 1993);
Lyon v. Grossheim, 803 F. Supp. 1538, 1552-55 (S.D. Iowa 1992) (finding that
application of regulations pertaining to receipt of literature violated inmates' First
Amendment rights); Stone-El v. Fairman, 785 F. Supp. 711, 716 (N.D. Il. 1991)
(holding that prison officers had no justification whatsoever for opening or reading
correspondence addressed to or from the courts).
I' See, e.g., Mosier v. Maynard, 937 F.2d 1521, 1522 (10th Cir. 1991) (denying
summaryjudgment to defendants in case challenging denial of religious exemption
from haircut rule to Native American), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 260 (1993); Ramer v.
Kerby, 936 F.2d 1102, 1104 (10th Cir. 1991) (stating that a policy barring prisoners
from calling staffmembers as witnesses denied due process); Whitney v. Brown, 882
F.2d 1068, 1074, 1077-78 (6th Cir. 1989) (affirmingJewish prisoners' right to travel
in the complex to attend weekly Sabbath services); Richardson v. Coughlin, 763 F.
Supp. 1228,1239 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (granting summaryjudgment on First Amendment
claim and denying summary judgment on due process claim), affd sub nom.
Richardson v. Selsky, 5 F.3d 616 (2d Cir. 1993).
' See e.g., Smith v. Massachusetts Dep't. of Corrections, 936 F.2d 1390, 1396-97
(1st Cir. 1991) (holding that procedural regulations governing reclassification and
transfer to higher custody did not trigger liberty interest requiring due process
procedures, and that placement of plaintiffin "awaiting action" status did not violate
due process);Johnson v. Moore, 926 F.2d 921, 922-23 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that
denial of hearing before placement in lockdown and transfer from federal to state
prison without procedural protections did not violate due process, and that absence
of a paid chaplain of plaintiffs faith did not deny plaintiffa "reasonable opportunity"
to practice his religion); Weaver v. Toombs, 756 F. Supp. 335, 337-38 (W.D. Mich.
1989) (holding that openingand reading of correspondence and confiscation of legal
materials of two inmate co-plaintiffs pursuant to policy permitting inmates to render
legal assistance to each other only with prior written approval was reasonable under
Turner standards), aff'd, 915 F.2d 1574 (6th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 923
(1991).
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leave room for significant litigation involving grossly inadequate
prison conditions. In Wilson v. Seiter,295 the Supreme Court held
that plaintiffs must prove deliberate indifference to prevail in
conditions of confinement cases.29 6 The Court rejected the view,
held by the majority of the circuits, that conditions of confinement
depriving prisoners of basic necessities of life violate the Eighth
Amendment regardless of the intent of prison officials. 297 The
Court also rejected the lower court's holding that prison officials
must be shown to have acted with "persistent malicious cruelty" to
establish an Eighth Amendment violation. 9 Some commentators
and practitioners have expressed the view that Wilson significantly
toughens the standard for conditions of confinement cases and may
even sound their death knell.2 99 However, a careful analysis of the
decision leads to the conclusion, in accord with the overwhelming
consensus of experts in the area of prison litigation, that Wilson
does not significantly toughen the standard for establishing an
Eighth Amendment violation in conditions of confinement cases,
although its tone may harden the attitudes of prison officials and
judges predisposed to resist such litigation. As John Boston states
in an excellent analysis of the case:
the deliberate indifference standard is already well established,
particularly in litigation concerning medical care, inmate-inmate
violence, and other threats to prisoners' health and safety-areas
in which prisoner litigants have enjoyed their most consistent
success. In cases involving other conditions of confinement,
something like the deliberate indifference standard has been
S. Ct. 2321 (1991).
See id. at 2326.

295 111
2

See id. at 2324.

2'
29

Id. at 2328.
' See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse,Justices Restrict Suits ChallengingPrisonConditions
Limit on Cruelty Pleas, N.Y. TIMFS, June 18, 1991, at Al (indicating that Wilson will
"likely make it more difficult for prisoners to prevail in [conditions of confinement]
lawsuits"). Private practitioners and nonlitigators were much more likely to express
the view that Wilson makes conditions litigation virtually impossible to win. See, e.g.,
Interview with David Casey, Partner, Peckham, Lobel, Casey, Prince &Tye, in Boston,
Mass. 9 (Aug. 20, 1991) (transcript on file with author) (stating that the Wilson
standard is tough and will make it more difficult for his firm to become involved in
prison litigation); Interview with Beth Parker, Partner, McCutchen, Doyle, Brown &
Enersen, in San Francisco, Cal. 1 (July 7, 1991) (transcript on file with author)
("Wilson is really problematic.... [It is] extremely difficult to do these cases.");
Telephone Interview with Aryeh Neier, Executive Director, Human Rights Watch 1
(Feb. 13, 1992) (transcript on file with author) (stating that the era in which courts
appointed masters and intervened has come to an end, based on composition of the
U.S. Supreme Court).
8
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routinely applied, though often without using the term.... In
short, the effect of [Wilson] is chiefly to ratify the long-standing
status quo in the courts.300

The Court's recent decision in Helling v. McKinneys0o supports this
reading of Wilson. In Helling, the Court held that involuntary
exposure to environmental tobacco smoke could constitute cruel
and unusual punishment if the plaintiff established that prison
officials were deliberately indifferent to "an unreasonable risk of
serious damage to his future health." 0 2
One other area of Supreme Court jurisprudence affecting
prisoners' rights cases deserves mention."3 In Rufo v. Inmates of
Suffolk County Jail,0 4 the Supreme Court determined the appropriate standard for modifying consent decrees in public law cases.
Rufo involved a decree that prohibited double ceiling in a jail
designed for single occupancy." 5 This issue is extremely important to corrections litigation because many jurisdictions are
currently operating under consent decrees that impose population
caps."' 6 The pressures of overcrowding and budgetary constraints
have prompted many state officials to seek modifications of existing
consent decrees to remove or increase population caps and reduce
the obligations previously incurred by the state."0 7 The defendants in Rufo, along with a coalition of state Attorneys General and
the United States Attorney General, urged the Court to adopt the
view that modification is warranted whenever the constitutional
standard is clarified. 0 8
The Court conclusively rejected this
standard, holding that "[a] proposed modification should not strive
to rewrite a consent decree so that it conforms to the constitutional
floor."0 9 The Court held that: "a party seeking modification of
a consent decree must establish that a significant change in facts or
law warrants revision of the decree and that the proposed modifica-

-"0John Boston, Highlights of Most Important Cases: Modification of Judgments/
ConsentJudgments, NAT'L PRISON PROJECTJ., Spring 1992, at 6, 7.
01113 S. Ct. 2475 (1993).
302 Id. at 2481.

- For a discussion of the Supreme Court's decisions limiting recovery of
attorneys' fees and expenses under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, see infra part IV.B.
5" 112 S. Ct. 748 (1992).
30- See id. at 756-57.
'o See Brief of the American Public Health Association as Amicus Curiae at 35
n.32, 7Wilson v. Seiter, 111 S. Ct. 2321 (1991) (No. 89-7376).
-t See infra note 406 and accompanying text.

308 See Rufo 112 S. Ct. at 763.
"9Id. at 764.
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tion is suitably tailored to the changed circumstance."3 10 Although the Supreme Court rejected the lower court's view that
prison officials seeking modification must show a "'grievous wrong
evoked by new and unforeseen conditions,'3"" its adoption of a
12
flexible standard "left things pretty much as they were."
The question remains: will the federal judiciary, two-thirds of
which has been appointed by Presidents Reagan and Bush,3 1 3 be
willing to rule in favor of prisoners and enforce orders requiring
significant correctional reform? The answer may be "yes." Over
and over, advocates have reported that some of the most conservative judges, when faced with grossly inadequate and unsafe prison
conditions, have ruled in favor of inmates. 14 A review of recent
published decisions supports this view:
although courts are
3 15
rejecting claims that may have been successful fifteen years ago,
plaintiffs continue to prevail in cases challenging core conditions of
confinement.3 16 One survey of cases with published opinions filed
3'

0

Id. at 765.

" Id.

at 757 (quoting United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 119 (1932)).
312 Boston, supra note 300, at 7.
1
$ 3 See Cummings, supra note 26, at A2 (indicating that the Reagan and Bush
administrations had appointed 67% of the federaljudges). Cummings points out that
"[i]n the last four years, Mr. Bush has appointed 180 judges, who have been
overwhelmingly young, white, male and wealthy. Mr. Reagan and Mr. Bush together
appointed only two blacks to the federal appellate courts, including Supreme Court
Justice Clarence Thomas." Id.
"' See Ortega Interview, supra note 209, at 3-4 (stating that she prefers to take
cases arising in an "extremely conservative county" with a right wingjudge, and that,
using this strategy, "we have yet to lose a case"); Telephone Interview with Marvin
Sparrow, Director, North Carolina Prisoners Legal Services 2 (Aug. 2, 1991)
(transcript on file with author) (stating his organization has had good success with
very conservative judges).
315 See, e.g., Smith v. Fairman, 690 F.2d 122, 125-26 (7th Cir. 1982) (commenting
that double ceiling, while "unpleasant and regrettable," was not a constitutional
violation), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 946 (1983); Frohmader v. Wayne, 766 F. Supp. 909,
914 (D. Colo. 1991) (granting defendant summary judgment despite plaintiff's
allegation that he was "hit, kicked, beaten, and tortured all night long," on the ground
that these allegations were "condusory"), rev'd inpart,958 F.2d 1024 (10th Cir. 1992);
Harris v. Murray, 761 F. Supp. 409,413 (E.D. Va. 1990) (stating that failure to receive
a hearing prior to administrative segregation does not deny due process); Kitt v.
Ferguson, 750 F. Supp. 1014, 1020-22 (D. Neb. 1990) (stating that double bunking
and other conditions did not violate inmates' constitutional rights under totality of
circumstances test), affd, 950 F.2d 725 (8th Cir. 1991); Dohner v. McCarthy, 635 F.
Supp. 408, 427 (C.D. Cal. 1985) (finding permanent double celling constitutional).
316 See, e.g., McCord v. Maggio, 927 F.2d 844, 846-47 (5th Cir. 1991) (stating that
Eighth Amendment violation exists where plaintiff spent months in a "Closed-cell
restriction" cell that was flooded with sewage and foul water with a bare mattress to
sleep on); Moore v. Morgan, 922 F.2d 1553, 1555 (11th Cir. 1991) (stating that
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during the eight years following Bell v. Wolfish317 found that
inmates were successful in 73.8% of prison and jail overcrowding
cases, and that inmates were just as successful from 1983 to 1986 as
they were from 1979 to 1982.18 Another recent study suggests
that "more 'Republican' judges on the federal bench does not spell
the end of judicial activism in [prison cases]; such background
characteristics of judges are powerful predictors neither of judicial
intervention nor of the extent of that intervention."319
In sum, the federal courts have not closed the door on litigation
challenging conditions and practices in correctional institutions.
They have, however, reduced the likelihood of success by adopting
a standard of deference to prison officials, dramatically limited the
likelihood of success in First Amendment and due process cases,
and narrowed the range of cases in which federal courts will
intervene.
IV.

FROM A TEST CASE TO AN IMPLEMENTATION MODEL:

THE FUTURE OF CORRECTIONS LITIGATION

Litigation's legacy as a necessary but limited form of corrections
advocacy poses questions concerning the potential and direction of
litigation over the next decade. This Section explores the emerging
trends in corrections litigation, with an eye toward developing a
model of legal services delivery that maximizes the potential of
advocacy to improve conditions of confinement in correctional
institutions. It is based upon interviews of lawyers with corrections
background and expertise and is supplemented by studies of public
interest lawyering.

inmates routinely slept on floor in bullpens with 15 square feet per inmate and cells
with 20 to 22 square feet per inmate, and noting the complete absence of time
outside of the cell); Tillery v. Owens, 907 F.2d 418, 427-28 (3d Cir. 1990) (holding
that double ceiling and unsanitary conditions violate the Eighth Amendment), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 343 (1991); Lyons v. Powell, 838 F.2d 28,31 (1st Cir. 1988) (holding
that a requirement that inmates sleep on the floor may be unconstitutional); Carver
v. Knox County, 753 F. Supp. 1398, 1402 (E.D. Tenn. 1990) (holding that various
conditions of confinement violate Eighth Amendment), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 1919
(1990).
317 441
311

U.S. 520 (1979).
See Jack E. Call, Lower Court Treatment ofJail and PrisonOvercrowding Cases: A

Second Look, FED. PROBATION, June 1988, at 34, 35.
31
JohnJ. DiIulio, Jr., EnhancingJudicialCapacity, in COURTS, CORRECTIONS, AND
THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 38, at 3, 8 (summarizing Robert C. BradleyJudicial
Appointment and Judicial Intervention: The Issuance of Structural Reform Decrees in
CorrectionalLitigation,in COURTS, CORRECTIONS, AND THE CONSTITUTION, supra note
38, at 249, 262-65).
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Corrections advocacy is in the midst of a shift from a test case,
law reform model to an implementation model of correctional
reform. In the early days of the prisoners' rights movement, the
test case model of law reform dominated the legal strategy of
plaintiffs' advocates. This strategy, which grew out of the litigation
strategy that culminated in Brown v. Board of Education,2 ° focused
on bringing cases that would establish new constitutional protections for inmates. Litigators chose cases based on their potential
to establish favorable precedent, particularly at the appellate level,
and to affect the broadest possible range of persons who were
"similarly situated who are not themselves parties." 21

320 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Commentators agree that the test case strategy of law
reform was developed in the school desegregation area and is exemplified by the
litigation campaign culminating in Brown. See HANDLER, supra note 6, at 26 (stating
that the "traditional" method "sought to change the political, economic, and social
system" through the use of test case litigation); Charles R. Halpern & John M.
Cunningham, Reflections on the New PublicInterestLaw: Theory andPracticeat the Center
for Law and Social Policy, 59 GEO. L.J. 1095, 1116 (1971) (stating that past public
interest efforts have been directed at segregated public schools, criminal courts, and
the welfare system); Rabin, supra note 2, at 221-23 (discussing strategy of the Legal
Defense Fund); Stephen L. Wasby, The Multi-Faceted Elephant: LitigatorsPerspectives
on PlannedLitigationfor$ocialChange, 15 CAP. U. L. REV. 143,144 (1986) (stating that
race relations have been "most closely associated with the planned litigation 'model,'
most notably through the campaign leading to Brown"); Comment, The New Public
Interest Lawyers, 79 YALE L.J. 1069, 1077-79 (1970) (discussing impact and drawbacks
of test case litigation); see also supra note 2 (listing scholars who attribute the origins
of law reform strategy to Brown).
321 Greenberg, supra note 2, at 320; see also Rabin, supra note 2, at 223; Boston
Interview, supra note 227, at 2. The National Prison Project and the Youth Law
Center, two national organizations specializing in corrections litigation, continue to
view the potential impact of a case on the law or on other institutions orjurisdictions
as a significant factor in determining whether to accept a case. See Interview with
Elizabeth Alexander, Associate Director for Litigation, National Prison Project, in
Washington, D.C. 14 (Nov. 15, 1990 and July 13, 1991) [hereinafter Alexander
Interview] (transcript on file with author) (stating that it is inappropriate for her
organization to take cases that deal with a small number of persons); Interview with
Adjoa Aiyetoro, Associate Director for Administration, National Prison Project, in
Washington, D.C. 2 (July 31, 1991) [hereinafter Aiyetoro Interview] (transcript on file
with author); Bronstein Interview, supra note 10, at 7 (stating that when selecting
cases his organization looks at potential impact of case); Koren Interview, supra note
260, at 6 (stating that criteria used to select cases are where case is located, chance
of success, harshness of conditions, and type of complaint); Soler Interview, supra
note 15, at 6 (indicating that cases are selected based on impact on state legislature,
coverage by various media, and the number of people being harmed).
A law school textbook published in 1974 lists some of the concerns that should
inform a lawyer's decision as to whether to proceed with a test case: (1) "Is the issue
one whose time has come?" (2) "How much damage will be done if the issue is raised
and the case lost?" (3) "Is anyone else promoting an orderly development of the
issue?" (4) "Is the contemplated jurisdiction the appropriate place to make the
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The test case model has had considerable appeal, particularly in
the corrections area. Through the 1950s, the courts had refused to
intervene at all in corrections institutions, and thus virtually no legal
standards specifically governed conditions and practices in prisons.
In the 1960s, for the first time, courts began to apply the First
Amendment and Due Process Clause to prisons, invalidating the
rules and procedures widely employed by correctional institutions. 22 Prisoners' rights advocates, faced with relatively undeveloped legal doctrine and an emerging judicial receptivity to corrections cases, developed theories such as the least restrictive alternative for pretrial detainees and the totality of conditions standard for
2
cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment.
Their early successes were striking.
Where possible, litigation challenged existing procedures and
rules in institutions and argued for imposition of constitutional
standards to govern conditions and practices. Many of the early
cases involved challenges to acknowledged institutional rules and
practices, such as arbitrary disciplinary procedures, censorship, and
prohibitions of religious observance.124
Central administrative
policy typically maintained these practices, which were amenable to
change through a test case strategy resulting in the imposition of
new rules and practices. 325 Once courts announced a new legal

challenge?" (5) "Is the issue as posed in the contemplated lawsuit the right first step?"
(6) "If the case is won, will the victory be reduced or eliminated by an adverse
political reaction?" (7) "Are the goals of the individual client different from the goals
of those who will benefit from a successful resolution of the test issue?" MICHAEL
MELTSNER & PHILIP G. SCHRAG, PUBLIC INTEREST ADVOCACY:
MATERIALS FOR
CLINICAL LEGAL EDUCATION 78-82 (1974).

32 See, e.g., Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558 (1974) (requiring due process
in prison disciplinary proceedings); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 413-15
(1974) (finding mail censorship of political, religious, and other material was
unconstitutional under the First and Fourteenth Amendments); Cooper v. Pate, 378
U.S. 546, 546 (1964) (per curiam) (finding that allegation that prisoner was denied
ability to purchase certain religious publications stated sufficient cause of action to
overcome summary judgment).
s The National Prison Project undertook to ground the totality of conditions
theory in the Constitution in the Alabama prison case. See Newman v. Alabama, 349
F. Supp. 278, 280-81 (M.D. Ala. 1972) (holding that insufficient medical care could
violate the Eighth Amendment), aff'd, 503 F.2d 1320 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421
U.S. 948 (1975); YACKLE, supra note 35, at 38-41 (outlining the importance of the
Newman holding); Boston Interview, supra note 227, at 6 (stating that allegation that
entire Alabama system was "rotten" and had to be dismantled was made early in
litigation).
24
1 See supra note 322.
"2See HANDLER, supra note 6, at 19-22 (arguing that the challenge lies in getting
bureaucracies to enforce, implement, or change rules); SUSAN M. OLSON, CLIENTS
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standard in these areas, institutions could comply by changing their
general policies in these areas.
Early corrections cases also had a shock value that advocates
3 26
hoped would reverberate to other institutions and systems.
Because litigation in correctional institutions was a relatively new
phenomenon that exposed outrageous conditions that were
previously insulated from scrutiny, advocates relied on these cases
to attract public attention and to create broader public pressure for
reform.
These strategic justifications for the test case model reinforced
lawyers' predisposition to embrace the law reform model as a result
of their professional incentives and orientation. 327 Many advocates exhibited tremendous confidence in the normative power of
law and its potential as a social change agent.328 They focused on

law as a body of legal rules and on the capacity to change those
rules through adjudication. This emphasis on changing legal norms
coincided with the training and skills of those orchestrating the legal
reform movement. Legal education emphasized appellate decisionmaking and socialized lawyers to place their faith and role identity
32 9

in adjudication.

AND LAWYERS: SECURING THE RIGHTS OF DISABLED PERSONS 170 (1984) (stating that

the likelihood of success improved where benefit is tied to one time managerial
decision
and minimal administrative discretion in the field).
s26 See Boston Interview, supra note 227, at 6 (describing premise of test case
model as assumption that ruling involving one institution would have a multiplier
effect).
s Neil Komesar and Burton Weisbrod have identified the visibility of test case
litigation as an approach that fulfills public interest lawyers' need for "publicity
maximization." See Neil K. Komesar & Burton A. Weisbrod, The PublicInterest Law
Firm: A BehavioralAnalysis, in PUBLIC INTEREST LAW: AN ECONOMIC AND INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 80, 88 (Burton A. Weisbrod et al. eds., 1978); see also HANDLER,
supranote 6, at 31 (stating that "tendencies toward test case litigation fit the training
and role models of the public interest lawyers"); Rabin, supra note 2, at 232-33

(noting public interest lawyers' tendency to exploit newly developed expertise).

328 See e.g., HARRIS & SPILLER, supra note 31, at 21 (stating that the impact of
judicial intervention in the cases studied was "broad and substantial" and that it
"reverberated outside the walls" of the prisons to affect the "broader community");
Wald, supra note 6, at 12 ("We felt confident in 'going for it,' 'doing the right thing,'
raising constitutional issues freely-almost profligately-seeking activist intervention
from the courts ...

."); Boston Interview, supra note 227, at 6 (noting that in the

1970s it was "[n]ot unreasonable to think that you [could] get a ruling and the
problem [was] solved").
29
See, e.g., Gerald P. Lopez, TrainingFutureLawyers to Work with the Politicallyand
Socially Subordinated: Anti-Generic Legal Education, 91 W. VA. L. REV. 305, 319 (1989)
(arguing that legal education focuses too greatly on appellate cases); Harold A.
McDougall, Lawyering and the PublicInterest in the 1990s, 60 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 10
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The test case model also responded to the resource constraints
facing many public interest advocates.3 0 The relative efficiency
of the law reform model was one of its selling points."3 ' A litigation campaign focused on changing national precedent could
conceivably be managed by a small group of committed lawyers.
The earlier cases focusing on rule changes and shocking conditions
were not fact-intensive or complicated in nature. Indeed, the
conditions in many of the institutions targeted early on were so
horrendous, and the cases so poorly defended, that trials were
relatively simple and inexpensive to conduct. According to the
associate director of the National Prison Project, "[a]necdotal
accounts were sufficient. Plaintiffs could use one expert for everything."3 3 2
For example, the entire liability trial in Pugh v.
Locke 5 5
cost approximately $4000.334
Defense counsel and
administrators were consistently outmatched in experience, ability,
and resources.
Litigation was typically highly adversarial, and
defendants frequently resisted resolving litigation through settlement.
The significance of the test case model of corrections reform has
diminished considerably in recent years and no longer characterizes
the efforts of many prisoners' rights advocates. Some look wistfully
back at the era of its preeminence, and many celebrate its significance in cementing law's place in social reform movements.3 ' 5

(1991) (indicating that traditional legal education did not look beyond litigation); Lani
Guinier et al., On Becoming Gentlemen: The Education of Women at the University
of Pennsylvania Law School (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
so See ARON, supra note 14, at 86 ("In the early years, the lack of resources meant
that public interest lawyers' first priority was filing lawsuits."). For a discussion of the
impact of resource constraints on the nature of corrections representation, see Sturm,
supra note 23.
331 See HANDLER, supra note 6, at 31 (describing efficiency of law reform activity
as compared to complex test case litigation); Rabin, supra note 6, at 223 ("The
potential staggering expenses of litigation are... minimized through careful selection
of test cases.").
112 Alexander Interview, supra note 321, at 21. Alexander adds that "cheap
victories are now nonexistent." Id.; see also Boston Interview, supra note 227, at 12
(stating that advocates formerly tried most prison cases on an anecdotal basis).
s" 406 F. Supp. 318 (M.D. Ala. 1976) (class action seeking declaratory and
injunctive relief with respect to cruel and unusual punishment in Alabama penal
system), affd sub nom. Newman v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1977), rev'd inpart
per curiam sub nom. Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, cert. denied, 438 U.S. 915 (1978).
" See Elizabeth Alexander, Prisoners'Lawyers Face CriticalIssues, NAT'L PRISON
PROJEcTJ., Fall 1987, at 22, 25.
"5 See, e.g., Wald, supra note 6, at 11-12 (describing the late 1960s as a "heady
time: the first wave of poverty law reform coughed up big issue cases; the federal
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However, the model no longer provides a useful framework for
planning and conducting most corrections litigation.
Commentators and advocates often attribute the demise of the
test case model to the increasing conservatism of the federal
courts. 8 5 Corrections advocates share a sense that their strategies
must adapt to the change in judicial climate and lack of receptivity
to expanding rights and developing legal theories. 37 Opportunities for developing innovative, path-breaking constitutional theories
are rare.33 Advocates generally bring cases only when they have
3 9
established precedent supporting them.
Judicial conservatism does not fully account for the decline of
the test case model of law reform. To some extent, the decline of
the model's significance is a natural development in the life cycle of
social change and litigation. As legal norms developed to govern
conditions and practices, advocates no longer faced completely
lawless institutions or blanket resistance to the imposition of legal
norms. Instead, they faced the challenge of implementing the legal
regime they helped create. Much of the lawyers' energy involved
enforcing orders already on the books. New cases increasingly
focused on implementing previously established legal norms. More
recent corrections cases pose problems that cannot be eliminated
solely through rule changes. 4 ° Amelioration of conditions and
overcrowding typically require additional resources and changes in
the behavior of complex systems, and are unlikely to be generalized
courts were hospitable, even eager to help us make new law for the poor and

disadvantaged").
s-' See id. at 12 (noting increasingly conservative tendencies of federal bench);
supra text accompanying notes 273-302 (noting increasing conservatism of Reagan/

Bush judiciary).
"I Indeed, this has been the subject of several annual meetings of public interest
advocates, including the ACLU, the Cover retreat, and thejuvenilejustice section of
the ABA.

-" But see infrapart IV (describing emerging significance ofstate law and statutory
causes of action).

"' See Ortega Interview, supra note 209, at 3 (noting that advocates now do
extensive legal research and information gathering before taking a case); Soler
Interview, supra note 15, at 8. The National Prison Project weighs heavily the
potential negative consequences of losing, both on the possibility of reform within a
particular jurisdiction and on the law. The organization places a high priority on

winning, and is reluctant to bring litigation viewed as risky. See Alexander Interview,
supra note 321, at 12.
'1 See Sturm, supra note 24, at 813-14 (describing "dynamics of organizational
stasis" that make conditions and practices in prisons "notoriously resistant to
change").
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to other systems without substantial enforcement efforts in those
3 41

systems.

This evolution tracks the life cycle of other social reform efforts.
The early stages of reform often revolve around defining the norms
and goals of the reform effort, and the later stages move to the
process of building institutions and methods for implementing
those goals.3 42 The shift also reflects the life cycle of institutional
reform litigation, the centerpiece of which is remedial enforce43

ment.3

The decreasing significance of the test case model also stems
from the success of early efforts to institutionalize legal norms in
correctional settings. As this Article has documented, litigation has
been quite successful in eliminating the worst abuses in correctional
settings.344 As litigation became more commonplace and the most
visible abuses were alleviated, the shock value of new cases diminished. Also, the prebureaucratic, arbitrary regimes of governance
have generally given way to more bureaucratic, legalistic structures. 4 5 Corrections administrators now view litigation as a fact
of life, and effective litigation management is one of a portfolio of
3 46
skills required for successful corrections management.
Finally, the inherent limitations of the law reform model play a
role in limiting its preeminence. Advocates learned through
experience that formal legal victories did not mean actual success
in achieving correctional reform. In many cases, defendants simply
ignored court orders requiring major changes in prison policy and
practice.3 47 Legal rules were not self-executing; change required
34 See id. at 815 ("[Prisons are] particularly resistant to change in the absence of
outside intervention ....
Internal reformers have limited power to generate the
resources and cooperation necessary to achieve change"). I am indebted to John
Boston for the development of this point.
342 See, e.g., PRESSMAN & WILDAvSKY, supra note 66, at 168-73 (describing
evolutionary relationship between policy formulation and implementation); Alan W.
Houseman, Poverty Law Developments and Options for the 1990s, 24 CLEARINGHOUSE
REV. 2, 9 (1990) (noting most AFDC representation "has entered into a 'late' phase").
34
See infra notes 399-415 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 135-46 and accompanying text.
345 See supra notes 100-07, 123-28 and accompanying text.
See Telephone Interview with Ted F. Webb, gubernatorial consultant on
appointing corrections commissioners 1 (Feb. 21, 1992) (transcript on file with
author).
34
' See Sturm, supra note 24, at 865. Prison officials may thwart efforts in the
following ways:
Defendants may ignore the existence of the court order or fail to inform
lower level workers of its mandate. They may deliberately undermine court-
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creating political and administrative incentives and capacity to
implement legal norms. 48
The test case model ignores the significance of implementation
in any effort to achieve lasting institutional reform. Its emphasis on
the liability stage of litigation and the development of legal rules
misdirects the energy and strategies of corrections advocates.
Success at trial orients lawyers' goals and strategies, rather than
actually alleviating unconstitutional conditions and practices. The
test case model does not prepare plaintiffs' lawyers to address the
challenges of monitoring and enforcement. 49 Plaintiffs' lawyers
frequently fail to recognize and account for the dynamics of running
35
a correctional institution in their remedial decrees.The topdown approach emphasizing changes in central administrative policy
ignores the institutional dynamics that account for many of the
problems plaguing corrections institutions and the significance of
local advocacy to reform. 5 ' This approach also masks conflicts
among clients about remedial strategies, and inflates the power of
lawyers to make value choices without taking into account competing perspectives and concerns.3 52 Moreover, the model's preoccuordered changes by promulgating them with a win and a nod. Or, they may
engage in passive resistance by translating the broad constitutional directives
that minimize judicial involvement or impact.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
" See id. at 828-29 (describing the lack of incentives to "embrace a reform
agenda" and the "risks and costs associated with seeking change").
39 See, e.g., HARRis & SPILLER,supra note 31, at 45-46 (plaintiffs' lawyers attributed
periods of inactivity during the compliance phase in part to "his uncertainty as to how
to proceed as well as his frustration"); cf. PRESSMAN & WILDAVSKY, supra note 66, at
35 ("Although EDA officials had thought that designing the innovative policy,
committing funds, and obtaining initial local agreements were the most crucial parts
of the program, the implementation of the program proved surprisingly difficult.").
" See Storey, supra note 40, at 35 (noting that plaintiffs' counsel "goal was to
make the decrees as specific as would reasonablybe appropriate"); Sturm, supra note
24, at 876 (noting that "[1]awyers frequently adopt extreme positions to enhance their
bargaining strength and cut their potential losses"); see also Nathan Interview, supra
note 160, at 4 (describing a lack of sensitivity to correctional culture and context as
a common deficiency of private firms involved in this litigation).
351 See Sturm, supra note 24, at 837-39 (describing the limits of administrators'
ability to effect change).
352 See LoPEz, supra note 6, at 3 (noting that activist lawyers employing the "topdown" approach in the 1960s and early 1970s "paid at best only sporadic regard to
whether litigation made more sense than some other strategy ... , to whether
litigation itself might not accommodate significant involvement by people in the
community, to whether litigation ... had a chance of penetrating the economic
situation they hoped and often claimed to change"); Deborah L. Rhode, Class Conflicts
in Class Actions, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1183, 1205-21 (1982) (discussing how attorneys
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pation with changing legal norms overlooks the significance of
remedy and enforcement in determining whether meaningful
reform occurs as a result of litigation.53
This failure to appreciate the significance of remedy is important for a number of reasons. Effective lawyering at the remedy
stage requires different skills and processes than those needed to
participate effectively in formal adjudication. Much of the remedial
process takes place outside the courtroom and the adversary model
of dispute resolution. Because cooperation by crucial insiders is
critical to implementation, 354 effective remedial advocacy requires
creative uses of negotiation, mediation, and experts. The test case
model simply ignores the political and institutional dimension of
implementation, and relies on legalistic approaches to compliance
that do not take into account the complexities of organizational
change. The model also blinds advocates to the importance of
building coalitions with insiders in the corrections field and linking
litigation to other methods of advocacy, such as public education as
well as administrative advocacy and legislative advocacy. 355
The test case model's emphasis on winning legal battles
reinforces advocates' predisposition to rely exclusively on formal,
adversary process. 31
Its dependence on the adversary model
saddles the test case strategy with the many limitations of adversary
process as a means of developing and implementing effective
"active in institutional reform class actions [are] subject to a variety of... pressures
that constrain [their] responses to class conflicts" and lead them to make decisions
without considering the varying remedial preferences among class members). For a
fuller discussion of need for forms of participation and representation that enable
meaningful participation by clients, see Susan P. Sturm, The Promiseof Participation,
78 IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming 1994).

" Early critics of the test case law reform strategy recognized the significance of
politics and implementation to successful law reform. See STUART A. SCHEINGOLD,
THE PoLrrIcs OF RIGHTS: LAWYERS, PUBLIC POLICY, AND POLITICAL CHANCE xi-xii
(1974) (examining litigation and political change in order to shed light "on the
broader problem of understanding the influence of legal values on political
outcomes"); Stephen Wexler, PracticingLawforPoorPeople,79 YALE LJ. 1049, 1055-56
(1970) (discussing an alternative manner of practicing public interest law that takes
into account political considerations and emphasizes informingand educatingclients
so that they can use their lawyers' knowledge); Comment, supra note 320, at 1077
(quoting Gary Bellow's comment that test case litigation is a dead end because it fails
to address inequalities in power and to provide for implementation).
' See supra text accompanying notes 195-98.
...
See infra text accompanying notes 417-31.
s5 See SCHEINGOLD, supra note 353, at 141 (stating that "lawyers are by training,
socialization, and expertise inclined to exclusive use of litigation"); supra text
accompanying notes 327-29.
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remedial solutions. Advocates frequently adopt a reactive posture
of waiting for problems to arise and then returning to court for an
adjudication of continuing violations of the court order.3 5 7 This
approach typically prolongs implementation. Nothing happens for
a period of time, and then the parties return to court to fight over
the adequacy of the defendants' efforts. This scenario fails to create
a framework for developing workable solutions to the legal
violations, and perpetuates the defensive posture that predisposes
responsible officials to resist judicial involvement."' 8
The test case model also creates a false picture of the relative
significance and demands of trial and remedy. Advocates who
embrace the test case model frequently fail to understand at the
outset that the remedial stage will consume the bulk of their time
and resources. Corrections advocates, particularly those with a
national reform agenda, often allocate insufficient time and energy
to the remedial stage.359
These problems, however, do not mean that test case litigation
has not and cannot play an important role in pursuing institutional
reform through the law. Certainly, the development of legal norms
has profoundly and positively affected the corrections field.360
The earliest cases brought in any new institutional context necessarily act as test cases that will affect the contours of future legal
challenges. However, the test case model cannot achieve lasting
institutional reform on its own. It must be linked to a broader
advocacy strategy that recognizes and builds on the importance of
36
implementation. '
35" See, e.g., HARRIS & SPILLER, supra note 31, at 157-60 (stating that plaintiffs'
monitoring activity consisted of responding to inmates' complaints of noncompliance
by filing contempt motions); Alexander Interview, supra note 321, at 10 (noting that
NPP will return to court where orders get "screwed up"); Bronstein Interview, supra
note 10, at 4 ("We want to be called back in where there are national implications.").
' See HARRIS & SPILLER, supra note 31, at 14 (noting that noncompliance often
resulted from an "unwilling or unresponsive attitude"); Sturm, supranote 42, at 139495 (describing the tendency of the adversary process to produce hostility, and
resistance and the incompatibility of adversary participation with the demands of
remedial implementation).
3
59 See HARRIS & SPILLER, supra note 31, at 20 ("[T]he efforts of plaintiffs'
attorneys to monitor compliance diminished over time, suggesting that they should
not be relied on as the only source of compliance information."); Sturm, supra note
23.
'~ See supra text accompanying notes 100-07.
361 See Aiyetoro Interview, supra note 321, at 24 (discussing various methods for
achieving reform, including using the media, lobbyists, and prisoners' rights organizations to educate the community); Boston Interview, supra note 227, at 13-14 (same);
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In reaction to the changes in the judicial, political, and administrative environment, corrections advocates have begun to recast
their roles to conform to an implementation model of law reform.
This model focuses on achieving and maintaining institutional
reform, and is characterized by two simultaneous and somewhat
competing developments, each of which is discussed further below.
Cases that go to trial focus on implementing well-established,
minimal standards of decency in a variety of institutional settings.
This litigation has become increasingly complex, fact intensive,
adversarial, and costly to litigate.362 At the same time, effective
advocacy now requires the development of informal means of
factfinding, remedial formulation, and monitoring, and the linkage
of litigation to broader strategies of correctional reform.16 ' The
challenge facing public interest advocacy over the next decade is to
reconcile and sustain these two prongs of the implementation
model, and is likely to reflect and be affected by the following
trends.
A. Prison andJailLitigation Will Concentrate on Gross
Inadequaciesin Core Conditions of Confinement
Litigation currently undertaken by prisoners' rights organizations targets institutions that fail to provide inmates with the
minimal necessities of civilized existence.164 This trend is likely to
infra text accompanying notes 418-31.
12 This development resulted from a combination of factors: the toughening of
Supreme Court evidentiary standards for establishing liability, the fact-intensive
nature of the problems at issue, the developing competence and adversariness of the
defense bar, and in some cases, the greater subtlety of some of the problems targeted
by litigation. See Breed Interview, supra note 238, at 1, 2 (noting increasingly
adversarial attitude on the part of state officials, and the challenges of presenting a
case that will stand up against more and more effective defense people); see also
Houseman, supra note 342, at 2 & n.4 (noting similar trends in welfare law); Alan W.
Houseman, A ShortReviewofPastPoverty Law Advocacy, 23 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 1514,
1521 (1990) (discussing developing trends of welfare law in the 1980s, including
increasingly complex, fact-based litigation).
'-' See ARON, supra note 14, at 85-93 (noting increasing combination of advocacy
strategies by public interest lawyers); Sturm, supranote 9, at 1365-67 (discussing ways
in which public remedial litigation differs from the traditional adversary process).
'" See e.g., Alexander Interview, supra note 321, at 21 (stating that NPP focuses
its resources on conditions and practices that are life-threatening, particularly
overcrowding combined with some deprivation of a basic human need); Boston
Interview, supra note 227, at 2-3 (stating that YLC selects cases targeting dangerous
practices); Soler Interview, supra note 15, at 5 (same); Telephone Interview with Bob
Stalker, Staff Attorney, Evergreen Legal Services (July 16, 1991) (transcript on file
with author) (same).
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continue. Virtually every specialist reported a shift away from First
Amendment, due process, and programmatic issues towards an
emphasis on overcrowding, environmental health and safety,
violence, and medical and mental health care. 65 Many report a
particularly significant increase in the number of cases challenging
the adequacy of medical care in correctional facilities. 66 Advocates
also noted a growing recognition of the problems confronting
women in correctional institutions, and a burgeoning interest in
addressing these issues.167 Advocates are increasingly reluctant to
bring litigation unless conditions or practices are dramatically and
unequivocally inhumane or arbitrary, or a substantial nonconstitutional claim can be asserted. 6
If a facility or system meets
minimal standards in most areas, litigation is unlikely to be brought.
Advocates attribute this concentration on core conditions of
confinement to the confluence of several factors. First and
foremost, they point to the deterioration of the law in the area of
civil liberties and the toughening of the standards in conditions of
confinement cases. 69 Second, advocates identify health and safety
" See Alexander Interview, supra note 321, at 20-21 (noting that the National
Prison Project does not foresee bringing new cases on First Amendment or due
process grounds alone); Boston Interview, supra note 227, at 2 (discussing an
increased concentration on health and safety issues at Prison Legal Services); Soler
Interview, supra note 15, at 9 (noting the same for the Youth Law Center).
' As of 1991, the Prisoners' Rights Project had more cases challenging medical,
dental, or psychiatric care than any other subject matter area. See Interview with
Angus Love, Director, Institutionalized Persons Project, Pennsylvania Legal Services,
in Philadelphia, Pa. 4 (July 12, 1992 andJuly 14, 1992) [hereinafter Love Interview]
(transcript on file with author) (reporting that the greatest number of complaints
concern medical care). The Prison Law Office in San Quentin, California, reports
more medical care cases than any other subject matter category addressing prison
conditions and practices. See Letter from Bonnie Cash, Office Manager, Prison Law
Office, San Quentin, Ca. 3 (Dec. 5, 1991) (on file with author) (providing data for the
fiscal year from July 1, 1990 to June 30, 1991).
3" See National Prison Project, Litigation Overview (Sept. 5, 1989) [hereinafter
Litigation Overview] (on file with author); supra note 272 and accompanying text.
363 See Boston Interview, supranote 227, at 2 (discussing increasing concentration
on threats to health and safety); Ortega Interview, supra note 209, at 4 (noting that
ifjails are fairly adequate, SCHR will decide not to litigate); Soler Interview, supra
note 15, at 8-9 (stating that YLC generally does not bring cases without good law
behind them, and now focuses more on statutory issues than constitutional doctrine).
" See Boston Interview, supra note 227, at 2; Litigation Overview, supra note 367,
at 2; see also Clark Foundation Grantees, Corrections Litigation 2 (unpublished report,

on file with author).
In prison cases, the primary focus today is on five issues: overcrowding,
environmental health and safety, medical and mental health care, violence,
and sex discrimination in practices and programs. In juvenile cases, the
major issues are lack of classification systems, inadequate health services,
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as the most important problems facing inmates of correctional
institutions. 7 ' Given the limited resources of the lawyers representing inmates and the growing expense and complexity of
corrections litigation,7 litigators generally accept the importance
of limiting their efforts to the problems threatening the survival and
bodily integrity of their clients. 72 Third, specialists in corrections
litigation have developed substantial expertise in the areas of health
and safety and thus face lower start-up costs to each new litigation.
A number of those interviewed spoke of the efficiencies and virtues
of not having to "reinvent the wheel" with each new case.378 Their
familiarity with the area creates considerable incentives to use this
expertise to tackle similar problems in new institutions.
Finally, advocates describe earlier decrees targeting virtually
every aspect of prison life as unwieldy, difficult to implement, and
4
more likely to create resentment on the part of prison officials.37
Experience has led veteran corrections litigators to focus their
remedial efforts on "issues which state officials understand and are
75
easy to monitor for required change."

inadequate training and supervision of employees, sanitation, and use of
restraints and isolation.
Id.
...
See Boston Interview, supra note 227, at 2; Love Interview, supra note 366, at
3 (citing medical services as one of the biggest areas of concern after overcrowding).
311 For a comprehensive discussion of the extent and nature of representation of
inmates in corrections cases, see Sturm, supra note 23.
-' The issue of the appropriate norms and processes for rationing scarce legal
resources is a controversial one. See Gary Bellow &Jeanne Kettleson, From Ethics to
Politics: ConfrontingScarcity andFairnessin PublicInterestPractice,58 B.U. L. REv. 337,
342-45 (1978); Marshall J. Breger, Legal Aid for the Poor: A Conceptual Analysis, 60
N.C. L. REv. 282, 282-86 (1982); Marie A. Failinger & Larry May, LitigatingAgainst
Poverty: Legal Services and Group Representation, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 32-51 (1984).
" See e.g., Alexander Interview, supra note 321, at 15, 29 (noting that a
"specialized office saves time" and avoids "reinventing the wheel"); Boston Interview,
supra note 227, at 2 ("We have the resources [and] background to do [these cases]
without having to reinvent the wheel with every new case."). The phenomenon of
specialization in public interest practice has been observed in other contexts. See, e.g.,
Rabin, supra note 2, at 232-33 (noting that "[a]fter mastering the intricacies of [a
particular agency practice], the public interest lawyer is reluctant to ignore the
efficiencies of further application of his newly developed expertise").
' See Litigation Overview, supra note 367, at 2.
375 Id.
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B. Corrections Cases Will Be More Complex and Costly to
Litigate,Requiring SophisticatedLitigation
Tools and the Extensive Use of Experts
Cases that target conditions and practices in bureaucracies,
rather than rules and regulations, tend to be more fact intensive and
expensive to litigate. 7 Higher standards of proof, more sophisticated and aggressive defenses, and less sensational forms of abuse
and deprivation further increase the difficulty and expense of
corrections cases. Formerly, plaintiffs could often prevail by
presenting essentially anecdotal evidence.1 7 The Supreme Court's
decisions over the last fifteen years, particularly in Bell v. Wolfish378 and Rhodes v. Chapman,3 79 toughened the evidentiary stan-

dards for demonstrating that overcrowding and other conditions are
depriving inmates of basic human needs. Proving that an institution's population significantly exceeds design capacity or violates
minimum professional standards is not enough. Plaintiffs must
demonstrate the connection between the prison conditions and a
38 0
particular harm to inmates.
376 See HANDLER, supranote 6, at 192-93 (describing the costlyand time-consuming
process of targeting bureaucratic processes); John Tull, Implications of Emerging
SubstantiveIssuesfor the Delivery SystemforLegal Services to the Poor,24 CLEARINGHOUSE
REv. 17,29 (1990) ("Litigation also may involve more frequently complicated factual
matters ....
[T]he costs to a [legal services] program will be increased.").
" See Boston Interview, supra note 227, at 12 ("A great deal of what we do now
is put together evidentiary [presentations] of [a] scope unthinkable 10-15 years ago.
[We formerly] tried these cases essentially on [an] anecdotal basis."); Michael B.
Mushlin, Rhodes v. Chapman AnalyzedforEffect on PrisonOvercrowding,NAT'L PRISON
PROJECTJ., Winter 1987, at 4, 5 ("In my days as a prisoners' rights litigator before
Chapman,we were able to address prison overcrowding by presenting straightforward
evidence .... ").
3- 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
37 452 U.S. 337 (1981).
o See id. at 348-49 (holding that violations of design standards are inadequate to
prove cruel and unusual punishment, and requiring a showing that violations of
professionally recognized minimum standards causes "unnecessary or wanton pain or
is grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crimes warranting imprisonment").
The Supreme Court has never articulated the constitutional standards by which to
judge the conditions in statejuvenile detention facilities. Lower courts have generally
held that the Due Process Clause governs the treatment of juveniles under the
supervision of the juvenile justice system. See, e.g., Gary H. v. Hegstrom, 831 F.2d
1430, 1432 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that the Due Process Clause is the standard
governing conditions of confinement of detainees who are not yet convicted); Santana
v. Collazo, 714 F.2d 1172, 1179 (1st Cir. 1983) (holding thatjuveniles confined in an
industrial school "have a due process interest in freedom from unnecessary bodily
restraint"), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 974 (1984). The issue of whether juveniles confined
in juvenile justice institutions can challenge the state's failure to provide them with
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This increased evidentiary burden has dramatically increased the
difficulty and expense of conditions of confinement cases. "There
are no cheap victories any more. Rhodes has introduced a much
more complex litigation model.
Successful litigation requires
massive discovery and greater reliance on expert opinions based on
close study of a particular institution."311 Wilon v. Seiteri8 2 continues this trend: "[Advocates] must anticipate [a] lack of resources
and lack of cooperation [by nonparties] and go down the line in
8
proving deliberate indifference."3
Plaintiffs' lawyers now require expertise in complex litigation,
class actions, and the vagaries of § 1983 issues to provide adequate
representation in conditions of confinement cases.38 4 The emerging recognition of the importance of systemic approaches to
institutional litigation has prompted experimentation with novel
procedural devices, such as defendant class actions, innovative case
assignment systems, and sophisticated approaches to monitor85
ing.3
Plaintiffs' lawyers increasingly use methods such as computerized tracking that provide a comprehensive picture of the
functioning of the institution and an informed basis of selecting
86
representative examples of more systemic problems.3

minimally adequate treatment also remains unresolved. Lower courts have relied on
the Supreme Court's decision in Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 324-25 (1982)
(holding that civilly committed persons have a right to minimally adequate treatment
to ensure their safety), to establish the framework for analyzing this issue. Youngberg
held that in determining whether a substantive right protected by the Due Process
Clause has been violated, a court must balance the individual's interest in liberty
against the state's asserted reasons for restraining liberty. See id. at 320. The proper
standard for determining whether the proper balance has been struck is whether
"professional judgment" has been exercised. Id. at 321. Federal courts have
interpreted Youngberg differently, some finding very broad guarantees of treatment
and others strictly limiting the amount of treatment guaranteed by the Constitution
to that granted in Youngberg. CompareScott v. Plante, 691 F.2d 634, 636-38 (3rd Cir.
1982) (reading Youngberg expansively) with Phillips v. Thompson, 715 F.2d 365, 368
(7th Cir. 1983) (reading Youngberg narrowly).
381 Alexander Interview, supra note 321, at 21. There is an "arms race in [the]
degree of sophistication" required by these cases; the evidentiary presentations used
today are "ofa scope unthinkable" 10 or 11 years ago. Boston Interview, supra note
227, at 12.
111 S. Ct. 2321 (1991).
's Bronstein Interview, supra note 10, at 5.
See Interview with Stephen 0. Kinnard, Partner, Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue,
in Atlanta, Ga. 2-3 (Aug. 12, 1991) (transcript on file with author); Cullen Interview,
supra note 22, at 9.
' See supra text accompanying notes 174-82 (describing recent procedural
innovations).
'3s See Boston Interview, supra note 227, at 12 (describing use of computerized
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The role of experts in corrections litigation has become more
complex and indispensable as parties show greater willingness to
litigate.
The use of expert witnesses has become essential to investigation,
the framing of the issues, and to analysis of the likelihood of
success before a complaint is filed. Experts also are now involved
in all phases of pretrial preparation. Their presence is invaluable
when depositions are taken or when interrogatories are drafted.
They assist in the review and analysis of documents,
selection of
87
exhibits, and preparation of cross-examination
The use of experts differs from that of noninstitutional litigation in
that experts interact with the administration, staff, and inmates to
develop a common factual basis and a workable remedy. They not
only assess the causes and likely impact of particular conditions;
they help develop a plan of action. Their interactions with those
who must live with a remedy can determine the future course of
implementation."' 8 If experts can work effectively with management and staff,judicial intervention can develop into a cooperative
endeavor that can enhance the quality of service delivery in the
3 9
institution and avoid protracted litigation. 8
The response of the defense bar to the increasingly stringent
standards of proof in corrections cases has also contributed to the
expense and difficulty of litigating these cases. Litigators report
that attorneys general have responded to the increased evidentiary
burdens by hardening their positions and becoming more willing to
litigate. 9 ° There are indications that the defense bar is becoming

tracking system in dental care case and increasing use of computerization in trial
preparation).
' Claudia Wright, Expert Witnesses: Expanding Their Role in Prison Cases, NAT'L
Fall 1987, at 12, 12.
38This is one of many areas of potential overlap between formal adjudication and

PRISON PROJECTJ.,

consensual dispute resolution and problem solving approaches in corrections
litigation.
" See generally Sturm, supra note 42, at 1062-72, 1090-91 (noting that successful
implementation of effective remedies is enhanced by cooperation and interaction

between experts and participants in the prison system).
" See Breed Interview, supra note 238, at 2 (describing an "attitudinal change" on
the part of attorneys general against settlements). This litigious posture is not
necessarily shared by the Department of Corrections. Advocates reported numerous
instances of disagreement between leadership in the corrections department and the

attorney general over whether to settle. In fact, the conflict of interest between the
government's attorney and the agency itself was a recurring theme. See, e.g., Boston
Interview, supra note 227, at 17 (noting genuine conflicts facing attorneys general);
Nathan Interview, supra note 160, at 3 (noting importance of competent defense
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391
more organized and combative in its approach to this litigation.
Thus, the corrections litigation of the next decade will require
considerable expertise in complex litigation and adequate resources
to enable plaintiffs to employ experts and engage in extensive
discovery.
The involvement of experts, although crucial to
92
successful litigation, dramatically increases the cost of litigation.

The Supreme Court's recent decision in West Virginia University
Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey, 93 prohibiting the recovery of expert fees
under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, ensures that organizations will not recover
costs they incur in major conditions litigation. 9 4 This unavailability of attorneys' fees for experts dramatically limits the capacity of
many lawyers to bring this litigation.3 95 The increased complexity
and expense of corrections litigation heightens the challenge of
finding resources adequate to support this litigation. Whether
private foundations will continue to provide significant support for

counsel in achieving reform and describing "complex representational problem[s]"
facing defendants' lawyers who must meet the needs of conflicting interests and
parties as well as take action that can be defensible politically").
"' For example, a group of attorneys general filed an amicus brief in Rufo v.
Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 112 S. Ct. 748 (1992), urging the Court to adopt a
standard allowing modification of consent decrees to conform to the constitutional
floor. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 19-22, Rufo, 112 S. Ct. 748
(No. 90.954). The firm representing the attorneys general is reported to have
developed a specialty in advising governments on fighting this litigation. See Nathan
Interview, supra note 160, at 2, 3 (describing role of the law firm Oneck Klein as
defense counsel in prison litigation). One conservative commentator suggests that
the Rufo decision has invited "a flood of successful government petitions to overhaul
consent decrees." Bruce Fein, Consent Decrees and the Consent of the Governed, TEX.
LAW., Feb. 17, 1992, at 13, 13.
" See Alexander Interview, supra note 321, at 25. The Department of Justice
alone spent over one million dollars in litigation costs in Ruiz v. Estelle, 503 F. Supp.
1265 (S.D. Tex. 1980), afl'd in part, 679 F.2d 115 (5th Cir.), modified, 688 F.2d 266
(5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1042 (1983); see also Knop v. Johnson, 712 F.
Supp. 571, 588 (W.D. Mich. 1989) (plaintiffs incurred $97,530.61 in expert witness
fees).
s" 499 U.S. 83 (1991).

s See id. at 102. In Casey, the Supreme Court held that expert witness fees could
only be recovered in the court's discretion as costs pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1920 and
1821(b), which limit recovery to travel expenses and a witness fee of $30 per day for
each day the witness appeared at a deposition or in court. See id. Section 1821 has
since been amended to increase the allowable per diem from $30 to $40. SeeJudicial
Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 314(a), 104 Stat. 5081, 5115
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1821 (Supp. IV 1992)). This amount does not
begin to cover the cost of expert's testimony. It also ignores the extensive informal
and preparatory role experts play, particularly at the remedial stage.

-" A survey conducted of legal services, law school clinics, and private firms
revealed that the expense of litigation is a considerable deterrent to lawyer
involvement in corrections litigation. See Sturm, supra note 23.
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national organizations specializing in corrections litigation is
uncertain."' The future of this litigation may well depend on the
willingness of Congress to amend § 1988 to allow recovery of expert
fees, private bar involvement in litigation, expansion of the role of
legal services, 9 7 and commitment by the Department of Justice to
the mandate of the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act to
protect inmates' right to minimally adequate conditions in correctional institutions.39 8 Resource constraints also require corrections advocates to exercise care in deciding whether and where to
bring litigation.

" The Edna McConnell Clark Foundation, which has been the primary private
funder of corrections litigation, has recently decided to phase out its general support
of corrections litigation.
" For a discussion of the current and potential involvement of each of these
sectors of the legal profession in litigation involving conditions of confinement in
corrections institutions, see Sturm, supra note 23.
'- See 42 U.S.C. § 1997 (1988). Under the Carter administration, the Special
Litigation Section of theJustice Department devoted considerable resources to prison
litigation. For example, they reportedly spent over one million dollars litigatingRuiz
v. E telle, see supra note 392, and private counsel in that case reports that Ruiz would
not have been possible without Department ofJustice resources. See Interview with
Donna Brorby, Partner, Turner & Brorby and plaintiffs' counsel in Ruiz, in San
Francisco, Cal. 3 (July 19,1991) [hereinafter Brorby Interview] (transcript on file with
author). They also paid for all the reports and experts in United States v. Michigan,
680 F. Supp. 270 (W.D. Mich. 1988). See Alexander Interview, supra note 321, at 3.
Under Presidents Reagan and Bush, however, theJustice Department essentially
abandoned its role in promoting constitutional prisons through litigation. The Bush
administration took the position that "the ability of many states to manage their own
prisons andjails efficiently has been hampered by the involvement of courts in their
day-to-day operations." William P. Barr, Expanding Capacity for Serious Offenders,
Remarks at the Attorney General's Summit on Corrections 24 (Apr. 27, 1992)
[hereinafter Expanding Capacity] (transcript available at the Department ofJustice);
see also William P. Barr, Remarks to the California District Attorneys Association,
1992 Winter Conferences (Jan. 14, 1992) (transcript available at the Department of
Justice) ("I recognize that the ability of states to manage their own prisons has been
hampered by the involvement of federal courts in the day-to-day operations of state
facilities."). The Attorney General at that time also adopted a policy against the use
of consent decrees to resolve corrections cases. Consistent with these positions, the
Justice Department switched sides in particular lawsuits to assist states in avoiding
judicial intervention, filed amicus briefs urging the lifting of population caps, and
offered to assist states and localities tied up in litigation. See Expanding Capacity,
supra, at 27 (describing the importance of the Department ofJustice's activities in
support of defendant states); United States' Memorandum of Law in Support of
Defendants' Motion for Relief from Judgment at 4, Ruiz v. Collins, 981 F.2d 1256
(5th Cir. 1992) (No. 11-78-987). The role of theJustice Department under President
Clinton in enforcing its mandate under CRIPA remains to be seen.
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C. ConsiderableAttention and Resources Will Be Devoted to
-Preservingand EnforcingExisting Court Orders

The remedial stage is in many respects the most important and
difficult aspect of correctional litigation. Establishing liability is
merely the first step in a long process of eliminating illegal practices
and conditions.- 9 Many of the institutions that were sued in the
1970s and 1980s have yet to achieve and maintain substantial
compliance with court orders."' As of January 1991, forty states
(plus the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands)
were operating under court orders, some of which were issued as
far back as the early 1970s.4" 1
Corrections advocates have come to realize the significance of
the remedial stage. Experience has shown that compliance is
unlikely to be achieved without the active involvement of plaintiffs'
counsel. Many correction litigation specialists report that they
devote increasing amounts of energy to implementation. 0 2 For
example, in twenty-four of the twenty-six active cases in 1992 on the
docket of the Prisoners Rights Project of the Legal Aid Society in
New York City ("PRP"), ajudgment had been entered on all or part
of plaintiffs' claims, whereas in 1973, only eight out of the PRP's
twenty-eight active cases were post-liability. °5 Similarly, twentyone out of the twenty-six active cases reported in the June 30, 1991
quarterly report of the National Prison Project ("NPP") are in the
post-liability phase of litigation.' 4 PRP's director, John Boston,
reports that a considerable proportion of the resources in his office

" See Sturm, supra note 24, at 809 (describing the many stages that comprise the
remedial process).
io See supra notes 216-19 and accompanying text.
401See Koren, supra note 188, at 14.
o2 When asked about her expectations for implementation, Elizabeth Alexander,
the associate director of litigation for NPP, stated that condition cases are expected
to remain permanently on the docket. She also stated that if there is not a
commitment to carry through with implementation, there is no reason to bring the
case. See Alexander Interview, supra note 321, at 43. Adjoa Aiyetoro estimates that
50 to 60% of her litigation work is post-litigation compliance work. See Aiyetoro
Interview, supra note 321, at 1; see also Bright Interview, supra note 10, at 2.
4
o"See John Boston, The Prisoners' Rights Project Then and Now (Feb. 1992)
(unpublished report, on file with author).
o See QuarterlyReport (ACLU/National Prison Project, Washington, D.C.),June
30, 1990, at 1-28. This figure includes cases resolved by consent decrees. See id. at
16.
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are devoted
to enforcement, and predicts that this trend will
5
40

continue.

Efforts by local, state, and federal officials to modify or vacate
existing orders add to the significance of enforcement activities by
corrections advocates. Many defendants are using recent increases
in inmate populations and new case law toughening the standards
for finding an Eighth Amendment violation to support motions to
modify outstanding decrees.40 6 Although the Supreme Court has
rejected the view that these factors alone warrant modification of
decrees, its articulation of a more flexible standard for modifying
orders and its increasing deference to official discretion will likely
encourage defendants to try nonetheless to seek modifications of
40 7
outstanding decrees on these grounds.
Defendants have also intensified their efforts to eliminate active
judicial supervision of correctional institutions. The Supreme Court
has held that a district court may grant partial relief from active
court supervision, 408 and that a district court must release a school
board from the court's jurisdiction once it has eliminated the effects
of its discriminatory conduct. 40 9

Some lower courts have relin-

quished active supervision, or even vacated outstanding decrees in
corrections cases upon a finding that defendants have achieved
substantial compliance. 40 Corrections officials, plaintiffs' counsel,
0 See Boston Interview, supra note 227, at 1.
See, e.g., Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk CountyJail, 112 S. Ct. 748, 763-65 (1992)
(adopting a more flexible standard for modifying consent decrees and remanding to
district court to determine whether population increases constituted a significant
change in facts warranting a modification of consent decree prohibiting double
ceiling); Ruiz v. Lynaugh, 811 F.2d 856, 861 (5th Cir. 1987) (affirming district court's
refusal to modify consent decree on grounds that defendants had acknowledged and
accepted the possibility ofincreased prison population upon entering into "crowding
stipulation"); TwelveJohn Does v. District of Columbia, 861 F.2d 295, 298-302 (D.C.
Cir. 1988) (affirming district court's denial of modification of consent decree on
grounds that, inter alia, increases in prison population were foreseeable); supra text
accompanying notes 304-12.
407 See Fein, supra note 391, at 13.
4' See Freeman v. Pitts, 112 S.Ct. 1430, 1445 (1992) (holding that district court
may in its discretion terminate judicial supervision of school districts incrementally
before full compliance has been achieved).
o See Board of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 249 (1991) (remanding to district
court to determine whether school board was entitled to relief from desegregation
decree). For a careful discussion of Supreme Court cases governing modification and
termination of injunctions, see David Levine, The Later Stages of Enforcement of
Equitable Decrees: The Course of Institutional Reform Cases After Dowell Rufo, and
Freeman, 20 HAsTINGS CONST. L.Q. 579, 610-11 (1993).
4
"See e.g., Kendrick v. Bland, 931 F.2d 421,423 (6th Cir. 1991) (affirming district
court's placement of case on inactive docket upon finding of substantial compliance
4'
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judges, and masters have all expressed keen interest in developing
an exit scenario for corrections cases.4 11 Indeed, experienced
corrections advocates have begun to use defendants' interest in
terminating judicial supervision as an incentive to develop alternative forms of accountability.4 12 This move is prompted in part by
the recognition that the court often shares defendants' interest in
ending the litigation. It also reflects the insight that the incentive
to terminate the litigation may be plaintiffs' strongest leverage, and
that a vision of an acceptable endpoint to the litigation should
inform the entire remedial process.
The increasing significance of the remedial stage presents both
challenges and opportunities for corrections advocates over the next
decade.
Successful advocacy depends on recognition of the
importance of the remedial stage, a commitment to continued active
involvement through the implementation process, and the development of skills and expertise that differ in important respects from
41
formal litigation skills developed in other complex litigation. 3

and denying motion to restore case to active docket absent showing of institutionwide violation of consent decree); Black v. Ricketts, No. 84-111 PHX-CAM, (D. Ariz.
Feb. 1988); Finney v. Mabry, 546 F. Supp. 628, 641 (E.D. Ark. 1982) (relinquishing
jurisdiction on finding of substantial compliance).
411See Breed Interview, supra note 238, at 5 (urging foundations to look at how
to help special masters successfully conclude their cases); Nathan Interview, supra
note 160, at 9 ("If cases are brought to conclusion in careful and sophisticated ways
and are not terminated prematurely, and if you build in certain mechanisms at the
end, backsliding will not be [a] problem ....
[I am] spending more and more of
[my] time on the endgame process.").
412See, e.g., Breed Interview, supra note 238, at 5 (urging use of departure of
special master to bring about change); supra text accompanying notes 184-86. One
strategy described in recent conversation with David Rudovsky, a private practitioner
currently representing inmates in a state-wide challenge of conditions in Pennsylvania
prisons, consists of developing and agreeing to a remedial plan and giving the state
an agreed upon period to implement it. If the state fails to do so, the case goes to
trial.
4" See Stephen Ellmann, Client-CenterednessMultiplied:Individual Autonomy and
CollectiveMobilizationin PublicInterestLawyers'Representationof Groups, 78 VA. L. REv.
1103, 1170-73 (1992) (discussing how public interest lawyers can help their clients
more effectively through "political mobilization" than through litigation successes);
Gerald P. Lopez, Reconceiving Civil Rights Practice: Seven Weeks in the Life of a
Rebellious Collaboration, 77 GEO. L.J. 1603, 1664 (1989) (advocating a need for
nondoctrinal lawyering in order to "fight for social change"); McDougall, supra note
329, at 35 (discussing how "a public policy approach [to law] requires teaching
students different lawyering skills to cope with the world"); Sturm, supra note 9, at
1365-67 (noting that nonadversarial interaction between advocates and nonparties is
of greater value in formulating and implementing remedies than are the "tools" of
the "traditional adversary process"); Lude E. White, To Learn and Teach: Lessonsfrom
Drie Fontein on Lawyering andPower, 1988 Wis. L. REv. 699, 764 (discussing how this
type of lawyering "bears little resemblance to traditional professional practice").
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Under the implementation model, the remedial stage becomes
the focus of litigation planning, resource allocation, and development of an overall advocacy strategy. The potential for successful
implementation of a court-ordered institutional reform frames the
advocacy strategy, rather than the likelihood of national impact or
law reform. Factors such as the potential involvement of capable
and supportive insiders, the political environment, or the existence
of a local advocacy network may take precedence over the significance of the legal principle at stake.
The implementation model also mandates strategic identification
of appropriate participants in the case. The involvement of parties
beyond those with formal responsibility for managing the system
may prove essential to achieving effective remedies for institutional
problems. 414 The problem-solving orientation that characterizes
remedial formulation and implementation also blurs the line
between formal litigation and other forms of administrative and
political action. Effective lawyering at the remedial stage requires
an understanding of the corrections context and culture, and an
ability to use creative processes of dispute resolution such as
mediation and expert involvement in fact-finding and negotiating
remedies. 1 5
Finally, implementation of corrections decrees is frequently
time-consuming and expensive.
Although this work typically
generates attorneys' fees, many organizations have not devoted
sufficient time and energy to the enforcement stage of corrections
litigation."' Corrections litigators have begun to develop systems
for ensuring regular payment of fees to compensate them for
monitoring activities. They have also begun to develop other
incentives for lawyers to play an active role in enforcing decrees. 417 If judicial intervention is to produce more than paper
414See supra text

accompanying notes 174-82, 210.
Brorby Interview,'supra note 398, at 3-4 ("[You] must get into prisons as
institutions.... The [implementation] stage doesn't resemble complex litigation....
411 See

[You must know] who in the organization will do the work so they get assigned. [It
is about the] interplay between litigation and pressure."). The Introduction of this
Article identifies the use of creative dispute resolution mechanisms and understanding of the systemic nature of the problems in correctional institutions as important
factors in the success of past litigation. See supra introduction.
416 In fact, a study conducted of corrections litigators, the results of which are
reported in a forthcoming article, finds that the remedial area is the most problematic
for all the organizations involved in this litigation. See Sturm, supra note 23.
417For instance, some consent decrees or orders include an agreement to pay
attorneys' fees for enforcement work on a quarterly basis. Any undisputed amounts
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victories, this aspect of the litigation must be the focus of considerable energy and thought over the next decade.
D. CorrectionsAdjudication Will Increasingly Link Up
with and Come to Resemble More Informal
and Systemic Forms of Advocacy
With the shift to an implementation model of correctional
reform, innovation now emerges not in the formulation of legal

theory, but in the processes used to develop and implement
remedies for legal violations. At first glance, this development
seems inconsistent with the trend toward the complex, adversarial
litigation described above. In reality, however, jurisdictions which
have endured the expense and pain of litigation, as well as those

willing to acknowledge their constitutional responsibilities, have
sometimes turned to more cooperative forms of dispute resolution
to avoid the costs and inefficiencies of adversary processes.41 a
Plaintiffs' lawyers, judges, masters, and defendants have developed
strategies that enlist the cooperation of responsible public officials
in the implementation process. 41 9 These strategies frequently blur
the distinction between litigation and other forms of problem
solving, and attempt to capitalize on the strengths of each.420
Where possible, cases are resolved not through formal courtroom
adjudication, but rather through mediation involving plaintiffs'
counsel, experts, and the officials responsible for addressing the

problems in question. 42 1 Plaintiffs' lawyers are experimenting with

are paid immediately, and disputed items are held until the end of the year. Courts
have also awarded interim fees. See Interview with Michael W. Bien, Partner, Rosen,
Bien & Asaro, in San Francisco, Cal. 4-5 (July 18, 1991) [hereinafter Bien Interview]
(transcript on file with author) (discussing the collection of legal fees in prison reform
cases).
418 In fact, it is not uncommon for constructive dialogue to emerge only with the
threat of warfare. See Schwartz Interview, supra note 267, at 4 (referring to a
statement by Mark Soler that litigation is the "atomic bomb of strategies" and noting
that "[the] availability of an option you don't use empowers other options").
419 See Bronstein Interview, supra note 10, at 5 ("[The] [r]elationship between
nonlitigative work and litigation [is] extraordinarily important and growing in
importance. The fact that we do things other than litigate gives us a lot of credibility
with the other side. We are notjust in the business of beating them up in court....
They recognize us as experts in their field.").
42' Cf Sturm, supra note 24, at 856-59 (the catalyst approach to judicial
intervention in prisons combines the strengths of formal and informal processes).
" A prime example of this approach is the mediated resolution of litigation
concerning conditions and overcrowdingin Pennsylvaniajuvenilejustice institutions.
See supra text accompanying note 182.
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consensual approaches to formulating remedies which avoid the
422
risk, expense, and adversarial quality of formal adjudication.
Faced with the threat of a court-imposed remedy, many public
officials have agreed to use structured negotiations, jointly selected
expert panels, and other collaborative approaches to develop
remedies.4 23
This emerging emphasis on implementation is prompting
litigators to expand their roles to include diverse forms of corrections advocacy, including mediation, training of corrections staff,
and legislative and administrative advocacy.
Litigators have
discovered that they can capitalize on the skills and access afforded
them through formal adjudication, and enhance their effectiveness
by combining formal and informal approaches to problem solving.424 Organizations with continuity in the field and a good track
record in bringing and resolving litigation use their reputations as
corrections litigation experts to engage in nonlitigation advocacy
and problem solving: "One reason that administrative advocacy and
" For a general description and analysis of this approach to public remedial
formulation, see Sturm, supra note 9, at 1373-76.
' See id. at 1417-27 (emphasizing potential of collaborative remedial formulation
approaches to educate parties, forge working relationships, devise creative solutions
and generate input from range of participants); see also LAWRENCE SUSSKIND &
JEFFREY CRUIKSHANK, BREAKING THE IMPASSE:
CONSENSUAL APPROACHES TO
RESOLVING PUBUC DISPUTES 80-81 (1987) (arguing that collaborative efforts at

devising remedies can resolve public policy disputes more effectively than litigation).
424 Repeat players are at a distinct advantage in their ability to prompt informal
problem solving. For example, the National Prison Project and the Youth Law Center
have worked to develop national reputations as experts in the field who are willing
to go anywhere with "big guns." They report that this reputation has given them a
leg up in settlement negotiations. See Telephone Interview with Howard Belodoff,
Associate Director, Idaho Legal Aid Services 3 (July 24, 1991) [hereinafter Belodoff
Interview] (discussing the "intangible effect of a big organization behind a case...
[which] makes defendants more inclined to settle, especially with an AG who doesn't
know what to do"); Cullen Interview, supra note 22, at 10 (stating that "NPP's visibility
is a strength"); Interview with Ralph Knowles, Partner at Doffermyre, Shields,
Canfield & Knowles, former Associate Director of the National Prison Project, and
former member of the Implementation Committee in Pugh v. Alabama, in Atlanta, Ga.
2 (Aug. 10, 1991) (transcript on file with author) (discussing importance of expertise
in correctional culture for negotiating effective remedies); Soler Interview, supranote
15, at 9, 16 ("[The] Youth Law Center is well known for its track record, [its]
willingness to spend whatever [is] necessary, ... [and its] greater resources.").
Expertise in the substantive law and familiarity with the institutional setting can also
enable them to settle cases without lengthy discovery. See Interview withJohn Sparks,
Partner, Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison, in San Francisco, Cal. 3 (July 18, 1991)
(transcript on file with author) (stating that it would have been "difficult to develop
early settlement without extensive discovery" if help from the Youth Law Center had
not been available).
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policy work are successful is that officials take seriously the threat
of litigation; because [Prisoners Legal Services Project] is a
successful litigator, discriminating in the choice of cases, and doing
cases that affect large numbers of people, they are respected."42 5
The directors of organizations such as the National Prison Project,
the Prisoners' Rights Project, the Youth Law Center, and the
Southern Center for Human Rights have developed reputations in
their fields that enable them to have considerable informal influence
426
on public officials.
Corrections specialists are involved in other forms of nonlitigation advocacy which are likely to gain significance over the next
decade. They do extensive amounts of public speaking on corrections issues. YLC and NPP have recognized the significance of the
media in attracting attention to corrections issues and creating
pressure to eliminate abuses. They have begun to explore new ways
of capitalizing on this important role of the media in defining public
policy on corrections issues. They work with legislatures, advocacy
organizations, and insiders in the corrections field wherever possible
as an adjunct to litigation efforts.4 27

" Telephone Interview with Grace Lopes, Managing Attorney, D.C. Prisoners
Legal Services Project 4 (July 15, 1991) [hereinafter Lopes Interview] (transcript on
file with author); see also Boston Interview, supra note 227, at 14 ("We have developed
such credibility that no one messes with us institutionally."); Soler Interview, supra
note 15, at 9 ("YLC is well known for its track record and willingness to spend
whatever is necessary.... [This] has a deterrent effect.... [It enables us] to reach
that critical mass of reform, when everyone jumps on the bandwagon instead of
impeding progress.").
For example, YLC is frequently asked to give technical assistance to corrections
officials outside the context of litigation. NPP has "provided technical assistance" to
prison officials in Hawaii and Rhode Island. Bronstein Interview, supra note 10, at
3. Attorneys from NPP and YLC regularly participate in conferences held by
corrections administrators and others in the corrections field. The Southern Center
for Human Rights and the Youth Law Center have used their potential for litigation
to prompt defendants to work with experts such as the National Council on Crime
and Delinquency ("NCCD") and the National Center on Institutions and Alternatives
("NCIA") to address overcrowding and develop alternatives to incarceration. See
Ortega Interview, supra note 209, at 7 (discussing the use of the NCIA for "educational effort[s]"); Soler Interview, supra note 15, at 5-6 ("[We] worked with NCCD to draft
legislation.").
42 See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Lance Liebman, Dean and Professor of Law,
Columbia University School of Law 1 (July 15, 1991) (transcript on file with author)
(reporting that staffers on the hill often pay close attention to positions expressed by
Stephen Bright, the executive director of the Southern Center for Human Rights).
' The juvenile area presents greater opportunities for nonlitigation advocacy
because children's organizations-and some political support for children's issuesexist in many states. The YLC has used a multifaceted approach to advocacy for
children since its inception. The organization attempts to build on existing advocacy
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State and local organizations specializing in corrections are
particularly well situated to engage in nonlitigation advocacy as an
adjunct to litigation. Those organizations that have developed
credibility with the local and state correctional institutions, such as
Prisoners' Legal Services in New York and the Juvenile Law Center
in Philadelphia, are in a position to resolve many issues informally- 2 They also have the opportunity to use forms of advocacy
other than litigation as a result of their contacts within the prison
and the local political and legal community.4" 9
This shift toward an implementation model of litigation also
suggests different criteria for determining whether to undertake
litigation in a particular jurisdiction. Litigators are beginning to
speak in terms of targeting systems instead of institutions. Instead
of focusing on the jurisdictions most likely to serve as a national or
regional example, advocates are beginning to assess how to get the
efforts for children and to avoid litigation where possible by using other forms of
advocacy. Indeed, Mark Soler estimates that only one-eighth of attorney time atYLC
is devoted to formal litigation. See Soler Interview, supra note 15, at 10.
Opportunities for political advocacy and coalition building are more limited in
adult corrections, particularly at the national level. Although NPP does play an
important role in policing the conduct of Congress and the ACA, its role has
developed mainly as a litigation organization. For example, NPP recently took an
active role in opposing the ACA's decision to weaken the standards for overcrowding.
See Love Interview, supra note 366, at 7. In addition, an NPP lawyer is coordinating
a community legislative component to accompany the statewide overcrowding
litigation in Pennsylvania. See Aiyetoro Interview, supra note 321, at 1. NPP also
provides material or testimony at the state level at the request of local affiliates. See
Bronstein Interview, supra note 10, at 6. Prison Legal Services in D.C. "coordinated
the formulation of a policy proposal on HIV and prisoners" that enlisted the support
of experts, the local advocacy community, and the government. Lopes Interview,
supra note 425, at 4.
" See Cullen Interview, supra note 22, at 6 ("[I] have good access to the [prison
administration).... [I] write a lot of letters and describe allegations [of inmates].
They respond routinely and fast. If [the case] has any merit, I can get it fixed at that
level. If [the case involves] a systemic issue, [I can] go to the media where I have
good contacts.").
'29 See Aiyetoro Interview, supra note 321, at 3 ("Legislators won't listen to
national people, but to the local community."). For example, John Gresham of
Prisoners Legal Services of New York reports that he regularly interacts with the
prison administration, the legislature, and the media about prison issues. See
Interview with John Gresham, Associate Director, Prisoner Legal Services of New
York, in St. Petersburg, Fla. 5 (July 29, 1991) [hereinafter Gresham Interview]
(transcript on file with author). He and others in the organization have made a major
effort to cultivate contacts beneficial to the client group, including the bar, church
groups, health care organizations, philanthropic organizations, and the media. See id.
Prisoners Legal Services in D.C. has been very successful in becoming involved in the
local community and in political issues, and in pulling in the bar and the business
community. See Koren Interview, supra note 260, at 5.
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"maximum leverage in an enormous multiinstitutional system." 430
One manifestation of this is an increasing recognition of the
importance of avoiding suits that will have predictable, negative
spillover effects on other institutions. For example, experienced
litigators resist bringing overcrowding cases against a single
institution within a larger corrections system, recognizing that these
cases merely shift the overcrowding problem from one institution
to another.
Assessments of the political and administrative
circumstances surrounding particular correctional problems are also
playing greater roles in the case selection process, and, at times,
even dictate whether or not litigators become involved.43 ' This
trend is likely to continue.
E. Advocates Will Explore the Possibility of Bringing Successful
Claims Under State Law and FederalStatutes
The federaljudiciary's increasing conservatism and deference to
state action has prompted interest in exploring state law and federal
statutes as alternatives to federal constitutional causes of action.
Some advocates have reported greater success pursuing litigation in
selected state forums where the law or the particular court may be
more amenable to judicial intervention. 432 Many of those litiga""0Boston
431

Interview, supra note 227, at 3.
See Alexander Interview, supra note 321, at 13 (discussing importance of local

politics and political climate in determining whether to accept a case); Krisberg
Interview, supra note 177, at 4, 6-7 (recommending that litigators spend less money

and time in adversarial states and look for states that, because of fiscal constraints or
political opening, could respond progressively to litigation); Soler Interview, supra
note 15, at 6.

4s2 Advocates suing in New Jersey, California, North Carolina, Idaho, New
Hampshire, and Massachusetts described the shift towards state courts and state court
claims. See Interview with Barry Barkow, Director, Massachusetts Correctional Legal
Services, in Boston, Mass. 11 (Aug. 15, 1991) [hereinafter Barkow Interview]
(transcript on file with author) (noting that some pro se prisoner cases won in state
court would be unwinnable in federal court, and foreseeing shift to state courts);
Belodoff Interview, supra note 424, at 2 (stating that he will seriously consider
bringing cases in state court because Idaho Supreme Court is not as strict in its
application of federal law); Telephone Interview with Elliot Berry, Senior Staff
Attorney, New Hampshire Legal Services 1 (Aug. 22, 1991) (transcript on file with
author) (urging a shift towards state courts and offering example of New Hampshire
double celing case producing"significantly better result than they would have gotten
in federal court"); Interview with Dick Taylor, Executive Director, North Carolina
Legal Services, in Chicago, Ill. 3-4 (Aug. 12, 1991) (transcript on file with author)
(describing workshop on bringing claims under state constitutions, which contain
broader language than the U.S. Constitution, as well as the use of state tort laws,
whose available administrative remedies are faster than constitutional remedies).
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tors interviewed, however, expressed considerable reluctance to
proceed in state court. They questioned the capacity of state courts
to handle the complex remedial challenges posed by corrections
litigation, and expressed concern that the technical and procedural
obstacles present in many state court systems would make large
scale corrections litigation unworkable."' Some admitted candidly that they were simply unfamiliar with state court procedure and
unwilling to venture into foreign territory. Finally, some of those
experienced with state court judges expressed skepticism that the
judges would take a "visible position around an unpopular issue"
(such as favoring inmates' rights) if they had to "stand for election."

4 34

Advocates expressed greater interest in using statutes as
footholds into correctional institutions, particularly in the juvenile
area, and predicted that more special education cases will be
brought in the next decade. For example, one expert noted that
practically all jurisdictions are in violation of the Individuals with
Disabilities Act, and about half of the children in juvenile corrections institutions qualify for protection under the statute.43 5
Because the statute relates to a range of services within these
institutions, it has the potential to change many aspects of the
institution. Advocates also observe the potential to address the
problems of AIDS in prison via the Rehabilitation Act and the
4
Americans with Disabilities Act.

6

Despite the ongoing exploration of alternative legal approaches,
constitutional litigation is likely to remain the staple of corrections
advocacy. Many of the most pressing problems facing corrections,
notably overcrowding, are not covered by existing statutes.
"sSee Alexander Interview, supra note 321, at 6 (describing a "strong prejudice"
at National Prison Project for federal courts, since the "NPP knows what it's doing,"
and the court has the capacity to deal with procedural complexity); Belodoff
Interview, supra note 424, at 2-3; Boston Interview, supra note 227, at 13 ("[S]tate
courts institutionallylack structure of thought and doctrine and procedure necessary
to sustain this type of work."); Love Interview, supra note 366, at 10 ("State court
rules tie you up too much."); Telephone Interview with Neil Himelein, Managing
Attorney, Community Legal Aid Society of Delaware 2 (Aug. 28, 1991) (transcript on
file with author).
s Breed Interview, supra note 238, at 2.
45
See No PLACE TO CALL HOME, supra note 264, at 35 ("Juvenile authorities
report that approximately two-thirds of the children in their system are severely
emotionally
disturbed.")
4
1 See Alexander Interview, supra note 321, at 20; Boston Interview, supra note
227, at 12-13.
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Moreover, there is some possibility that the courts will limit the
applicability of broad remedial statutes to correctional institutions.
F. The Need for Effective State and Local CorrectionsAdvocacy
Is Likely to Increase over the Next Decade
The increasing emphasis on implementation also suggests that
state and local advocacy will play a significant role over the next
decade. The process of monitoring and enforcing a remedy
requires the continued presence and involvement of plaintiffs'
counsel. State and local counsel frequently assume this responsibility.417 The state and local organizations specializing in corrections
litigation have the advantage of day-to-day interaction within the
institutions in their jurisdiction.
They are familiar with the
procedures, problems, and players of the institutions they regularly
sue, and many have ongoing relationships with the corrections
administration."' Many of these organizations are in the correctional institutions on a regular basis, and are thus in a good position
to investigate and evaluate problems. 39 Knowledge of the local
political scene, the day-to-day problems of the institutions, and the
key players within a particular system can be invaluable to the
implementation process. The regular presence of lawyers raising
questions can itself improve the quality of service delivery within an
institution, and resolve some issues without litigation. 440 Ongoing

" See Alexander Interview, supra note 321, at 16; Berg Interview, supra note 253,
at 3 (arguing that "real work has to be done at local level on implementation"); Cullen
Interview, supranote 22, at 5 (stating that prison culture can only change if advocates
are able to be on site).
4
See Barkow Interview, supra note 432, at 6 ("Arms length, on-site assistance
programs are the most effective and economical. Issues get addressed more
effectively because they can often be handled administratively."); Boston Interview,
supra note 227, at 1 ("[In New York City, we have] contact with people in the prison
system and... private provider[s] of medical care. We are engaged with the ...
Department of Corrections onaregular basis on averybroad range ofissues because
of the consentjudgments .... Familiarity breeds better communication."); Gresham
Interview, supra note 429, at 8 ("[NPP is] covering the nation so [they] cannot know
any system in detail. I know [the Commissioner].... We know all kinds of facts
about how things work, how records are kept, how [the] staff is deployed, what they
can do to screw people over .... ").
439 One commentator notes that prison law office staff "have a better feel of what
is going on day to day. They are really in there more. That is crucial for us. They
can find witnesses, potential plaintiffs. They know people, what works, [and the]
scope of cases pending in California." Bien Interview, supra note 417, at 7; see also
Interview with Luther Ortin, Partner, Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison, in San Francisco,
Cal. 4 (July 18, 1991) (transcript on file with author) ("[The] PLO had a lot of contact
with inmates.... They knew what kinds of reports to ask for.").
' See Brorby Interview, supranote 398, at 5 (arguing that on-site advocates raising
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relationships with the officials responsible for implementation
Local and
enable advocates to address problems informally.44
state organizations may also be better situated to link litigation to
political strategies for correctional reform." 2
CONCLUSION

Corrections litigation has played an important role in upgrading
the organizational capacity of corrections institutions and prompting government officials to assume responsibility for maintaining
minimally adequate conditions of confinement. Overcrowding,
fiscal crisis, and the absence of effective internal mechanisms for
holding the corrections system accountable ensure the continued
need for conditions-of-confinement litigation. Corrections advocacy
will present significant challenges to the legal profession over the
next decade. It will require the development of a wide range of
skills, from mastery of complex litigation to the ability to engage in
mediation and organizational advocacy. Significant resources to
support both the formal litigation and the informal advocacy will
also be necessary.
Although this study has focused on correctional institutions as
the target of judicial intervention, it contains important lessons for
public interest advocacy involving other institutions as well. The
study underscores the importance of institutional context in
assessing the need and potential for litigation to accomplish social
change, and suggests some general patterns cutting across institutions.
Litigation involving corrections institutions is distinctive in
several important respects. First, the information-generating
questions has real effects on prison operations); Cullen Interview, supra note 22, at
6 (stating that ability to have long-term relationship with officials enables advocates
to maintain steady pressure to address problems); Gresham Interview, supra note 429,
at 10 (explaining that it is a good idea to have people "in all prisons" and "at all
transfer sites").
4" John Boston reports that the Legal Aid Society is "engaged with the New York
City Department of Corrections on a regular basis on a broad range of issues."
Boston Interview, supra note 227, at 1. John Gresham describes a similar relationship
with the state system in New York. See Gresham Interview, supra note 429, at 3-4, 910. Bob Cullen of Georgia Legal Services also describes good long-term relationships
with the Bureau of Prisons, the state Department of Corrections, and the legislature,
and the ability to resolve many issues administratively as a result of their past
litigation success and their ongoing presence in the system. See Cullen Interview,
supra note 22, at 6.
' See supra notes 427-29 and accompanying text.
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capacity of litigation can play a transformative role in corrections
because of the institutional predisposition toward isolation and
neglect. Other contexts that share this tendency, such as institutions caring for the mentally ill, may respond similarly to litigation.
Second, the corrections field lacks any credible mechanism of
accountability to substitute for litigation. Inmates lack the potential
either to exit the system or to voice their concerns internally in the
absence of litigation. Inmates' constant and predictable lack of
political power undercuts the potential for effective political
advocacy, and they clearly cannot go elsewhere if they are dissatisfied. Prison officials can rest assured that their institutions will not
be closed down if they fail to meet minimal standards of decency.
Thus, political and professional sanctions available in other
institutional contexts, such as hospitals and nursing homes, do not
exist.
In other contexts with greater potential for effective
independent political and organizational advocacy, litigation may be
less important as a basic component of an advocacy strategy.
The prospects for successful legal challenge also play a role in
framing the continued importance of litigation in a particular field.
In the corrections area, overcrowding and fiscal crises combine to
perpetuate conditions sufficiently deplorable to prompt judicial
intervention despite increasing judicial conservatism. This may not
be true in other areas, such as poverty law, where politics and policy
arguments may well be more compelling than legal precedent.
Moreover, corrections institutions have no shortage of willing
plaintiffs and, at least in some jurisdictions, the system for handling
pro se complaints offers some prospect that these plaintiffs will be
heard. The impact of institutional context on litigation's potential
to achieve reform is important and warrants further study.
Despite these contrasts between corrections and other fields of
public interest advocacy, several common themes and trends emerge
that cut across institutional contexts. The shift in corrections from
the test case to the implementation model of advocacy appears to
be part of a more general trend.4 48 Poverty law advocates and
others have noted the growing significance of remedies, administrative enforcement, informal advocacy, and local initiatives designed
443 See, e.g., Houseman, supra note 362, at 1521 (discussing the need for greater
local and state-wide policy advocacy for public interest law); Houseman, supra note
342, at 15 (arguing that new types of practice will be necessary to ensure effective
advocacy as new substantive issues and new problems of resource allocation arise in
broad spectrum of public interest issues).
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to institutionalize reform across broad categories of need. Similarly,
public interest advocates in a wide range of areas are expanding
their conceptions of advocacy. Within the judicial arena, this
expansion portends a willingness to question the primacy of the
adversary model, to rethink the forms of public interest litigation,
and to experiment with more consensual forms of fact-finding and
dispute resolution. More generally, lawyers are exploring means of
linking litigation to public education, legislative advocacy, and
administrative reform. Commentators in a variety of fields have
noted the importance of linking litigation to a more systemic
approach to social change.
These developments have important implications not only for
the structure of legal services delivery in the corrections area in
particular, but for public interest advocacy in general. Many
existing organizations segregate their litigation staff from those
engaged in other forms of advocacy, and devote most of their
resources to formal adjudication. This study suggests the need to
rethink this division of labor.
Collaborative efforts among public and private lawyers will also
become more common and necessary for effective representation in
major corrections litigation and other areas of public interest law.
As cases become larger and more complex, few organizations will
have the resources, expertise, and inclination to handle major
corrections litigation on their own and still pursue a broader
strategy of institutional reform. As in other areas of public interest
law, corrections litigators are discovering the value of spreading the
load among groups of lawyers with different strengths and abilities.
A forthcoming article explores the various sectors of the legal
profession that have provided legal representation to inmates in
corrections litigation, with an eye toward facilitating the creation of
444
effective models of public interest advocacy.
The emerging emphasis on implementation also suggests the
need to rethink the form and character of litigation and lawyering.
The classic emphasis on courtroom advocacy and a formal adversarial process, although still important, does not respond to the
range of skills and processes required to provide effective advocacy.
As others have begun to recognize, litigation is being redefined to
include more collaborative processes, and advocates must face the
challenge of integrating litigation with other forms of advocacy.

4"

See Sturm, supra note 23.
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The singular focus in most law school clinics and classrooms on
traditional litigation skills and analysis fails to prepare future
lawyers to meet this challenge.
This Article uses the legacy of corrections litigation to discern
and guide its future. It underscores the importance of continued
litigation to maintain constitutional corrections litigation. Yet, it
signals the pitfalls of litigation and the limitations of traditional
adjudication as the sole or defining strategy for change. The
implementation model developed in this Article offers a workable
framework for corrections advocacy into the next century.

